

The Emergence and Consolidation of Opposition to Authoritarian Rule

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## **Abstract**

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This dissertation makes three arguments about the relationship between repression and mobilization in authoritarian regimes. First, repression is very unlikely to make all mobilization disappear completely, even public opposition. But systematic violent repression against specific targets forces them underground, and some actors are more capable than others of surviving those circumstances. A compartmentalized organizational structure and underground organizing skills make survival more likely when repression is most extreme. Second, public and nonviolent opposition is possible even against the most repressive regimes, as long as dissidents can rely on local protector institutions to reduce the cost of high-risk activism. Protector institutions are agents that the regime relies on for legitimacy and are willing to lend some safeguards to the opposition. Third, at the very local level and with narrow objectives, civil society can not only survive but also thrive under military dictatorships. These small and atomized efforts can, when there is a considerable reduction in state violence, transform into potent challenges against the state in the form of mass protests after a process of alliance formation.

The dissertation develops and examines these arguments at the subnational level in the case of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile from 1973 to 1990. It presents data from four original datasets based on tens of thousands of pages of archives from Chile and the United States, more than 50 interviews with the protagonists of the conflict conducted during eight months of fieldwork in Chile, and secondary literature. The datasets



contribute to our understanding of the 18-year period of Pinochet's rule at different levels of analysis. It triangulates data from different sources and overcomes important biases in the literature such as the focus on large movements, the assumption that the Catholic Church is a unitary actor, and the measurement of repression in a limited way.

Theoretically, the dissertation helps disentangle the punishment puzzle by lowering the level of aggregation with which it theorizes the dynamic relationship between repression and mobilization. The dissertation also contributes to scholarly understanding of the onset of nonviolent movements and the backfiring effect of state violence by explaining the conditions under which mobilization occurs following extreme repression. Finally, the dissertation contributes to the mobilization literature by theorizing on the survival and emergence of various types of organizing, as well as its antecedents, ranging from underground movements, armed groups, mixed-strategy campaigns, public and small-scale protests, and public large-scale mobilization.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction: The Punishment Puzzle

On the morning of September 11, 1973, the Chilean Armed Forces orchestrated a coup d'état that deposed democratically elected Socialist President Salvador Allende. The Navy occupied the Port of Valparaíso, and from there troops made their way to the capital. Allende's security guard GAP (*Grupo de Amigos Personales* or Group of Personal Friends) tried to protect the presidential palace and the president, but the rebelling forces soon overwhelmed them. From then on until 1990, Pinochet ruled with an iron fist in Chile for 18 years. Following the end of his rule, three truth and justice commissions convened to investigate Pinochet-era injustices—one in 1991, which focused on executions and disappearances, and two in 2005 and 2011, focusing on the victims of torture—and documented the disappearance of approximately 1,200 people, the execution of 2,300 individuals, as well as almost 40,000 cases of torture in prison (Rettig, 1991; Valech 2005, 2011).

In the days and months that followed the coup, the police and the Armed Forces detained, tortured, sexually abused, executed, and sometimes forcibly disappeared people suspected of having allegiance to leftist ideals. There was widespread collective and indiscriminate violence.<sup>1</sup> Government officials from Allende's political coalition (*Unidad Popular*), other leftist political parties and movements, labor unions, university student groups and teacher associations, grassroots organizations, and other leftist sympathizers faced these forms of repression, sometimes without distinction for their role. One year

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<sup>1</sup> Collective violence or collective targeting is when “groups of civilians are targeted based on a shared characteristic” (Steele, 2009). It is “distinct from being caught in the crossfire of battling armed groups” because the violence depends on a group's traits and the individual belonging to that group has a higher likelihood of being victimized because of their membership. In contrast, selective violence refers to when an individual is victimized because of their actions, such as supporting an armed group or participating in the opposition. Indiscriminate violence happens when the security forces do not discern who the target is, due to a lack of information or because of their use of certain weapons that do not discriminate, such as barrel bombs or a nuclear weapon (Kalyvas, 2006).



later, after the creation of the secret police, DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*), repression became less widespread, more selective, but still collectively based. Though Chileans would not see mass mobilization of the magnitude experienced during the democratic period until 1983, surprisingly, state repression did not completely demobilize the population.

In many ways, Chile exemplifies what Christian Davenport calls “the punishment puzzle” (Davenport, 2007). On the one hand, the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” stipulates that regimes always respond with coercion when challenged or threatened. On the other hand, scholars have found repression to have widely varying effects in many contexts. While in some situations we observe mass protests following extreme violence, such as in the aftermath of the Amritsar massacre in India in 1919, there are cases where crackdowns effectively kill mass mobilization, such as during the Iranian Green Movement in 2009 (Francisco, 2004; Harris, 2012). There are instances when violent repression has directly benefited an ongoing popular struggle, such as when televised violence against peaceful protesters generated more sympathy from whites and more commitment from African Americans during the U.S. civil rights movement (Morris, 1986). Movements have also proceeded without much change as a result of state repression, such as when, following the disappearance of the leader of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the weekly protest against disappearances took place the following Tuesday as scheduled (Mignone, 1991). This dissertation seeks to contribute to scholarly understanding of the punishment conundrum and other puzzling patterns of state repression and response. To that end, the dissertation will clarify the conditions

under which we observe dramatically different responses to state repression in the Chilean context.

The top targets of the Pinochet regime, namely leftist and ultra-leftist political movements such as the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party, began operating underground following the coup, albeit while paying a hefty human cost. At the same time, relatives of the victims of the repression, particularly those whose family members had been abducted and disappeared, started organizing in public in some localities, demanding answers about the whereabouts of their loved ones. In other words, state repression directly caused this popular mobilization, and it did so despite the fact that the relatives of the victims were also militants—or at the very least sympathizers—of political movements named the “internal enemy” and a “cancer” that must be “extirpated” (Barros, 2005; Fruhling, 1984; Huneeus, 2001). Further, contrary to what one would expect given the level of suppression, during the mid-1970s there was also a dramatic upsurge in the number of civil society organizations in Chile. Then in 1983, a series of mass protests at the national level swept the country until 1986, effectively challenging the military and leading to a plebiscite vote that ended the Pinochet dictatorship. Leftist political parties and unions played a crucial role in these mass demonstrations, despite the systematic repression against them for a decade.

These unexpected effects of state repression, and the presence of mobilization even in the unlikeliest moments of the dictatorship, do not discount the fact that state violence limits and shapes in a very significant way what citizens can do to resist and build opposition. In this vein, the dissertation explores three questions. First, under what

conditions can the top targets of a capable state improve their odds of survival? Second, under what conditions are we likely to observe mobilization as a consequence of violent repression? Third, what are the conditions under which mass public opposition emerges and consolidates in an authoritarian and repressive context?

This research finds that repression is very unlikely to completely eradicate all mobilization, even public opposition. But systematic violent repression against specific targets forces them underground, and some actors are more capable than others of surviving those circumstances. Repression sets the stage for future mobilization as well, not just many years later through experience with past selective repression (Finkel, 2015, 2017), but also immediately by mobilizing the relatives of the victims—and the victims themselves—under some conditions. At the very local level and with narrow objectives, civil society can not only survive but also thrive under military dictatorships. These small and atomized efforts can, under some conditions, transform into potent challenges against the state in the form of mass protests.

To answer the first question regarding the survival of the top targets of the regime, I find that a group's ideology, specifically how the group conceives of achieving power and establishing its political project, conditions the organizational structure and the skills of militants, and in turn their survival. The most ideologically extreme groups were the most resilient against repression, although they were persecuted even more fiercely than more moderate ones. The ultra-leftist belief that the "people's revolution" could only happen through popular insurrection meant that militants from those groups had prepared to go into hiding and had organized in partial secrecy before Pinochet reached power and high repression began. Compared to groups that were more moderate and focused solely

on public organizing on achieving power through electoral means and on making concessions with the opposition, the ultra-leftists were more equipped to survive the new environment of high repression with a cell structure and strict security measures to protect their members.

When does repression create new opposition that would not have otherwise existed? I find that repression causes new nonviolent and public opposition when potential dissidents are able to secure some level of protection from intermediary or “protector” institutions. Protector institutions are those that the government relies on for legitimacy and that are willing to lend some safeguards to the opposition. In this case, the Catholic Church, particularly the Vicariate of Solidarity, played this role for the relatives of victims. Communities that suffered high levels of repression but where the local parish was pro-Pinochet did not organize during the dictatorship. In localities that were similarly repressed but where the local priest, ideally the Bishop and Cardinal, supported the victims and their families, the relatives were able to organize public protests, hunger strikes, and other types of public demonstrations. This protector role enabled collective action not only among the relatives of victims, but also among unions that took their meetings away from their workplace and into local churches (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, January 1978).

Finally, under what conditions are we likely to observe the consolidation of a mass movement? I find that mass mobilization emerges through a process of alliance formation and that repression shapes the alliances that form in a very significant way. An alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations who cooperate to achieve their objectives, where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political, or

economic) associated with violating the agreement (Christia, 2012). For mass mobilization to occur, civil society organizations have to form alliances. There is not any single group in society, especially in a country under authoritarian rule, with the convening power to generate mass mobilization, except perhaps political parties, if they exist and are allowed to operate in public. Therefore, if they are to mobilize hundreds of thousands or millions of people, organizations have to build coalitions.

For any civil society group confronted with the choice to form or join an alliance with other opposition groups in an authoritarian regime, there are two main competing considerations. The first is reducing the probability of suffering violent repression, and the second is achieving political success. These priorities mean that each group wants to be part of a coalition that is large enough to win, but not so large—or threatening in another way—that it increases repression to unmanageable levels. By unmanageable levels of repression I mean frequent targeting of militants with executions and torture or forced disappearances. This level of repression forces opposition groups to operate underground, if they continue to organize at all. Therefore, organizations will be extremely unlikely to join coalitions with groups that suffer high levels of repression, except if a protector institution is part of the coalition, because it makes repression against them costlier for the state.

I study these questions at the subnational level for the Chilean context during the Pinochet dictatorship. This case study is ideal because of the dissertation's significant emphasis on measurement, as well as its specific questions about repression and its targets. The dissertation helps clarify the relationship between collective action and state violence. How can a dissident group have a relatively high rate of survival despite being

the number-one target of the secret police, as was the case for the MIR? Also, how can there be small public protests during the height of the repression, especially given what we know about large numbers reducing the likelihood of repression for the average protester (Kuran, 1989, 1997)? And finally, how did the mass movement in Chile consolidate after a decade of political violence? The targeting, forms, and frequency of the repression, as well as the coercive institutions of the state, varied during the 18 years of the Pinochet dictatorship. So did the efforts by the opposition to mobilize: there were small and failed attempts to mobilize, as well as large and effective challenges; there were nonviolent, armed, and mixed movements; there were ideological differences within the opposition; and there were new and old organizations, groups that transformed significantly during the dictatorship, and others that demobilized but later effectively regrouped. This variation provides considerable leverage to approach the series of questions that the puzzle of state repression motivates.

Furthermore, the case of Pinochet's Chile provides a wealth of data that allows for fine-grained analysis, from three national truth commissions; extensive archival materials from the opposition and some from the state, particularly those gathered at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights, the Vicariate of Solidarity, two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), CODEPU and FASIC; the National Archives in Santiago; and the Library of the Chilean National Congress. Scholars from Chile, Europe, and the United States have also produced outstanding secondary literature on this period of Chilean history. The dictatorial regime occurred recently enough that personal interviews with some of the protagonists have also been possible. In addition to relying on more than three dozen interviews with former dissidents and activists, politicians, religious leaders,

attorneys, journalists, and academics, which were conducted over the span of eight months of fieldwork in Chile, the dissertation's evidence comes from tens of thousands of pages of archives from various sources in Chile and from the U.S. National Security Archive in Washington, DC.

Each of the three substantive chapters of the dissertation (Chapters 2–4) addresses one of the above questions, drawing on four original datasets that measure repression and mobilization in different ways. Every chapter begins with a discussion of the relevant literature, followed by a detailed discussion of the theory. Then it delves into the dataset and considers the shortcomings of the data. Then the chapter proceeds with a presentation of the descriptive statistics and empirical findings, before offering evidence against alternative explanations.

Chapter 2 documents and accounts for the varying survival rates of the regime's top targets. It draws on a dataset at the individual level (Appendix A), which compiles the names of more than 9,000 individuals who were on Pinochet's kill lists. These are the lists of the "guerrilla forces" (*ejército guerrillero*) and "their sympathizers" that the head of the secret police DINA, Manuel Contreras, published in his book while in prison (Contreras Sepúlveda, 2000). Most individuals on these lists were leftist party militants, especially from MIR, the Communist Party, and Socialist Party, and Popular Unity government officials. I looked up every individual on the Contreras lists to code whether they were victimized during the dictatorship. The victimization data come from the three Chilean truth and justice commissions, as well as two NGOs that gathered information on victims, FASIC and CODEPU. The victimization lists allowed me to determine whether each individual on the kill lists was actually repressed, and if so, which form of violence

they endured. I was therefore able to show who were targeted and who among the targeted were victimized. To my knowledge, this is the first dataset for any regime that enables the comparison of the intended-to-repress population with the victimized population. It allows us to learn about the relative capacity of militant groups to curb that repression intended toward them.<sup>2</sup> Most studies on repression only measure the state violence that was carried out, which hinders our ability to fully understand the resilience and capacity that groups have to protect themselves from counterinsurgency campaigns.

Chapter 3 addresses the conditions for new mobilization as a consequence of repression, showing that extreme repression can backfire against the regime in the short term. It contains the analysis of two newer datasets to show that repression leads to new mobilization when there are protector institutions to lower the cost of high-risk activism. The second dataset in the dissertation (Appendix B) gathers information on the position of Catholic priests heading each congregation in the most populated state in Chile (the Metropolitan Region) vis-à-vis the regime's human rights violations and their overall support of Pinochet. Each congregation is geo-coded, as are the localities where the relatives of the victims of the regime organized publicly to advocate for their family members. This dataset allowed me to test the hypothesis that public mobilization is possible in an environment of very high repression provided that potential activists are given some level of protection, in this case from the Catholic Church. By including all the Catholic congregations in the state, the analysis avoids the bias that might otherwise emerge from examining only a few churches.

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<sup>2</sup> To my knowledge, the only other dataset that makes the intended-to-repress and repressed population comparison is Kalyvas and Kocher's (2007) study of the U.S. Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War. However, their data do not allow for comparisons of the relative capability of different groups, since the only opposition group studied is the Viet Cong.



The third dataset (Appendix C) seeks to expand this analysis to cover all of Chile, as well as to overcome some of the endogeneity problems that arise when studying the relationship between repression and mobilization. It contains the ideology of every bishop that served during the dictatorship, thereby representing the priests' political tendencies at each congregation. I rely on the fact that bishops have considerable power over the priests' assignment to the congregations in their dioceses and archdioceses, as well as substantial oversight of their activities. To analyze the effect of repression and the bishops' ideology on the emergence of mobilization by the relatives of victims, I leveraged the plausible as-if random assignment of bishops given their retirement at the age of 75. The instrumental variable makes the identification of the Catholic Church's effect on the likelihood of new mobilization more persuasive.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that as long as violent repression does not exceed a certain level, alliances between opposition groups can proliferate, leading to the consolidation of mass mobilization. It draws on a fourth dataset (Appendix D) that contains the universe of cases of opposition groups that existed during the dictatorship in the Metropolitan Region, the most populated state in Chile. "Opposition group" is very generally conceptualized in this dataset to include as many organizations as possible that challenged—even if modestly—the military junta. Banned political parties, unions, religious organizations, student groups, and others are included in the study because, as Johnston (2005) pointed out in, there has to be a rethinking from the idea that repression eliminates mobilization to the idea that repression is more likely to transform it (as cited in Davenport et al., 2005). This reconceptualization "compels one to look for mobilization and resistance in realms that are not frequently considered in existing

research: for example, the Boy Scouts, neighborhood associations, barber shops, parties, comic books, periodicals. These spaces are not just interesting in and of themselves, but they also create a context for subsequent mobilization: the gains from the previous time period set the stage for the next one, and so forth” (Davenport et al., 2005, pp. xxii–xxiii).

As a result of an effort to overcome the bias in most studies on social movements, of focusing solely on larger movements and those that are obviously political and anti-regime, the fourth dataset in this dissertation includes more than 1,400 opposition groups that existed in the Metropolitan Region any time between 1973 and 1989. A subsample of this these cases was fully coded at the group-year level, including the pattern of violence toward each opposition group, which improves one’s ability to test hypotheses on the factors that lead to the emergence and consolidation of mass mobilization (Gutiérrez Sanín & Wood, 2017). I selected the subsample using stratified random sampling without replacement, as well as in-depth qualitative knowledge of the cases. Detailed variables on nonviolent and violent repression at the group-year level, as well as on alliances, resources, international support, organizational structure, ideology, and others, were included in the dataset.

Prior to delving into the second chapter, on the survival of the top targets of the regime and how underground organizing works, I first provide a general overview of the pattern of repression in Chile and how the military junta operated and came to power.<sup>3</sup> This analysis serves as an important background for all subsequent chapters, and the discussion of specific patterns of repression and mobilization in each chapter. The

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<sup>3</sup> The Chilean Armed Forces have not declassified or turned in any documents for researchers to understand their modus operandi. However, three Chilean truth and reconciliation commissions, the trials of former security agents, victims’ testimonies, extensive work by historians and journalists, and the U.S. National Security Archive provide us with a decent understanding of how the military junta came to power, operated, and repressed the population.

ideology of the regime, as well as their conception of the internal enemy and their formulation of what constituted a threat to the military junta and Chile, are crucial to understand who was targeted, how, and how much. I identify four stages of repression during Pinochet's rule based on the pattern of political violence and secondary literature (Barros, 2005; Fruhling, 1984, 1985; Huneeus, 2001).

### **Repression and the Military Junta**

The coup of September 11, 1973, did not come as a surprise to most people, despite Chile's long democratic tradition. Widespread political and economic turmoil during the Allende administration even made centrists, the Catholic Church hierarchy in Chile, and a large proportion of the Chilean population (if not the majority), hope for a takeover by the Armed Forces and a quick transition to elections (Stern, 2006; Valenzuela, 1978). Inflation rates skyrocketed in the early 1970s, and there was a severe shortage of basic goods, as well as strong grievances from the upper classes given the accelerated land reform program and expropriations. Allende promised to deliver on the Socialist project and to carry Chile to a more equitable society through the "*via chilena*," peaceful and democratically (Stern, 2006). But the president found himself between extreme and sometimes violent left-wing radicals from the Socialist Party and MIR, who demanded quicker and more absolute change, and a virulent right that demonized the regime, including a right-wing paramilitary group *Patria y Libertad* (Altamirano, 1967; Huneeus, 2001). The destabilizing actions of the United States government—such as funding of opposition newspapers, support of massive strikes by the *gremios* (professional associations and unions, particularly bus drivers), financing of opposition

candidates, and intelligence sharing for the coup—emboldened and enabled the political right and the Armed Forces in Chile (Kornbluh, 2013).

The real shock to most Chileans was the cohesiveness with which the Armed Forces acted on September 11, the violence of the coup and its aftermath, and the protraction of the Armed Forces' retention of power (Stern, 2006; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1986). Leftists, including even the leadership of the Popular Unity government but especially MIR militants and extreme Socialists, believed that there were still enough officers and commanders in the military who were *constitucionalistas*, who would uphold their sworn constitutional duty to be subservient to the president elected by the people. The worst case scenario would be another failed coup, like the commonly known *tanquetazo* or *tancazo*, which took place in June 1973 and was successfully put down by Army Commander-in-Chief Carlos Prats. MIR militants and some Socialists hoped to join the military's constitutionalist forces, who would supply the arms and direction, to help maintain Allende in power after a few rebelling forces attempted another coup (Interviewee 22, November 2015 and April 2016, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 35, November 2015, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 53, April 2017, Santiago de Chile). What in fact happened on September 11, 1973, was an overwhelming show of force by a cohesive Armed Forces that faced little resistance beyond a few skirmishes in the presidential palace *La Moneda* by members of the GAP, in the *población* La Legua, and at the textile industry Sumar in Vicuña Mackena, also in Santiago (Garcés & Leiva, 2012). The Armed Forces were also able to take control of leftist strongholds in other regions like Concepción and Valparaíso with surprising ease (Huneus, 2001).

Within a few hours of the coup, the General Director of *Carabineros* (the police) and the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces formed the military junta: César Mendoza of *Carabineros*, José Toribio Merino of the Navy, Augusto Pinochet of the Army, and Gustavo Leigh Guzmán of the Air Force. This last member was the most violent in his speeches early on, famously saying that the first and most important priority of the junta was to “eradicate the Marxist cancer” and that they were “willing to fight against Marxism, willing to extirpate it regardless of the consequences” (Huneus, 2001, Kindle Locations 1742–1772, translated from Spanish to English by author). This speech was given in the context of General Leigh’s establishing himself as a force to be feared after ordering the bombardment of *La Moneda* with warplanes, which was inconceivable to Chileans up until that point. The military junta also emphasized from early on that they were confronting an internal enemy and that there was an internal war worthy of a counterinsurgency campaign, thus evoking the National Security Doctrine of the United States and Latin America during the Cold War (Comblín & Methol Ferré, 1979). The decree-law No. 5 of September 22, 1973, established a state of siege and a state of emergency, thus giving the military special powers to detain and court-martial people, as well as to significantly restrict personal liberties (Barros, 2005, p. 153). But how could Pinochet avoid losing public support for this coercive campaign if there was no visible resistance from the left and if the military junta had easily consolidated power throughout Chile within hours of the rebellion?

One of the main justifications the military junta used for this level of vitriol, widespread violence, and restrictions on the general population was Plan Z. The military junta announced its discovery of a plan, fabricated by the military itself, from the Popular

Unity government and extreme leftist elements to assassinate more than one thousand members of the economic and right-wing elite in Chile (Stern, 2006). In Plan Z, Allende was supposedly planning a power grab through a coup (*auto-golpe*) and had lists of people designated for execution to end with their detractors. The military junta built a massive propaganda campaign around Plan Z, making sure that it would carry all over Chile with specifics from each locality to augment its credibility. Indeed, as historian Steve J. Stern writes, “[a]s the shock of Plan Z gained cultural and political traction, the mutating idea of an essentially democratic Chile, able to rely on a soft repressive interim, could begin to give way” (Stern, 2006, p. 50). The possibility that leftists could carry out this plan, combined with the real acrimony against Allende during his administration, was all the Armed Forces needed to maintain legitimacy in the face of such assaults against individual liberty.

Though most news bits associated with Plan Z that the pro-military junta press published after the coup were patently false, extreme leftists ironically fueled the propaganda machine by exaggerating their capacity for armed struggle (Stern, 2006). Political movements like the MIR and the armed wing of the Socialist Party had an incentive to overstate their preparation for armed conflict, as well as their stockpiles before the coup. These “verbal excesses” from the leadership of the more revolutionary leftist movements promoted their status and possibly increased their recruits, but it was also fuel to the propaganda fire that allowed the military junta to wage an unrelenting campaign against them once they secured control of the country (Barros, 2005, p. 155).

In order to carry out this counterinsurgency campaign against leftists and their sympathizers, the Armed Forces needed a centralized way of gathering intelligence.

DINA, or the National Intelligence Directorate (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*), became the secret police of the military junta, but it is more accurately described as the secret police of Army General Augusto Pinochet. This organization started operating informally from day one, though it was not formally constituted until November 1973, and it began legally operating in June 1974. DINA comprised army majors and colonels, who quickly supplanted the intelligence agencies of the various branches of the military: the Army's DINE, the Air Force's SIFA, and the Navy's SIN (Barros, 2006). Lieutenant colonel of the Army, Manuel Contreras, became the head of DINA and reported directly to Pinochet (Barros, 2006; Kornbluh 2013). DINA then became the main agency leading the counterinsurgency effort against leftists in the country and recruited from all the branches of the Armed Forces. Designed with the Brazilian Intelligence Services from the Armed Forces in mind, it trained its agents in methods of torture and infiltration (Huneus, 2001, Kindle Locations 1849–1854).

DINA is believed to have helped Pinochet consolidate power within the military junta, to the chagrin of the other commanders. Initially the idea was that the commanders-in-chief would share the main leadership position by rotating the presidency of the junta. But Pinochet was able to secure the post and give DINA free rein. DINA is mainly responsible for the level of brutality at detention centers, the systematic abduction and disappearance of leftist militants, and violent episodes like the Caravan of Death. This last one occurred outside of the Metropolitan Region, when a death squad traversed the territory from north to south, torturing and executing leftists from September 30 to October 22, 1973 (Rettig, 1991). At the order of Pinochet, Army Brigadier General Arellano Stark led the death squad. They took political prisoners in the northern city of

Antofagasta, for example, who had been previously sentenced to 60 days in detention, and executed them, disposing their bodies in unmarked mass graves. Many of these individuals are to this day considered detained-disappeared because some bodies were also thrown in the sea and never found (Huneus, 2001). This incident is one of the prime examples of how Pinochet was able to act outside of the scheme set out by the Armed Forces and acted without regard for the local police and the order imposed in the provinces outside of the Metropolitan Region. In fact, the Caravan of Death, as well as other behavior by DINA and Pinochet that fell outside of what the rest of the military junta apparently wanted—such as the assassination of General Prats in Argentina in 1974 after his voluntary exile following the coup, the attempted assassination in 1975 of former Christian Democratic Vice President Bernardo Leighton in Rome, and the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington, DC—led to infighting among the commanders-in-chief.

In 1974, the Armed Forces created another agency independent of DINA, *Comando Conjunto* (Joint Command), composed primarily of members of the Air Force and *Carabineros*, as well as militants of the extreme right and leftists who had turned after torture (Rettig, 1991).<sup>4</sup> The new agency also specialized in the counterinsurgency against leftists and their sympathizers and largely competed with DINA, though they had a division of labor.<sup>5</sup> In particular, they focused on exterminating the Communist Party, while DINA tended to focus more on MIR and the Socialist Party (Spooner, 1994, p. 120). The other branches of the Armed Forces also removed their officers from DINA in order to signal their disapproval. However, this probably had the unintended consequence

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/comando\\_conjunto.htm](http://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/comando_conjunto.htm).

<sup>5</sup> There is also evidence that *Comando Conjunto* worked with DINA in some instances (see Memoria Viva's article in Footnote 4).



of radicalizing DINA even more (Huneus, 2001, Kindle Locations 1934–1936). In 1978, Pinochet further consolidated power when he and the other members of the junta removed General Leigh. By that time, CNI (*Central Nacional de Informaciones*) replaced DINA as the main secret police in response to pressure from the United States after the assassination of Orlando Letelier and from the unrelenting protests by the families of the disappeared. By 1980 there was a new Constitution, heavily influenced by Pinochet but also a reflection of the internal negotiations and power struggles among junta members (Barros, 2006). In 1981 Pinochet became President of the Republic, and Merino of the Navy became president of the military junta.

Some of these changes, particularly the 1980 Constitution, are also attributable to the military junta's concern for their international standing and their adherence to legality. The international community—particularly the United States, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and the international Catholic leadership—were all condemning the military junta's human rights record and were isolating Chile as a result. Abundant evidence suggests that the military junta wanted to extinguish international criticism and the domestic opposition that was also building up by 1975 (Cruz Roja, 1975). On several occasions the United States even threatened to stop exporting arms to Chile and to impose economic sanctions if it did not improve its human rights record (Vicariate of Solidarity, 1977) (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1976). The United States also successfully exerted pressure so that Chile would extradite Michael Townley, accused of working with DINA to orchestrate the assassination of Letelier near the White House (Kornbluh, 2013).

This brief chronology allows us to identify different patterns of repression during the 18-year dictatorship, which can be classified into four chronological phases of repression (Rettig, 1991; Fruhling, 1984; Vicariate of Solidarity, 1977). Each of the following three chapters contains more details about the specific pattern of violence in the relevant part of the punishment puzzle at hand.

### **First Phase of Repression: September 11, 1973–June 1974**

The first phase of repression is characterized by collective and indiscriminate violence, including mass detentions, torture, executions, forced disappearances, and large-scale raids in factories, homes, and poor communities. The military also occupied the streets of main cities in the context of a curfew, the state of emergency, and the state of siege. While the main target of the violence were leftists and members of the deposed Popular Unity government, the repression often did not discriminate by rank or political importance of the individual. Also affected were people who were simply “in the wrong place at the wrong time” or those who violated curfew even if they had not been engaging in political actions. Despite the apparent disorganization and generalized coercion, the military junta was not operating in a legal void. Indeed, the state of war was declared, granting “military authorities absolute jurisdiction over all crimes which infringed on the National Interior Security Law or the Code of Military Justice” (Fruhling, 1984, p. 353). The country’s state of internal war also gave the military junta the ability to court-martial individuals, making it the first clear sign of espousing the National Security Doctrine (Fruhling, 1984).

The objective of the repression was primarily to consolidate power following the coup by shocking and overwhelming the opposition, as well as to neutralize leftists and

their political movements. Comprised in the security forces enforcing the repression were all the branches of the Armed Forces, the police (*Carabineros*), and an informal agency that would become DINA were operating throughout Chile, and this slew of myriad agencies involved in the crackdown resulted in coordination problems (Fruhling 1984; Rettig 1991). There was also a “large and visible civilian” participation in the repressive process, as the military junta called on the citizenry to denounce leftists and inform on their neighbors. Toward the end of this period, the target of oppression narrowed to primarily the MIR, especially targeted by DINA (Barros, 2006; Rettig, 1991; Stern, 2006).

### **Second Phase of Repression: July 1974–1978**

The second phase of repression was characterized by an increase in the selectivity of targets. There was also collective violence in the sense that leftist party militants were deemed dangerous regardless of their current political activities—past associations were reason enough for detention or worse. A significant decrease in indiscriminate violence also characterized this period, as well as the centralization of the anti-leftist campaign to DINA as the main security agency in charge of gathering intelligence, identifying the enemy, and neutralizing them. In response to legal appeals by the religious community—led mainly by COPACHI (*Comité Pro Paz*), founded in 1973 and FASIC (*Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas*), founded in 1975—as well as by the relatives of the disappeared, repression became far more secretive (Fruhling, 1984, p. 352). Instead of detaining people during the day and in their homes or workplaces, DINA developed the practice of abducting people, agents not in uniform, on the street without witnesses who would know the victim. The percentage of those detained with witnesses dropped

dramatically, from 92% in May 1976 to a mere eight percent in November of the same year (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1976). The military was less visibly present and repression not as obvious, which—combined with press censure—led to a reduction in the appearance that the Armed Forces were waging an internal war.

Various forms of repression continued, including detentions, torture, sexual violence, executions, and disappearances. The raids, the state of emergency and siege, and curfews were also ubiquitous and affected virtually all Chileans. The main targets during this period were the political parties and movements of the left, particularly the MIR, the Socialist Party of Chile, and the Communist Party of Chile. These organizations were “attacked one after the other according to the level of political and military threat that the Armed Forces perceived them to be” (Barros, 2006, p. 162, translated from Spanish to English by author). The oppression came first to MIR, from 1974 to 1975, and then to the Socialist Party in 1975, followed by the Communist Party in 1976. The objective was to completely dismantle and destroy these organizations and to prevent them from re-emerging.

In addition to DINA’s role in the counterinsurgency campaign, the *Comando Conjunto* also became prominent starting in 1975 (Barros, 2006, p. 162). As mentioned earlier, *Comando Conjunto* was focused more on the Communist Party and employed the same forms of repression as DINA, including torture, executions, and disappearances. In addition, during this period the courts continued to play an important role in helping the military junta conduct its repressive campaign with legitimacy by rejecting all the habeas corpus that the Vicariate of Solidarity sent around the cases of the disappeared. The

regime's framework of legality was thus upheld, thus implicating the justice system as a clear accomplice in the crimes against humanity committed during this period (Rettig, 1991).

Internationally, Pinochet seemed to defy the pressure, such as by canceling a trip by UN observers. His defiance led to an increase in the difficulty of the regime to obtain credit from multilateral organizations, renegotiate external debt, and obtain bilateral credits (Barros, 2006, p. 193). In addition to the international community making the cost of repression clear, internally Pinochet realized that political violence was also costly for his most ardent supporters. For example, General Leigh warned that Chile was going to receive a severe blowback for the list published in the press in July 1975 of 119 MIR militants killed abroad (*la lista de los 119*) (Barros, 2006, p. 194). The excesses of the counterinsurgency campaign were thus starting to take a toll on the internal cohesion of the military junta, as well as on the legitimacy of the regime abroad and in the eyes of the Chilean people. As a consequence, the military junta replaced DINA with an agency with fewer powers, the National Information Center (*Central Nacional de Informaciones*, hereinafter CNI). According to decree-law 1009, the CNI did not generally have the legal authority to detain people. If they needed to "preventively detain" someone during curfew, they were obligated to inform family members of their detention within 48 hours (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, August 1977). Despite these legal restrictions, however, in practice the CNI still conducted prolonged detentions without warrants in secret localities, torture, and executions. The most important difference between the CNI and DINA was that the former ended the practice of forced disappearances and that Manuel Contreras was no longer at the helm.

### **Third Phase of Repression: 1979–1983**

The third phase was characterized by repression as a deterrent and a policy of “containment,” coupled by a dramatic reduction in detentions and executions. It was about containing the mobilization of the opposition rather than of destroying the left. The CNI responded to the opposition’s organization rather than to the mere existence of leftists, thus ending collective repression. There were no forced disappearances during this period, the state of siege ended, and the state of emergency continued. The sharp drop in detentions and executions is attributed to domestic and international pressure that was threatening to destabilize and delegitimize the regime (Fruhling, 1984; Rettig, 1991). However, torture in detention was extremely common. The repressive apparatus reacted quickly and decisively when confronted with any armed action and public demonstrations of discontent by labor unions (Fruhling, 1984, p. 366).

There was also a dramatic increase in legal repression during this period. For example, the new Labor Law severely curtailed the rights of unions, restricting the duration of strikes and controlling manners of collective bargaining. The military junta also weakened professional associations by enacting a law that deprived them of legal authority over their members and opening competition of associations within the same profession to incite divisions (Fruhling, 1984, p. 368). At the same time, the Catholic Church became bolder in denouncing human rights violations, the association of relatives of the disappeared engaged in more confrontational actions, and the press was more open to printing negative coverage of the junta. These events happened when the bodies of disappeared individuals were discovered in Lonquén, a southern rural town in the

Metropolitan Region, after a survivor told the Vicariate of Solidarity about the incident (Fruhling, 1984, p. 369).

#### **Fourth Phase of Repression: 1983–1989**

Finally, the last phase of repression occurred during the mass national protests that swept the country and the emergence of a powerful armed organization linked to the Communist Party, the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR). This period was characterized by a dramatic increase in the number of detentions given mass public actions, the execution of some protesters, and a very violent response to the FPMR. Disappearances emerged as a form of repression again, though this time against FPMR soldiers and particularly after the assassination attempt of Pinochet in 1986. Detentions of protesters, however, were not prolonged, though torture was still systematically practiced. The objective of the repression in this period was to neutralize mass public actions in defiance of the regime and to bring order to the country once more. The security agency in charge of the repression during this period was the CNI and increasingly, given street actions, *Carabineros*.

Having described how the military junta consolidated power in a summary of the phases of repression during the dictatorship, the next chapter delves into the first of the substantive analyses, examining the question of survival among the top targets of a capable and repressive regime.

## Chapter 2. Explaining the Survival of Top Targets

In the months and years immediately after the coup of September 11, 1973, intense repression descended upon government officials from Allende's political coalition party Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular* or UP), other leftist political parties and movements, labor unions, university student groups and teacher associations, grassroots organizations, and other leftist sympathizers. But there was a major difference in how the regime targeted leftist political parties and the rest of the opposition. The military junta subjected leftist party militants, especially those from the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), the Communist Party (PC), and the Socialist Party (PS), to high levels of selective and collective violent repression. Hundreds of militants from each of these movements perished, suffering detention and torture. The secret police DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*) often abducted and disappeared their victims. This pattern of repression forced the organizations underground, though many militants left the country in self-exile. Survival and resilience in clandestinity varied, however. As the data presented in the chapter demonstrate, the MIR was among DINA's top targets (Rettig, 1991), and it nonetheless had a much lower rate of victimization than other leftist political movements.

This chapter thus asks: in highly repressive and capable states, why do some opposition groups have a higher rate of survival than others facing a similar pattern of violence? Why are some dissidents better at surviving selective and collective repression than others? Using an original dataset comparing the regime's intended-to-repress population with the actual victims of the dictatorship, the chapter evaluates the differing rates of survival among the main targets of the regime. The dataset, "Targets and Victims



of Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1989" (Appendix A), includes more than 7,000 individuals in the government's kill lists, their affiliation to political opposition groups, and indicators for whether they were in fact a victim of the repression according to the three Chilean truth and justice commissions. The types of victimization during the 18-year Pinochet dictatorship ranged from torture, execution, disappearance, or forcible displacement. Victims on the kill list also could have suffered a combination of these forms of repression (e.g., tortured and then disappeared). The analysis thus compares intended repression with actual repression throughout Chile during Pinochet's tenure to estimate the probability that an individual on the hit list was victimized given their membership to a particular opposition group. This comparison is one way to estimate the effectiveness of the opposition group's self-defense against persecution.

The main finding of the chapter is that the militants of the MIR, despite being one of the most ideologically extreme groups and was likely thus subjected to more determined oppression than the other top targets, had a far higher survival rate than those in the other major opposition groups. By leveraging extensive archival documents from the three main political movements—MIR, PS, and PC—as well as interviews with former militants from those groups, the chapter demonstrates that this organizational feat by the MIR is attributable to their compartmentalized organizational structure and their capacity for underground organizing (UO). These two characteristics are in turn attributable to their ideology. The MIR's ideology is based on a vision of Chile as a socialist utopia, which could only be attained through popular insurrection. The leadership considered concessions to the right, and even with centrists, to be anathema. Though they had mainly engaged in electoral politics and peaceful actions since their

founding in 1965, MIR militants were also preparing for what they viewed was an inevitable revolutionary struggle to root out the most entrenched elements of the oligarchy. Given their view that the right would never willingly give up their wealth or power, revolution was the only way to implement MIR's goals for Chile.

This philosophy led to two important organizational decisions, which characterized the group since its inception. First, the MIR developed an organizational structure similar to other Marxist revolutionary organizations, with a compartmentalized cell structure, safe houses, and parallel cadres prepared to take over if the leadership fell. Second, the MIR trained its militants in underground organizing and imparted skills such as detection avoidance. It is important to note that while an armed strategy is inextricably linked to MIR's revolutionary ideals, the aspect of the ideology that matters for survival against high selective and collective repression does not have to do with armed action per se. Secrecy, compartmentalization, and ability to avoid detection are skills that could theoretically be imparted to militants of nonviolent groups. We often observe an empirical correlation between armed groups and this organizational form given the strong tradition of revolutionary Marxist movements, as well as the fact that armed action against capable states always occurs in clandestinity. There are examples of unarmed underground organizing in Chile's history and beyond. The Communist Party of Chile in the 1940s and the 1950s did not engage in armed struggle, nor during the Pinochet dictatorship, until they developed an armed wing with the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR) in 1985. Outside of Chile, the Gülen movement in Turkey is a mainly nonviolent organization that also has a compartmentalized organizational structure (Aras & Caha, 2000).

The Communist Party, Socialist Party, and Allende' UP coalition, which also featured prominently in the regime's kill lists, fared worse than the MIR in the survival rate of militants. These political parties did not perceive armed insurrection as a necessary step in building their vision of Chile, with the exception of a more extremist and armed wing of the Socialist Party called CNR (*Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales*). They viewed electoral politics and nonviolent action as the only option, particularly during Chile's long history of democracy before the coup. Therefore, far from training its militants in underground organizing, and devising a compartmentalized and alternative organizational structure, these groups trained traditional democratic political operatives—militants engaged in public, electoral, and institutional processes who made concessions to their opponents on a daily basis.

After showing that the differences in ideology and organizational structure between opposition groups correlate with their differing rates of survival with the large-N data, the chapter then discusses the plausibility of alternative explanations. It shows that factors such as the size of the group, resources, the possibility of going into exile, and the level of determination by the security apparatus cannot explain the MIR's relatively high rate of survival. The chapter also explores the possibility that the demographics of the militants, as well as the temporal variation in repression, may explain the observed pattern of survival. Finally, embeddedness in the local community, though important for survival, cannot explain the observed difference in survival, as the three main opposition groups on the target lists all had deep ties to the population. Given that the regime never succeeded in completely eliminating the main opposition groups on the target lists, the

study is consistent with the idea that local embeddedness and community support are also important factors in explaining group resilience.

### **Surviving High Levels of Repression**

Despite extensive research on government repression and counterinsurgency campaigns, there is little agreement on why the state sometimes succeeds in appeasing the opponent but fails at other times. State-led violence, infiltration, and intelligence work can lead to the elimination of opposition groups being (Aminzade et al., 2001; Davenport, 2014; Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; Tarrow 1998), but at other times dissidents are able to fend off the blows and even remain resilient (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Finkel, 2015, 2017; Loveman, 1998). Progress in this field of research has partly been hampered by the difficulty of the selection problem that we face when studying repression, namely, that we observe only the repression that is carried out, not the one that was avoided or prevented (potentially) due to the skills and organizational structure of an opposition group.<sup>1</sup>

Existing research has emphasized the importance of resources for organizational resilience, be they material, human, or social. Counterintuitively, rebel groups that have plentiful economic resources tend to perform poorly because they attract opportunists (Weinstein, 2006). Groups unable to provide these material incentives draw on social, ideological, and ethnic ties, which tap into nonmaterial interests, and these attract the most committed militants. During times of pressure, which is the case during

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<sup>1</sup> One exception is the work by Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) on the Vietcong, in which they compared the targets of U.S. Operation Phoenix to those who were captured. They showed that confirmed Vietcong fighters were more likely to survive than those who were unconfirmed Vietcong fighters. Rather than comparing opposition groups and their relative ability to survive, however, the author's objective in this chapter is to challenge the assumption that participation in rebel groups is always very costly. The idea is that some rebel organizations can provide private incentives to participants—in this case physical protection—thus lessening the collective action problem of free riding.

counterinsurgency campaigns, a lack of devotion to the cause can lead an organization to buckle because militants do not have the discipline, are more willing to flee, and possess weaker ties to the community. This explanation of organizational success considers leadership, skills, and ideology to be endogenous to resources (Weinstein, 2006, p. 21). Though the quality of militants is essential for group resilience, as well as avoiding adverse selection in recruitment, the distribution of resources does not explain the pattern of organizational survival in many cases. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Chile, though having far more resources than the MIR, effectively recruited people who were highly committed and ideologically aligned to their respective organizations (Interviewee 44, May 2016, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 25, May 2016, Santiago de Chile; Alvarez, 2011; MIR, 1965).

Networks and local embeddedness are also important explanations for organizational resilience and cohesion (Lewis, 2013, 2017; Parkinson, 2013; Petersen, 2001; Staniland, 2014). Parkinson (2013) argued that overlapping formal and familial connections are key to successful clandestine organizing. It is unclear, though, why some groups have such networks and display these skills, while others do not. Parkinson suggested that repression and the form of local embeddedness shape the formation of these networks and capacities—high collective repression, which the Israeli Defense Force waged against deeply embedded Palestinians, led to the emergence of clandestine formal and informal overlapping networks. The MIR, PS, and PC, however, were all subjected to high collective repression, and though they all attempted to organize

underground once they experienced the extent of the repression,<sup>2</sup> some were more successful than others in avoiding victimization.

Similarly, in explaining how rebel groups in Uganda were able to transition from onset to sustained mobilization, Lewis (2013, 2017) argued that the most important factor is avoiding government detection until the insurgency is able to withstand repression. Groups that worked through (ethnically) homogenous networks were able to maintain secrecy and enjoy a higher level of security than those that did not have deep ties to the communities in which they were based. Local networks and social embeddedness are not only crucial for survival but also to ensure growth and sustained mobilization. Indeed, locals are also the most important source of recruits for incipient rebel organizations. Even though Lewis (2013, 2017) did not argue that the networks have to be ethnically based, it is not clear if the same protection holds in contexts where ethnicity is not as salient.

In Chile's urban centers, poor working-class neighborhoods (*poblaciones*) were known, prior to the coup, for being aligned to particular political movements (Schneider, 1995).<sup>3</sup> These communities were practically under military occupation for much of the dictatorship; therefore, it was not a matter of groups avoiding detection from a weak state. The intelligence agencies had considerable information about the opposition groups they wanted to neutralize, though individuals within these organizations sought to avoid detection to save their lives and continue the resistance. Instead of emphasizing the role of ethnicity without minimizing the role of close-knit communities, the chapter argues

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<sup>2</sup> Perhaps with the exception of very low-level operatives, such as students in non-leadership roles, every former militant I interviewed from the MIR, PS, and PC had either tried to go underground or to go into exile. They perceived the situation after the coup as not allowing for any other option.

<sup>3</sup> For example, La Victoria is a *población* (poor working-class neighborhood) in the southern part of Santiago that is known for having strong ties to the Communist Party (Schneider, 1995).

that detection avoidance, especially from a highly capable state, requires a certain organizational structure and skills, which can be derived from the group's ideology.

Staniland (2012, 2014) showed that whereas armed groups with weak ties to local communities are prone to fragmentation and collapse, those with strong vertical and horizontal ties build resilient and cohesive internal structures based on trust, shared norms, and worldviews. These ties connect dissident leaders to one another and to the communities on which they rely for support. Though pre-existing communal ties could well account for the fact that the three main targets of the Pinochet regime were never eliminated,<sup>4</sup> there is little variation in these ties across the main organizations targeted. The Socialist Party, Communist Party, and the MIR were deeply embedded in working-class neighborhoods, unions, and the student population, making this argument insufficient for explaining differences between their victimization rates (Garcés & Leiva, 2012, pp. 18–20).

Another way in which local embeddedness and networks are important for high-risk collective action is through status rewards and sanctions, as well as community-level references about risk and norms of reciprocity (Petersen, 2001; Wood, 2003). Rather than explaining individual participation or degrees of collaboration, this chapter seeks to uncover the reasons some dissidents, once they are already engaged in high-risk activism, succeed in avoiding repression. Networks and local embeddedness nonetheless connect to my argument about the capacity for underground organizing and organizational structure

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<sup>4</sup> I would argue that the sheer size of these political movements also contributed to the difficulty of rooting them out completely from Chilean society. The Communist Party reached 200,000 members at its peak (Alvarez, 2011), the MIR was in the tens of thousands (Garcés & Leiva, 2005), and the Socialist Party had more than 100,000 militants (Jobet, 1987).

in that even particularly skilled militants would probably not get very far without communities on which to rely for support and their survival.

The chapter builds on theories that emphasize the skills of militants to explain survival and resilience. Finkel (2015, 2017) argued that sustaining resistance requires skillful rebel leaders, and these skills are acquired through past personal experience with selective repression. Instead of past experience with selective repression, Schneider (1995) argued, the Communist Party developed communities' capacity for organizing, which explains the level of mobilization and resilience of some neighborhoods in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship. Davenport's (2014) theory about demobilization is also essentially making an argument about skilled organizers, showing that failed groups are unable to vet members to avoid infiltration, build trust inside the group, or develop the capacity to predict and prepare for government repression. For Davenport (2014), dissidents can experiment with different aspects of their organization—the level of radicalism they embrace in terms of objectives, the clarity of their goals, their level of openness, and their hierarchical nature—to strike the “right balance”<sup>5</sup> that boosts trust and avoids demobilization.

These works leave a few questions unanswered. First, it is not clear at what level skills are needed for Finkel's theory to work: is it just the leadership or the rank-and-file

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<sup>5</sup> The way Davenport arrived at this conclusion starts by outlining the main external and internal challenges of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs). The most important variables external to the dissident group are resource deprivation, problem depletion, and repression. The main internal factors at play are factionalization, exhaustion, loss of commitment for the group, departure of members, and rigidity. Davenport cross-tabulated these internal and external factors on two axes to illustrate how they can occur simultaneously to create a mutually reinforcing trap for movements. For example, “deprivation may provoke . . . exhaustion as dissidents grow weary of having to go from door to door and fund-raiser to fund-raiser in pursuit of support” (Davenport, 2014, p. 39). Thus, striking the right balance means avoiding these self-reinforcing traps by being able to predict repression and to guard against infiltration, which generates trust.



that has to be skilled? Can skilled leaders transfer their knowledge to the other members of the organization, or is it only personal experience with past repression that creates skilled dissidents? The narrative from the cases of Jewish resistance in ghettos during World War II suggests that one or two leaders are single-handedly saving the organization from Nazi capture and elimination. Second, it is unclear whether past experience with selective repression develops through learning or a natural selection mechanism. Those who survive past selective repression may naturally be more equipped for underground work, in which case the skills may not be transferable.

This chapter argues that skills are transferable, that they need not emerge from personal experience with selective repression, and that it is not sufficient for only leaders to be skilled, at least in the case of large political movements. Both the Communist Party and the MIR in Chile had some experience with selective repression before the 1973 coup, though in the case of the PC the period of repression was from 1948 to 1958, 15 years before Pinochet's coup (Corvalán, 1997, pp. 190–191). MIR militants had been arrested more recently (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) in response to political assassinations and robberies they committed, though these crackdowns did not force the group to start operating underground in an organized and disciplined way.<sup>6</sup> In addition, none of these groups faced the high level of repression they would later endure during the Pinochet dictatorship, which means that strategies that might have been used in the past

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<sup>6</sup> In fact, as I show in the data discussion, even before the coup Pinochet and the military had lists of MIR, PS, and PC militants. During the democratic period, these political movements were open and operating in public, making this kind of intelligence work easier. Some MIR and PS militants did operate in semi-clandestinity during the democratic period that preceded Pinochet's coup. I interviewed two of those militants, and they were neither on the regime's kills lists nor the victimized lists. While none of these groups had a clandestine operation in the decade preceding the coup, the MIR and a faction of the SP had some semi-clandestine militants. Personal interviews with leaders of these groups suggest that many more MIR militants than SP militants were operating in semi-clandestinity during the years preceding Pinochet's coup.

proved effective in confronting this new government. For example, one of the CP militants I interviewed explained that the safe house became obsolete when security forces started arresting family members, including children, and threatening to torture them unless the militant turned himself in.<sup>7</sup>

It is also not clear why and how some groups were able to achieve the right balance in political objectives, organizational structure, and level of openness, while others could not. The factors that Davenport (2014) identified as being crucial to prevent organizational failure—namely the level of radicalism, openness, goal clarity, and hierarchy—are all double-edged swords. For example, more extreme objectives lead to more government repression, but they can also generate more intra-group trust. The effect of radicalism on organizational success is thus indeterminate. Since the analysis relies only on one (negative) case, the Republic of New Africa (NRA) in the United States, which the FBI successfully infiltrated and demobilized, it is not possible to systematically compare the differences between groups that overcame these challenges with those that did not. Further, while opposition groups in Chile adapted to repression in various ways,<sup>8</sup> major transformations are rare and difficult, sometimes leading to splits in the organization. For a political movement like the MIR, which had thousands of highly committed militants, it would have been extremely difficult to make their ideology, political objectives, and strategy more moderate, as these were the aspects of the organization that attracted their most loyal participants. In fact, the MIR often accused the PC and the PS for being “reformists, traditionalists, and bourgeois” (Corvalán, 1997,

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<sup>7</sup> Interview with Respondent 13, March 2016, Santiago.

<sup>8</sup> For example, militants from all of these opposition groups went underground and tried to develop secret structures. In addition, ten years into the dictatorship the Communist Party decided, after decades of advocating for a purely nonviolent strategy and participating in electoral politics, to create an armed wing.

p. 105). As Sanín and Wood (2014) argued, ideology often constrains groups' strategic choices for normative reasons.

Schneider's theory about the Communist Party's building organizing capacity in Santiago's working-class neighborhoods, which were then able to mobilize against the Pinochet dictatorship, raises questions about the role of labor unions and other actors with high capacity for organization. Even though labor unions were among the most organized and powerful institutions in Chile for decades before the military coup, they played a relatively weaker role in the resistance against Pinochet because repression was extremely effective against their type of organizing (Bongcam, 1984; Gaudichaud, 2004). Union leaders were quickly laid off, imprisoned or worse, and then replaced with Pinochet supporters. Others were co-opted. Factory managers surveilled union activities closely and neutralized any deviation from strictly apolitical organizing. At a minimum, being an agitator meant becoming unemployed, which would often lead to the breadwinner's children going hungry (Interviewee 30, April 2017, Santiago de Chile). Thus, the workplace became a vulnerable and ineffective locus of organization during the dictatorship. Instead, labor unionists who were still active usually organized in churches rather than in the workplace, which drastically reduced their number of followers. For these reasons, this chapter argues that a general capacity for organization, such as the one that unions had, is not sufficient to confront high levels of collective violence. Specific skills in underground organizing are necessary to survive and continue operating in the most difficult circumstances.

## **A Theory of Underground Organizing**

The most important organizational concerns for primarily nonviolent political movements and parties operating against a capable secret police in an urban setting are avoiding capture; not losing militants or collaborators to fear, imprisonment, or death; and continuing the organization's operations. Capture is extremely damaging to the organization for many reasons, not least because militants undergoing torture or threats of torture for their family members, may give up information that lead to even more arrests. Militants giving up information about their fellow militants, or even the belief that this is happening (it is difficult to distinguish rumors from facts in these situations), erodes trust, which is of fundamental importance for underground survival and for cell activity to continue. Infiltrations and collaborators are most toxic for the social fabric of these types of organizations, as their survival depends on trusting their militants and allies. Beyond self-preservation, continuing the political work of the party requires militants to transition the organization to clandestinity and therefore to significantly restrict activities.

Instead of public assemblies, openly recruiting and spreading their message in schools and university campuses, and running for local elections, a clandestine opposition group meets in secrecy with small numbers of militants, prints pamphlets in secret places and hands them out at night, conducts quick public actions that send the message that they are still present, and do intelligence work to protect themselves and their peers from repression.

### **Organizational Structure and Skills**

Given these strategic challenges for the opposition group, the chapter argues that an organizational structure based on compartmentalization is vastly superior to more

open and connected forms of organization. This form of organizing consists of militants being placed in small cells of three to four individuals, and the cells are usually organized hierarchically in a pyramid form. The higher the rank, the fewer cells there are and the closer the ties are to the leadership. At the top is the main leader of the group along with his closest confidants. Ideally, individuals in different cells do not know anything about each other. Communication between parallel cells is nonexistent, and communication between higher-ranking and lower-ranking cells is very limited. One or two individuals from a higher ranking cell serve as liaison to a lower cell to pass along intelligence, obtain information about what is happening on the ground, and inform the group about upcoming actions. The idea behind compartmentalization is to significantly reduce the cost of repression in settings where the secret police is highly capable and where hiding in remote areas is not feasible.<sup>9</sup> The assumption is that some level of infiltration by the state is inevitable, and as a consequence, people will get captured and tortured and will give out information. A compartmentalized organization mitigates the effects of these security breaches of opposition groups by the state.

There are also skills that militants can leverage to survive, continue their political work, protect their peers, and effectively put this organizational structure into action. The group's organizational structure and the underground organizing skills of its militants are the main explanatory variables of this study. These variables are highly intertwined, which is why they are treated here as a bundle. For example, in an opposition group that is structured in cells and has a high degree of compartmentalization, the only line of

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<sup>9</sup> There are many reasons political movements and parties in Chile did not set up camp in remote areas of the country, including that their centers of popular support were the urban working poor, students, and peasants, as well as the fact that there are no rainforests in Chile where these groups could have established territorial control, sustained their rank and file, and been sufficiently connected to centers of power.

communication of a militant to the organization consists of one or two people, and these individuals have to remain extremely vigilant and timely to never lose the points of contact on the street. Otherwise, the militant can become completely disconnected from the group (in Chile they called getting disconnected from the party *descolgado*).

Discretion, even with family and close friends, and the ability to tell an alternative, coherent, and consistent story with a new identity are also paramount to preserving compartmentalization.

The most important capabilities that militants should have include memorizing directions, names, times, and places of contact with the group; avoiding writing anything down or possessing compromising materials; memorizing people's faces in buses and vehicles in case they start to follow by foot or car; walking on the sidewalk against traffic to make it harder for security forces to follow by car; changing homes if there is any indication that security forces are close to detecting the refuge; changing identities by obtaining fake documents and telling a consistent alternative story of one's life and work; having a schedule of leaving and returning home that is consistent with this alternative story; disconnecting from any militant or sympathizer who has been detained and then released (he/she can only be reintegrated after careful scrutiny); maintaining compartmentalization by being discrete with acquaintances, friends, and relatives, as well as by not revealing information to anyone about their role within the organization; and finally, given that it is very difficult to hold a steady job in these circumstances, militants have to find ways to raise funds to survive, most commonly by joining the informal economy in some capacity (Alvarez, 2003, pp. 92–95; Serge, 1926; Interviewee 35, October 2015, Santiago de Chile).

The description of what constitutes underground organizing capability makes it clear that it is not necessarily linked to an opposition group using an armed strategy. Even though the cases with the highest underground organizing capability in this chapter are opposition groups that had an armed strategy as part of their repertoire, purely nonviolent groups could just as well adopt a compartmentalized organizational structure and underground organizing skills. For example, the Gülen movement in Turkey involved a group that adopted a compartmentalized cell structure under a democratic regime while using a completely nonviolent strategy (Aras & Caha, 2000; Farooq, 2016; Yavuz, 2013). It may be empirically more common to find UO capability being adopted by armed groups or criminal organizations than by nonviolent opposition groups. One of the reasons is that nonviolent groups usually rely on large masses of people for their power, and a compartmentalized organizational structure limits the number of people that can join the organization, as well as the capacity to assemble the masses. Armed groups also almost always operate underground because of the state's imperative to maintain the monopoly on violence, while nonviolent groups are not as commonly repressed to the same extent. Nonetheless, nonviolent groups could just as well incorporate both the skills and organizational structure that increases the chances of survival against high repression if they face those circumstances.

### **Group Survival and Resilience**

The main dependent variable in this study is the rate of victimization of militants by opposition group and, as a corollary, the overall resilience of the opposition group. The rate of victimization is the proportion of militants from an opposition group that are recognized political victims of the Pinochet dictatorship divided by the total number of

militants from the same opposition group who were on the government's lists of wanted individuals. The overall resilience of the opposition group is defined as the ability of organizations to withstand state repression by avoiding disintegration, effectively replacing fallen militants, and adapting their political work to continue fulfilling their mission.

The chapter argues that the chances for survival and resilience of opposition groups largely depend on their ability to conduct clandestine operations, which involves hiding, changing identities, moving from house to house, avoiding surveillance and infiltration, conducting all operations in secrecy, and compartmentalizing the organization by operating in small cells that are not in communication except through very few and indirect channels. These measures make it more difficult for security agencies to capture militants, and even if they succeed in doing so, this structure contains the damage because it affects few people in the organization. Opposition groups that had not imparted these skills to their militants or experimented with compartmentalization or a cell structure before the military coup on September 11, 1973, were ill-prepared to confront the armed forces and secret police that suddenly sought to eliminate them. The higher the rate of victimization, the more likely the group is to disintegrate by losing its active militants and by fizzling out as fear discourages people from joining the organization or taking on leadership positions within it. Dissident organizations that do not have a critical mass of militants capable of conducting underground organizing will also lack the ability to adapt the political work to a high-repression environment, making them less likely to fulfill the organization's mission. Thus, the first hypothesis is that opposition groups with a compartmentalized or partially compartmentalized structure and



militants trained and/or experienced in underground organizing will be more likely to survive high levels of lethal collective or selective repression than those without such training or experience and organizational structure (**Hypothesis 1**).

While this chapter argues that a compartmentalized organizational structure and underground organizing skills are important ways of curbing repression and its demobilizing effects, there are other ways of reducing victimization rates. Dissidents may seek exile to protect their lives, as hundreds of thousands of Chileans did, including the elite of the Communist and Socialist parties (Orellana, 2015). Though going abroad did not completely eliminate the chance of becoming a victim of the regime, as there are many examples of assassinations and assassination attempts of political figures by DINA and its affiliates in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, survival was much more likely abroad than in Chile for these top targets.<sup>10</sup> However, exile was not a realistic option for most militants.

Since the membership size of these opposition groups was at least in the tens of thousands at the time of the coup and their base was working class and relatively poor, clandestinity was often the only option. In addition, some opposition groups, such as the MIR, strongly discouraged its militants from leaving the country at a time when they thought it was most imperative to build the resistance (MIR, 1975; Pinto et al., 2006). Importantly for the central question in this chapter, militants who stayed in Chile were able to continue the mission of the organization, though the political work changed in significant ways given the level of repression. MIR militants helped forge the beginnings

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<sup>10</sup> The campaign to eliminate enemies of the Pinochet regime outside of Chile was called Operation Condor (*Operación Cóndor*), and it involved the participation of the other military governments in the Southern cone, such as Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil. The most prominent victim of this plan was Chilean Ambassador to the United States during the Allende regime, Orlando Letelier, who was killed along with his assistant Ronni Moffitt in a car bomb in Washington, DC, in 1976 (Kornbluh, 2004; Rettig, 1991).

of an opposition movement against the military government in secrecy, at a very local level, and through apolitical civil society organizations with narrow goals. This work happened many years before the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties returned to Chile.

Of course, staying in the country and adapting to a high-repression environment also has its downsides for future political gains. In particular, a compartmentalized organizational structure, significant restrictions on political activities as to what is possible underground, and investment in underground organizing skills all detract from building a movement that has the capacity for mass mobilization. During this period, the top targets of the regime also became more radicalized, specifically by supporting armed rebellion over a democratic exit to the dictatorship. These decisions would then become major setbacks in an open political arena. For example, by the late 1970s the Communist Party decided to engage in armed actions as part of their resistance against the Pinochet regime. The PC developed the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (*Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez* or FPMR) by training cadres in Cuba and the Soviet Union. The FPMR and the PC's endorsement of armed action was the reason they were excluded from the "Democratic Alliance" talks that led to the transition back to democracy. Ultimately, the coalition of political parties negotiating the transition wanted to contest elections and/or gain political power through mass mobilization when democracy returned to Chile. Therefore, the changes they brought about by staying in Chile through a period of high repression, though increasing their survival, presented setbacks in this regard (Alvarez, 2003).

As a corollary of the first hypothesis, we should observe that groups with training and experience in underground organizing, as well as compartmentalization, before the coup had a higher survival rate at first compared to those groups that did not have these capabilities before the coup. As time went by, experience with repression, which led to retooling militants and restructuring the organization, should increase the survival rates of groups that were initially ill-prepared for the Pinochet dictatorship. This process should reduce or close the gap between the groups that were initially equipped to manage high levels of repression and those that were not. Unfortunately, how time affected survival rates among the different groups cannot be properly tested with the large-N data presented in the chapter because there is no information about the timing of each case of torture, which is the most common type of repression and from which discrepancies between groups emerge. That said, interview and archival data presented in sections below, as well as secondary sources on the Communist and Socialist Parties, suggest that militants and their organizations indeed learned from repression.

Though the idea of learning suggests that organizations can adopt different structures and militants acquire new skills, especially with the impetus of regime violence, there are reasons to conclude that being prepared in advance is extremely important for survival and resilience. The first few months of a new military regime's trying to consolidate power are often particularly brutal. The military junta in Chile sought to show overwhelming force from the first hours of the coup. Victimization records are consistent with this pattern, as more than 67% of all detentions during the 18-year dictatorship accounted for by the first National Commission on Imprisonment and Torture occurred during the first four months following the coup, from September to

December 1973 (Valech, 2005). In addition, systematic disappearances, executions, and mass torture occurred during the first four or five years of the military dictatorship (Fruhling, 1983; Policzer, 2009).

Additionally, some of the most effective measures for underground work are far more difficult to adopt after the organization has been operating in public. For example, complete compartmentalization is a real challenge if militants know each other and can identify affiliates far beyond their cell. If a militant who knew many comrades during the democratic period were captured and forced to identify others on the street (a process DINA called *salir a porotear*), they would be able to turn people in whether or not they were operating in their own cell.

One way to mitigate this problem is by moving militants to different regions where they do not know their fellow comrades. This strategy has an important downside, as it reduced the level of embeddedness of the group in the community. Suddenly militants were left without their trusted local contacts on which to rely to seek refuge, funds, and protection.

The situation for well-known public figures of these groups formerly operating above ground was even more difficult. Changing identities was not possible because their real names were already associated to a known face. Even if they moved to a more remote place or a region far from their former area of operation, anyone could identify and report them. As the Bolshevik revolutionary Victor Serge pointed out, “for a revolutionary party to be surprised with illegality is like assuring its disappearance” (Serge, 1926, p. 89). Even if revolutionary parties operated within the legal and democratic institutions of a regime, Serge argued, they must always be prepared to go

into illegality because circumstances could change. The main opposition groups in Chile all operated in public before the coup; therefore, none of them could ever achieve a perfect level of compartmentalization. But some had built an underground infrastructure during the democratic period, including having some militants assume double identities, which made it easier for the adoption of full clandestinity at the time of the coup (Interviewee 22, May 2017, Santiago de Chile).

### **Explaining the Main Independent Variable: Ideology**

Now, the question is, what explains the fact that some groups had the capacity to go into clandestinity when Pinochet reached power while others did not? The chapter argues that, in this case, ideology explains the differences in skillsets and organizational structure we observe among opposition groups. Ideology, according to Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood (2014), “is defined as a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the objectives pursued on behalf of that group, and a program of action” (p. 213). Ideology matters for several reasons, but most relevant in this case is that groups’ beliefs led to different “blueprint[s] for institutions and strategies” (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010; Sanín & Wood, 2014). Table 2.1 below summarizes the variations in ideology among the military junta’s top targets according to the kill lists.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The author compiled Table 2.1 based on information from archival documents, personal interviews with leaders of the opposition groups, and secondary literature.

Table 2.1. Pre-Coup Ideology and Strategy of Main Political Movements and Parties Included in Pinochet's Target Lists

Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR): Ultra-leftist, Marxist-Leninist, Communist, Scientific Socialism, and Guevarism

People's Organized Vanguard (VOP): Ultra-leftist, Marxist-Leninist, Anarchist, Guevarism

Socialist Party (PS): Leftist, Socialist, Statist

Communist Party (CP): Leftist, Communist, Marxist-Leninist

Popular Unity (UP): President Allende's party coalition, which was in power at the time of the coup. UP included Socialists, Communists, the Christian Left, MAPU, the Radical Party, and Independent Popular Action

	Constituency	Objectives	Program of Action		Strategy	Org. Structure	UO* Capability
<b>MIR</b>	Poor, workers, intellectuals	Socialism, new social order	Democratic participation, insurrection, revolution		Mainly nonviolent, some armed action	Hierarchical, parallel structures, underground cells	High
<b>VOP</b>	Urban poor, workers, felons	New social order, anti-authority, socialism	Rebellion	→	Armed	Underground small network	High
<b>PS</b>	Working poor, peasants, intellectuals	Socialism, new social order	Democratic reforms, gradualism		Nonviolent, electoral, armed wing**	Hierarchical, all public	None (wing: moderate)
<b>PC</b>	Working poor, labor unions	Communism, new social order	Democratic reforms, gradualism		Nonviolent, electoral	Hierarchical, all public	Low**

\* UO: Underground Organizing

\*\* Overall the Socialist Party did not have underground organizing capability, though a wing of the PS, namely the CNR (*Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales*), and the followers of Carlos Altamirano believed in an insurrectional path to socialism that included armed struggle. They thus had more preparation in underground organizing.<sup>12</sup> In fact, a personal interview with one of the main militants in the CNR reflects that the compartmentalized structure and organizing skills they developed before the coup were responsible for their survival. This PS branch was the part of the party that had the least number of victimized militants from all the clandestine directives (Interviewee 48, April 2016, Santiago de Chile).

\*\*\* Even though the PC had not adapted no recent experience, training, or organizational structure for underground organizing, it would not be accurate to assign the group "none" in UO capability. The PC had to engage in clandestine work from 1948 to 1958. President Gabriel González Videla instituted the "Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy," which banned the Communist Party. Some institutional memory on how to survive underground might have remained. Interviews with former PC militants have revealed that they set up "safe houses" to prepare for potential persecution before the 1973 coup (Interviewee 16, April 2016, Santiago de Chile).

<sup>12</sup> In 1967, Carlos Altamirano declared that "[t]he struggle needs to involve armed action. Imperialism will not be defeated peacefully. We cannot defeat imperialism with nice words or by gaining power electorally. The final confrontation between imperialism and the revolution will most definitively be decided in the armed camp" (Altamirano, 1967, p. 4, author's translation).

Though all four main top targets were to the left of the political spectrum, there are important ideological differences between them. Most relevant for explaining underground organizing capacity and organizational structure are the differences in their programs of action. The Communist and Socialist parties were committed to gradual political and social reforms that were endorsed through a democratic electoral process, and they also eschewed a violent takeover of the government. As a consequence of these commitments and their worldview that a new socialist order was possible through democratic means, these political parties built broad coalitions with other political movements. In fact, a coalition of political parties called Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular* or UP) brought Salvador Allende to power in 1970, which included the Socialist Party, Communist Party, Radical Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Popular Action, the Movement for Unitary Popular Action (MAPU), and later the Christian Left and the Movement for Unitary Popular Action-Peasant Worker splinter party (MAPU-OC). These parties espoused the “Chilean way to socialism” (*vía chilena*) in contrast to a revolutionary path to communism *à la* Cuban Revolution (Corvalán, 1997).

On the other hand, the program of action of the MIR and VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*) centered on achieving a new social order through a revolutionary path that was more in line with the Cuban Revolution. These political movements did not eschew violence as a strategy to reach power, and, in fact, many *miristas* and VOP militants, including the leadership, thought that an armed revolution or an insurrection of the masses was required to achieve their ultimate goal of a socialist Chile. They believed that the upper classes would never relinquish power and accepted all social and economic reforms through democratic means. Even though the MIR and VOP were never close to

forming an armed insurgency and—at least MIR—had engaged with the democratic system and electoral politics, they believed that ultimately they would have to organize a popular insurrection to seize power fully and institute the necessary reforms (Garcés & Leiva, 2012; Gaudichaud, 2004; Vargas & Díaz, 2007).

MIR documents reflected this worldview and how its emphasis on a potential insurrection led them to prepare its militants for this type of struggle in 1966, well before Pinochet rose to power. First, the MIR clearly defined its position as non-conciliatory, explaining that the right would never give up power peacefully: “We question the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’ insofar as it ‘represents a provisional agreement between the Socialist bureaucracies and imperialism, destined to delay and impede revolutions, and similarly, it preserves social injustice . . .’” (MIR August 1965, author’s translation). Moreover, the MIR stated that it was preparing militants for the revolution of the masses: “The Central Committee of the MIR resolves to increase the depth and breadth of their campaign among the masses, in order to prepare for a national anti-imperialist self-defense campaign of the exploited and working poor, insisting on the importance of its objective of the *universal arming of the people*, along with the requirements of military training, [and] of learning about the problems of the popular defensive and revolutionary war” (MIR January 1966, author’s translation and emphasis). These two statements are representative of MIR’s ideologically more extreme position and their approach to organizing, which included preparation for armed struggle even during the democratic period.

Parties with a program of action dominated by gradualism and electoral politics developed far-reaching electoral machines with similar characteristics to the ones we



observe in stable democracies (Stokes, 2005). The Communist and Socialist parties had candidates at all levels of government, maintained a strong presence in parliament, ran successful electoral campaigns at the presidential level, and had mass grassroots organizations that built their constituencies and mobilized the vote, particularly the working class, students, and unions. The organizational structure of these parties was thus public, hierarchical, and pyramidal. Leaders and militants carried out party activities and conducted their lives completely out in the open. Militancy or membership to one of these political parties was public knowledge. As a consequence, the skills of the militants that these parties attracted to their ranks, as well as the capabilities that militants and leaders forged by participating in these parties, were contrary to those required for underground organizing. Instead of being discrete in one's neighborhood, maintaining a double identity, and anonymizing actions, Communists and Socialists were outspoken, well known in their communities, and tasked with building the membership base, educating the masses, and getting out the vote.

Both Communists and Socialists recognized that these qualities became a handicap with Pinochet in power and the counterinsurgency campaign. As Luis Corvalán, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, said: "The Communist Party's 20 years of legality lived during the Ibáñez, Alessandri, Frei, and Allende administrations, except for the short period in the first one, had driven us to a certain loss of acquired experience throughout the not so few reactionary governments that we had to confront in the past. That is how I would explain my detention, which took place on September 27, only 16 days after the military coup" (Corvalán, 1997, author's translation). Similarly, the Socialist Party recognized its lack of preparation to face an enemy like DINA. The head

of the second interior clandestine directive of the Socialist Party, Eduardo Gutiérrez, was convinced they had to start learning underground organizing skills and developing a compartmentalized structure:

It was in the year '75 when we realized that we had to take drastic measures that would allow us to protect our lives and we decided to do what Europeans did in their resistance. We read texts that discussed the topic and decided to go completely into clandestinity; in order to do that we had to change our names, establish mechanisms of communications completely compartmentalized, no one knew your actual name, nor your address, and thanks to those measures we survived. (Interview with Eduardo Gutiérrez, in Vargas Barraza & Díaz Daza, 2007, pp. 41–42)

More revolutionary political movements, with a program of action that espouses mass insurrection and an armed takeover of the government as the ultimate way to achieve their goals, at least partially develops a more covert organizational structure and militants have the opportunity to forge underground organizing skills. Revolutionary movements maintain some level of compartmentalization, secrecy, and underground activity even when they are conducting themselves in a democratic system and partaking in elections. The reasons are that semi-clandestinity protects them from potential future repression, which may come even from democratic governments, prepares them for the closing of civil society space that may occur once there is a change in regimes, and builds their capacity to wage the ultimate struggle to achieve a socialist utopia when the conditions are propitious. The MIR conducted underground operations during the pre-

Pinochet democratic period, but it also contested elections in university councils and labor unions and had candidates for public office (Angell, 1972; MIR, 1965b).

Ideology, however, does not operate in a vacuum; it interacts with the regime in power, and with the social, economic, and political order in the country. To illustrate this idea, take the hypothetical example of Chile's MIR operating in Fidel Castro's Cuba. If the MIR had been a political movement in Cuba, its program of action would be very different, and its constituency and objectives would likely be the same. In this more agreeable context, the MIR would not be a revolutionary or insurrectional political movement. Rather, it would be part of the system, operating within government institutions, and out in the open.

The MIR in Chile, however, and specifically around its founding in 1965, was created in opposition to the status quo and with the intent of dismantling the dominant social, economic, and political order. Contextualizing ideology in this way reveals the more generalizable argument about opposition groups that have different organizational structure and skills. The distance between the groups' political and economic goals on the one hand, and the current regime on the other, largely determines the level of state repression the group will face. The differing programs of action are a function of this political distance. The Communist and Socialist parties were part of the government before Pinochet came into power: they were in fact part of the coalition of parties that brought Salvador Allende to the presidency, the world's first democratically elected Socialist president. Consistent with this logic, the Communist Party was on the fringe in Chile in the '40s and '50s. The regime banned them, and they went underground during that period. Communists then acquired experience in clandestine organizing and adopted

a more compartmentalized organizational structure (Corvalán, 1997). Following the ideas of contextualized ideology and political distance, the theory would predict that the MIR and VOP would be more equipped—with their particular organizational structure and skillsets—to operate in a repressive environment than the Socialists and Communists at the time of the coup in Chile in 1973.

In sum, ideological differences among the top targets help explain the variation in the groups' underground organizing capability and organizational structure. The wider the political wedge between the groups' vision for the country on the one hand, and the social, economic, and political status quo on the other, the less conciliatory its program of action will be. A more aggressive program of action leads to the creation of (at least partially) compartmentalized structures and the development of militants skilled in underground organizing, regardless of the regime in which they are operating. By this logic, the more extreme a program of action is in the political context of the country, the higher the rate of survival of the group when repression increases and civil society space closes. Therefore, the second hypothesis is that the more distant the ideology of the opposition group from the current regime in power, the more likely it is to have militants skilled in underground organizing and to organize the group in a compartmentalized structure (**Hypothesis 2**).

Being an outsider ideologically (because the regime in power has a very different political and economic project) and top target of a capable state are both, separately, unnecessary but sufficient conditions for having underground organizing skills and a compartmentalized structure. That said, it is difficult to empirically separate the effect of ideology from the effect of repression in an environment of high repression given that

ideology varies with the regime. A group is an outsider ideologically when there is considerable distance between the regime and the non-state actor's political project. Even though not all ideologically distant groups face high state repression, high repression is only ever perpetrated against ideologically distant groups. When the regime is unwilling to use high levels of repression, however, we observe a more independent effect of ideology on underground organizing capability. Outsider groups could—and do—operate under regimes that are not going to heavily repress them (e.g., the MIR during the Allende administration), and one could still see the group developing the skills for underground organizing and a compartmentalized organizational structure. Ideology explains why certain groups in low repression environments develop UO capabilities.

As specified in greater detail in the following section on research design and data, the chapter tests the second hypothesis by comparing the survival rates of different opposition groups and by leveraging archival materials and interviews with former dissidents to elucidate the connection between ideology, underground organizing, and resilience in the face of high levels of repression. The first hypothesis, linking survival to a particular organizational structure and a set of skills, is tested with the quantitative, individual-level data of those on the intended-to-be-victimized lists and those actually victimized.

### **Research Design and Data**

The Targets and Victims of Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1989 dataset (Appendix A) compiles the names of almost 9,000 individuals in Pinochet's secret police wanted lists, their political affiliation, and whether they were eventually victimized by the state. The dataset also includes all victims of the regime, whether or not they were on the hit lists. I

compiled this individual-level dataset from several archival sources. The head of the secret police DINA, Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, while serving a 529-year sentence for human rights violations, published a book titled *The Historic Truth: The Guerrilla Army*. In it he lays out his version of the junta's fight against communism. The 450-page appendix of the book, which makes up most of the manuscript, are photocopies of the government's lists of "dangerous individuals," "wanted individuals," and "members of leftist parties and sympathizers of the leftist guerrillas," along with their political affiliation, leadership positions, information about the security agencies looking for each individual, whether they had military experience or explosives training, and sometimes even home addresses of militants. Even though the Armed Forces and other Chilean security agencies insisted that they burned all the records from the dictatorship period and were thus unable to produce information about victims, it appears that Manuel Contreras took many of the documents from DINA with him when the intelligence agency was dismantled in 1977.<sup>13</sup>

In order to code whether or not each individual on these lists was actually repressed during the dictatorship, I consulted the lists of victims from the three Chilean truth and reconciliation commissions—Rettig (1991),<sup>14</sup> Valech (2005) (also referred to as Valech I in this dissertation),<sup>15</sup> and Valech (2011) (also referred to as Valech II in this

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<sup>13</sup> "Los misteriosos archivos perdidos de Manuel Contreras" by Carlos Basso, *El Mostrador*, August 9, 2015, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2015/08/09/los-misteriosos-archivos-perdidos-demanuel-contreras/>.

<sup>14</sup> The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (or *Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*) is commonly called the Rettig Commission, and the report was published in 1991.

<sup>15</sup> The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report (or *Comisión Nacional de Prisión Política y Tortura*) is commonly called Comisión Valech I, and the report was published in 2004 and 2005.

dissertation)<sup>16</sup>—as well as reports from two NGOs, CODEPU,<sup>17</sup> and FASIC,<sup>18</sup> which contain some of the most up-to-date lists of victims of torture and people who were forcibly displaced within Chile, respectively. The information on the displaced is the most incomplete, though in the future FASIC may be able to compile a more complete list of individuals (with their political affiliation) who were removed from their home and sent off to live in remote areas of Chile. The three truth and reconciliation commissions investigated crimes throughout the entire country extensively, with the purpose of gathering a complete list of those repressed by the Pinochet regime between 1973 and 1990. However, it is almost certain that we do not have all the names of people who were subjected to repression, primarily because of fear of reporting (even after the return of democracy) and stigma surrounding victimization, particularly torture. There might have also been whole families disappeared, which makes it almost impossible to recover their information. We also know that the truth commissions did not count those who were tortured outside of prisons or facilities run by security forces because Valech I and II focused solely on torture in prison. For example, individuals who were tortured at home, which was common in shantytowns occupied by the security forces, were not accounted for in the Valech lists of almost 40,000 tortured individuals.

The commission reports and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) victims lists provide information on all the nationally recognized individuals who were disappeared, executed, tortured in prison, and forcibly displaced during the 18-year

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<sup>16</sup> The Valech Commission was reopened in 2010, and they published another report with thousands more cases of victims of torture in prison. This report is Valech II.

<sup>17</sup> CODEPU is the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People (*Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo*).

<sup>18</sup> FASIC is the Christian Churches Foundation for Social Assistance (*Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas*).

dictatorship. The lists of the disappeared and executed, and to some extent of the forcibly displaced, provide even more details about each individual than the government hit lists. They include characteristics such as occupation, age, place where the person was detained, city and state where they were from, and political affiliation. This fine-grained data allowed me to code a binary variable for “opposition group discrepancy,” which identifies cases where the government, evidenced by the hit list, classified the person as being from a different group from the one coded in the victims lists. I assumed that the victims lists more accurately recorded political affiliation given the rigor and depth of the truth and reconciliation commission reports, and given that this information was gathered during a period of democratic rule and thus of significantly less fear. On the other hand, intelligence agencies gathered the regime’s wanted lists and might have made mistakes about people’s political affiliation. However, there are limitations to what one can infer from these discrepancies, given that it is not possible to know if there was a discrepancy for someone who eventually did not become a victim of the state. I can make claims about political affiliation discrepancies for the subset of people who were eventually victimized, as the more fine-grained data come from the victims lists.

The data have a couple of more limitations that should be noted. First, the government target lists vary in the amount of information that is provided about each individual. Some lists only have first and last names and political affiliation, while others have home addresses, classifications of individuals by type (leader, activist, extremist, suspect, guerrilla, and terrorist), the security agency searching for the individual, and whether they had military training. I can subset the data to analyze a fuller range of variables, but unfortunately some analyses have a much smaller sample size.



Complementing the sparer target lists with information from the victims lists helps; however, I cannot make any claims about the likelihood of victimization using this data because of a lack of comparable data for non-victims. Since it would be very difficult—or impossible—to access more information about those on the target lists who did not become victimized, I used this fine-grained data only to make inferences about those who were victimized.

The second drawback of the data is that we cannot be certain about the time when these target lists were made and the years of intelligence work that they reflect. Manuel Contreras provided no such information before passing away in prison in 2015. It was also not possible to interview other members of the DINA leadership who are in the military prison of Punta Peuco today. The Chilean government, in particular the head of Gendarmerie, did not allow any interviews with these prisoners despite many attempts. I was nonetheless able to secure interviews with the head of the Valech II truth commission, prosecutors who have built legal cases against DINA members, human rights experts, and militants who infiltrated DINA for a few months, to obtain as much information as possible about the origins and uses of these lists. Based on these interviews, and on crosschecks with the names, we can be quite confident that the lists were developed before they orchestrated the coup of September 11, 1973. Most likely, the sector of the military planning the coup gathered the lists of known individuals to be associated with their main political rivals during the democratic period immediately preceding the military dictatorship (Interviewee 17, March 2017, Santiago de Chile; Huneus, 2001).

Another piece of evidence suggesting that the lists were based on pre-coup intelligence is the fact that many individuals who are on the lists were imprisoned or killed two or three days following the coup.<sup>19</sup> If the lists had been compiled any time after Pinochet reached power, there is no reason why these individuals would still be part of the “wanted” population. It is important to note that gathering these lists during the military dictatorship would have been much more difficult because the top targets of the regime went from mostly operating in politics publicly during the Allende administration to hiding within a matter of weeks after September 11, 1973. Had these lists been compiled during the dictatorship, there would also be methodological challenges because of disparities in the quality of the lists depending on the group. At a time when all the opposition groups were operating underground and trying to hide, one would expect relatively better lists for groups that were not adept at underground organizing and compartmentalization, and poorer quality lists on militants who were hiding well or using their double identities effectively. Fortunately, this is not an issue in this case because most militants in all opposition groups were operating publicly when the lists were created.

There might have been some updating of the lists during the Pinochet dictatorship, but probably no major efforts to keep updating them, though this is far less clear. There is reason to think that there was some updating because the secret police, which was one of the agencies in charge of finding many of the individuals on the lists, was not founded until November 1973, and it was made an entity separate from the military in June 1974. If the lists had not been updated at all after the coup, there would

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<sup>19</sup> For example, Sergio Bitar, José Tohá, Aníbal Palma, Arturo Jirón, and Carlos Matus, cabinet members from the Allende administration, were all on the lists despite being taken to the Dawson Island concentration camp within three days of the coup.

be no DINA-assigned individual on the lists. But the lists were likely not systematically updated. Two or three years into the dictatorship, the armed forces and secret police started focusing heavily on creating and identifying each individual on the organizational charts of the top targets. Rather than going one by one through the lists, security agencies later focused on discovering the names of individuals on each cell in order to get to the top leadership (Interviewee 17, March 2017, Santiago de Chile). Their strategy was to find militants from the third- and second-level cadres, which would lead them to the top leadership for the decapitation of the groups (Interviewee 15, April 2017, Santiago de Chile). For these purposes, the security forces used the lists but also the new leads that they received as they detained and tortured individuals and used information gathered from denunciations (Interviewee 15). This use of the lists should not present a methodological problem because the same strategy was used for all top targets of the regime. There is no reason to think that the security agencies used the lists differently for the MIR compared to the PC or PS (Interviewee 15; Interviewee 17).

It is also likely that the lists were not updated beyond 1977, which was when Pinochet replaced DINA with the Center for National Information (CNI or *Centro Nacional de Informaciones*) given pressure from the United States following the DINA-orchestrated assassination of the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, and his assistant Ronni Moffitt. Manuel Contreras, head of DINA until its dissolution and the man responsible for publishing the lists in his book, was no longer in charge of Pinochet's counterinsurgency operations beyond 1977. If the CNI updated the lists, it is unlikely that they then would have reached the hands of Manuel Contreras

for him to publish decades later, as he not only stopped serving the Pinochet regime in 1977 but also retired from the army shortly thereafter.

Using simple descriptive statistics, the next section shows who was targeted and who was victimized among the targeted. The proportion of victims by group reveals the variation of the dependent variable of survival, and the number of individuals by political affiliation on the hit list is the independent variable. The chapter then shows regression results and examines this relationship to ascertain whether my theory about training and skills is at least consistent with the large-N data. Archival sources on ideology and training lend further support to my theory about ideology and the skills that flow from it. To build a case that the observed differences in survival rates between opposition groups are attributable to their underground organizing capability and that these skills flow from their ideology, the chapter also offers a variety of qualitative data, including in-depth semi-structured interviews with former dissidents, primary sources from the main opposition groups, and secondary literature on the top targets.

## **Empirical Analysis**

### **Explaining Survival**

One of the most striking features of Pinochet's hit lists is the amount of ink spilled on the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). In fact, three lists were solely focused on this group—on naming all the members on record, their military experience or explosives trainings, and whether or not they had training in Cuba. More than 29% (or 1,881 individuals) of the target lists are members of the MIR, followed by what the government classified as “leftist parties,” which are mainly militants from the Communist and Socialist parties, with a few from MAPU or the Movement for Popular Unity

Action (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria*), the Christian Left or IC (*Izquierda Cristiana*), and the Popular Unity or UP (*Unidad Popular*). These made up about almost 38% (or 2,362 individuals) of the sample.

Notably, the political affiliation of the third largest group of individuals was unknown to the regime (1,840 individuals, making up 28.5% of the sample). With the victims lists, one is able to determine which groups tended to be unknown to the regime but were still victimized. Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to determine the political affiliation of those who were unknown in the target lists and who never became a victim, though ideally we would have that data to see which groups were more difficult to identify for the regime, perhaps because of the skills of those militants or because the intelligence agencies were, for some reason, less interested in those individuals.

The National Liberation Movement—Tupamaros was a left-wing guerrilla from Uruguay that had some agents in Chile after escaping repression in their home country in the early 1970s. Tupamaros make up almost five percent of the sample (303 people). Unfortunately, we cannot conclude anything about foreign groups like the Tupamaros because the Chilean truth and justice commissions, on which this chapter relies for victimization records, only systematically assessed abuses against Chilean citizens. Finally, there were also members from the FPMR armed group associated with the Communist Party, which formed in the mid-1980s. Figure 2.1 below shows the distribution of group membership observed in the government's target lists.




Figure 2.1. Count of Individuals by Opposition Group in All Target Lists

In their report, the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation highlights that the MIR was singled out and intensely repressed, which is consistent with the observed pattern of individuals wanted by the regime on these lists. DINA “set for itself the basic task of eliminating what it regarded as the ultra-left, particularly the MIR and other groups or persons connected to it” (Rettig, 1991, p. 61, author’s translation). These hit lists reveal the extent to which the security apparatus focused on this one opposition group even compared to other leftist groups that were also considered enemies of the state, such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. In fact, the chronology of the repression also supports the observation that the MIR was singled out for

repression. Even though the military junta targeted all leftist political movements from the moment of the coup, the timing of the victims suggests that the secret police focused on the MIR first. Though they have not released their archives, the truth and justice commission reports state that the victims were predominantly MIR militants first, and then the secret police concentrated on Socialists in 1975, followed by the Communists in 1976 (Rettig, 1991). Historians have also elaborated on this sequencing: “The political parties were attacked one after the other according to the level of political and military threat that the Armed Forces perceived them to be. Thus, the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) withstood the worst punishment from DINA during 1974 and early 1975, followed by the Socialist Party (PS) in 1975, and the Communist Party (PC) in 1976, which was also attacked by the *Comando Conjunto*” (Barros, 2005, p. 162).

This approach gave an advantage to the PS and PC, affording them more time than the MIR to prepare for the extreme state violence that followed. As mentioned earlier, even though it is difficult to prepare for the underground in a short period of time, especially following a period of public organizing, the PS and PC had at least two to three years to prepare before the worst violence reached them. This benefit most likely helped lower the victimization rate of PS and PC militants, though it was not enough to compensate for the pre-coup structure and skills that MIR militants had. In short, the chronology of repression makes this chapter’s main finding even more puzzling.

It is also worth pointing out that the MIR was the smallest of the top targets. Shortly before the coup, which was the height of the movement for MIR, the Communist Party had around 50,000 militants, while the MIR had up to 10,000 (Alvarez, 2011). The

Socialist Party was larger because it grew enormously during Allende's presidential campaign and during his tenure in office (Gaudichaud, 2004).

In terms of the rate of victimization conditional on being in the kill lists, Figure 2.2 shows a total of 2,163 individuals on the target lists who were in fact victimized during the military dictatorship. Slightly more people were never victimized during the same period (N=2,400). That is, 47.4% of the target list suffered from the most severe forms of repression. Most of those affected were victims of torture, followed by executions, and disappearances. The number of forced displacements is very small (N=25) in this sample, which might be due to the fact that the displaced lists are not as complete as those for the other forms of repression.<sup>20</sup> More likely, however, is that the opposition groups on these lists were top targets of the regime and thus subject to violent forms of repression. The government tended to use forced displacement against those who they perceived as less of a threat (Orellana, 2015).

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<sup>20</sup> The truth and justice commission reports did not systematically measure forcible displacements, so I worked with FASIC, which created the displaced list I have been using, to see if I could obtain—or create with their archives—a more complete list of individuals who were isolated in remote parts of Chile.







Figure 2.2. Number of Individuals in Hit Lists by Form of Repression

Another interesting pattern emerges when comparing an individual's political affiliation recorded by the regime with the affiliation registered by the victims themselves or their families. Among all 75 victims whose political affiliation was recorded erroneously by the government, more than 69% (or 52 individuals) were not from the MIR even though the state classified them as such. The regime classified them as *miristas*, and they were repressed even though they were from a variety of other leftist groups or even non-affiliated.

Despite the secret police's emphasis on demobilizing the MIR, Figure 2.3 shows, the rate of victimization of *miristas* was far lower than other leftist groups. The MIR's lower rate of victimization provides strong evidence for the first hypothesis, which predicts that groups with high underground organizing capability will tend to have a

lower rate of victimization than groups without those qualities. The probability of victimization for an individual who is a MIR militant on the kill list is 43.38% ( $\Pr(\text{Victim} \mid \text{MIR}_{\text{KL}}) = 43.38\%$ , where  $\text{MIR}_{\text{KL}}$  stands for a MIR militant in the kill list). In contrast, more than 56% of leftists from other parties on the hit list were victimized ( $\Pr(\text{Victim} \mid \text{non-MIR}_{\text{KL}}) = 56.36\%$ , where  $\text{non-MIR}_{\text{KL}}$  stands for a non-MIR militant in the kill list). In terms of absolute numbers, there is no question that the MIR paid a hefty human cost—being on the target list of a capable state willing to persecute people is going to be costly for any group. Of the almost 1,900 MIR militants, a total of 810 were disappeared, executed, or tortured. In addition, as Figure 2.3 shows, MIR militants were about as likely to be disappeared or executed as members of other leftist parties, such as the PC and PS. However, it is surprising that the top priority group for Chilean security agencies sustained a much lower rate of overall victimization, attributable to differences in the rate of torture, compared to other target groups.



N=4,239

Figure 2.3. Percentage of Victims and Non-Victims from MIR and Non-MIR Groups




Figure 2.4. Number of Victims of Each Form of Repression by Opposition Group

If government repression had been randomly assigned on the target list, we would have observed a very different pattern of victimization, as the rate of repression would reflect the actual proportion of individuals from the MIR and from the non-MIR groups on the target lists. Put in another way, were the repressive apparatus as capable of finding a *mirista* as they were a non-*mirista* on the list, holding the security agency and their determination constant, one would have observed a proportion of victims by group equal to the proportion of people from the MIR and from the non-MIR on the lists. This is of course assuming that the security agencies in charge of finding the MIR and of finding the non-MIR members were equally capable and had similar resources available to them. Given that the MIR was the top priority of the most ruthless security

organization, the secret police DINA, the bias that the level of determination or resources could have would make the findings in this chapter less likely, not more.

Had the repression been randomly distributed across target lists, 951 *miristas* would have been victimized (or 50.57% of the total number of victims on the target lists). But in reality, a total of 816 were victimized *miristas*. Similarly, random repression among those on the kill lists would have meant that 1,194 members from non-MIR known groups were victimized (or 50.57% of the total number of victims). But there were a total of 1,329 victimized non-MIR militants. In other words, *miristas* fared far better than they would, had the repression been representative of the proportion of people on the lists, and the non-MIR members fared worse. The difference is substantively significant, as an additional 135 MIR members would have been victimized had the repression been representative of their prevalence on the lists; further, had the non-MIR militants' rate of victimization dropped from the random assignment to the same extent as the MIR's rate, 135 more people would have been saved from suppression.

If the MIR were not better at surviving and avoiding government repression compared to other groups, what would these data have looked like? Given the government's determination to exterminate the MIR, even equal rates of victimization between MIR and non-MIR groups would have suggested that the MIR fared better than the non-MIR groups. If the MIR's rate of victimization were significantly larger than other groups' rates, one would be skeptical that the MIR was in fact more capable of surviving.

## **The Link Between Ideology and Survival**

Having examined the target list and the pattern of victimization within it, the question remains: why were MIR militants better equipped to survive high selective and collective repression than the PS, PC, and other leftist parties? As previously noted, among the major political movements and parties in Chile at the time of the coup, the MIR was the most ideologically extreme. As an ultra-leftist group, it was purist and refused to align with other leftists that were willing to compromise. MIR leaders heavily criticized—and even sabotaged at times—the Popular Unity government that reached power democratically in 1970 and ruled until the coup on September 11, 1973. MIR's ideology included the idea that armed insurrection was a necessary step in bringing about a Marxist utopia. Even though they could—and did—gain power through nonviolent action and electoral politics, MIR militants believed that the “oligarchic forces” were never going to give up their power peacefully. Armed confrontation would thus be inevitable in the future.

These ideas led the group to develop the capacity to organize in cell structures and teach militants how to lose security forces following them, change their identity, and live on the run without leaving trace, among other skills.<sup>21</sup> The MIR had already dealt with some level of government repression during the Allende regime, as the UP punished its bank robberies and other violent acts. Nonetheless, the MIR never went completely underground prior to the coup that brought Pinochet to power.

On the other hand, 1973 was the first time that the Socialist Party was ever in need of engaging in clandestine work: “The PS, in all its history until 1973, had never

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<sup>21</sup> MIR Estrategia No. 1–9, 1965–69; Declaración de principios MIR, 1965; MIR Programa del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 1970.

been an illegal organization, contrary to the PC, which had some knowledge on the subject” (Vargas & Díaz, 2007, p. 41, author’s translation). The Communist Party also went through a period in Chilean history when it was banned from politics when the “Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy” (colloquially known as the “damned law” or *ley maldita*) was established in 1948 by Gabriel González Videla and lifted in 1958. Given that 16 years had passed since the PC’s experience with clandestine work, few militants had any experience with this type of organizing.<sup>22</sup> Before the coup of 1973, the PC embraced a gradualist, nonviolent, and electoral strategy to achieve its goals, which meant that their militants were all trained as party operatives in a democracy and thus publicly known.

The most ideologically extreme groups present in Chile at the time of the coup were VOP, the Tupamaros from Uruguay, and the MIR. A splinter group of the MIR and Communist militants who criticized their organizations for being too bourgeois formed the small armed group, VOP, in 1968. They were completely anti-system and had a small following of workers and felons (Rodríguez & Andrés, 2010). Even though VOP had been debilitated and practically demobilized during the Allende administration, a few VOP members made it into the junta’s target lists. The Tupamaros were an ultra-leftist group from Uruguay, though some militants had sought refuge in Allende’s Chile. They escaped intense crackdowns in their home country in 1968 and found a welcoming environment in Chile. Therefore, Uruguayan Tupamaros in Chile were also part of Pinochet’s ultra-leftist targets.

My hypotheses about underground organizing and extreme ideology also predict that VOP and the Tupamaros would be among the groups with the lowest rates of

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-96368.html>.


victimization. However, there are too few cases of VOP militants and Tupamaros on the lists to test this expectation because the groups were very small. That said, even if I had a larger sample size of militants from these two groups, the fact that these groups were very small and that the Tupamaros were not from Chile should also matter for resilience or lack thereof. It is unlikely that, even with training and underground organizing capacity, these small and uprooted groups would be able to survive repression from the Chilean intelligence and security agencies. These cases highlight the possibility that in addition to high selective repression and a capable state, another scope condition of my theory is that opposition groups should be relatively large (in the hundreds or thousands) and embedded in their communities for skills to matter.

To conclude the quantitative portion of the chapter, the following logistic regression has as the dependent variable a binary indicator for whether or not the individual was a victim of the Pinochet dictatorship (the variable takes on the value of 1 if they were a victim of torture, execution, disappearance, or forced displacement; 0 otherwise). The main independent variable of the model is a binary indicator for whether or not the individual was a MIR militant or a militant from another major leftist political party (1=MIR militant; 0=militant from non-MIR leftist party). Those with unknown affiliation in the kill lists are excluded from the analysis. There are two control variables, which are both binary as well. The control variable DINA indicates whether or not the secret police was the security agency assigned to capture the individual (1=DINA assigned to individual; 0=otherwise), and the variable Leader indicates whether or not the individual held a leadership position in the opposition group (1=Individual is a leader of organization; 0=otherwise). It is important to control for the variable Leader because



otherwise this model assumes that the security agencies prioritized all individuals on the kill lists equally. The only way we can quantify for most cases the fact that not all militants had the same level of importance for the military junta is by identifying the leaders, who certainly were the number one target from each opposition party. The model is as follows:

$$\text{Victimized}_i = a + b\text{MIR}_i + b\text{Leader}_i + b\text{DINA}_i + e_i \text{ (where } i \text{ is each individual)}$$



Variables are discrete and First Difference is a change from 0 to 1

N=803

95% Confidence Interval

Figure 2.5. First Difference for Change in the Probability of Victimization Given MIR Militancy

\*Note: Control for whether or not individual is a leader and for whether or not the security agency was the secret police DINA

The first difference plot (Figure 2.5) shows that being a *mirista*, as opposed to a non-MIR militant, statistically significantly and substantively reduces the probability of

being victimized, even when controlling for security agency and for being a leader or top-ranking official. DINA was by far the most ruthless organization and also the agency in charge of eliminating the MIR, so it is surprising that despite these factors, MIR militants were still able to have a lower rate of victimization than non-MIR militants. On average, being a *mirista* is associated with a 10 percentage point reduction in the probability of being victimized, compared to non-MIR militants, controlling for DINA and for leadership position in the group.

### **Alternative Explanations**

How can we explain the observed data if it is not by arguing that the MIR was more capable than other top targets in fending off repression? First, one could argue that the main security agency cracking down on the MIR was less determined or less equipped than those that persecuted the other opposition groups. This explanation, as explained earlier, is very implausible because DINA was the most ruthless security agency of the military dictatorship, and their top priority was to exterminate the MIR (Dorat Guerra & Weibel Barahona, 2012). In fact, 63% of MIR victims in the dataset were tortured, executed, or disappeared by DINA, and out of all the repression in which DINA engaged, 68% was directed at the MIR. As the logistic regression results demonstrated in Figure 2.5, the probability of victimization increased by 36% if the security agency after an individual was DINA, compared to all other security agencies. We also know, as described in Chapter 1, that DINA had the power and resources it needed to wage its counterinsurgency campaign and that it followed orders directly from Pinochet in doing so. Together, these pieces of evidence overwhelmingly show that the security forces interested in destroying the MIR had the resources and were determined to

achieve their objective. Therefore, this contention cannot account for the MIR's lower victimization rate.

Another rival explanation is that the MIR was uniquely positioned—through networks or international safe havens—to go into exile compared to the other leftist parties. It could have been the case that MIR members were on average wealthier or had comparatively more connections to be able to leave the country than members from other top targets. This hypothesis is also very implausible. First, the MIR's leadership categorically refused offers for asylum, calling on its militants to remain in Chile after the coup because it was the most important time to serve the country. The MIR's post-coup policy of never to seek asylum came directly from General Secretary Miguel Enríquez: “the MIR does not seek exile” (*el MIR no se asila*) was his iconic phrase (Pinto et al., 2006, p. 156, author's translation). For those reasons, the assaults against the leadership and the price it paid in absolute numbers for being the main target group (even if the overall rate of survival was much better than the rate of survival of the other leftist groups) was significant. *Miristas* took the leadership's orders seriously. The organization had a very hierarchical structure, and the few leaders who tried to seek asylum were called traitors and threatened with death by their own group (Pérez, 2003). By contrast, no other leftist party or movement had this policy of non-asylum. The top leadership of the other main leftist parties, such as the Communists, Socialists, MAPU, and UP, if they were not in prison or dead, left Chile a few months after the coup. By then it had become clear that the military junta was willing to use extreme force against the opposition (Angell, 1972, p. 128).

There is also evidence that the MIR did not have a comparative advantage in terms of resources. After coding the socioeconomic class of the individuals on the target and victims lists based on their occupation, Table 2.2 shows that *miristas* had a higher proportion of lower-class people and a much lower proportion of upper-class individuals, in comparison to non-MIR leftist parties and movements. The Codebook in Appendix A contains more information about how the dataset codes socioeconomic class.

Table 2.2. Socioeconomic Class of Individuals on Target and Victims Lists Based on Their Occupation

Socio-economic class	MIR	non-MIR
Low	148 (62.18%)	296 (60.66%)
Medium	66 (27.73%)	93 (19.06%)
High	24 (10.08)	99 (20.29)

In addition, the target lists have the occupation of the top officials of the MIR and other leftist political parties, indicating if an individual was a minister, senator, ambassador, or part of the top leadership of the opposition. This information enables the classification of certain members of these groups as possessing high social status, which is a reasonable proxy for the latent variable of ability to seek asylum. Within the highest rank of all top targets, the leadership fared about the same. The victimization rate for MIR and non-MIR leaders was approximately 37.5%. Therefore, among the social class most able to go into exile, the data show that the victimization rate was around the same, suggesting that the leaders' opportunity to seek asylum also fails to explain the MIR's overall lower rate of victimization.

Moreover, an additional piece of evidence that undermines the idea that *miristas* were more capable of seeking asylum than non-*miristas* has to do with the base and demographics of the movement. Both the MIR and the Communist Party had strong bases of support among the poor, which were intensely organized in shantytowns or *poblaciones* of Santiago. The MIR also organized the native population of *Mapuches* in the South, who were (and are) among the most disadvantaged groups in Chile (Schneider, 1995, p. 96; Pérez, 2003). The Targets and Victims dataset does not currently have enough observations with occupation/social class information to include those variables in the logistic regression model. However, there is secondary literature pointing to the fact that there were not as many differences between the bases of the various leftist parties. Moreover, there is little reason for concluding that the differences that exist would make the MIR more adept at surviving violent collective and selective repression.

The MIR and PS leadership tended to be from the middle and upper echelons of society, particularly the intellectual class, such as university students and professors. The MIR's core supporters were students, the poor, workers, or—to a lesser extent—labor union leaders (Garcés & Leiva, 2012). The Socialist Party was probably the most diverse in their membership base; they had support from the middle classes, the working poor, students, and labor unionists (Daire, 1986; Vargas & Díaz 2007). The Communist leadership tended to be workers and labor unionists (Alvarez, 2003, 2011).

Another alternative explanation is that the MIR was more locally embedded in the community than the PC and PS, which would explain their lower rate of victimization. Embeddedness is a difficult variable to measure, but there is some evidence indicating that the PS, PC, and MIR were all deeply embedded in their communities. If anything,

the MIR had less of a history with their communities of support because the founders constituted the group much more recently, in 1965. The Communist Party and Socialist Party, on the other hand, have been formal organizations since 1922 and 1933, respectively. Despite differences in the length of their historical presence, the three movements put immense emphasis on community organizing, volunteering, and education, which forged strong ties in the community (Alvarez, 2011). Indeed, organizing, educating, and serving the poor are the *raison d'être* of leftist political movements. There are four types of evidence that this chapter leverages to demonstrate that the level of embeddedness was similar across the three top targets and that, if anything, the MIR had a disadvantage in that regard.

First, electoral results from varying levels of government and different institutions show that the MIR, PS, and PC had wide public support. Results from the June 1973 parliamentary elections, which was two months before the coup that deposed President Allende, show that the Communist Party and Socialist Party were very popular in Chile—together they gained more than 50 of the 150 seats in parliament (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3. Parliamentary Election Results in Chile, Communist and Socialist Parties, June 1973

Parliamentary Elections June 1973	Votes (Chile's population in 1972: 9.7 million)	No. of Representatives (out of a total of 150)
Communist Party (PC)	593,738 (16.4%)	25
Socialist Party (PS)	678,796 (18.7%)	28

*Note:* Reproduced from Angell (1972, p. 94)

The electoral results for delegates to the largest coalition of labor unions in Chile, the CUT (*Central Unica de Trabajadores*), show a similar pattern of popularity and local embeddedness of the Communist and Socialist parties, at least among the working class. As illustrated in Table 2.4, the Communist Party gained 45% of the vote, while the Socialist Party won almost 25% and the MIR 1.4%. The small percentage for the MIR is typical of a more fringe and extreme organization.

Table 2.4. Electoral Results of the Largest Coalition of Labor Unions in Chile (CUT), 1968

Delegates elected to lead the largest umbrella union, the CUT ( <i>Central Unica de Trabajadores</i> )	Percentage vote, 1968
Communist Party (PC)	45.5%
Socialist Party (PS)	24.6%
MIR	1.4%

*Note:* Reproduced from Angell (1972, p. 94)

There is also evidence that the MIR was particularly popular and embedded among Chile's youth, with a strong following among university students. Table 2.5 shows that in the 1965 elections for University Council, the MIR won 505 votes in Santiago and 810 in Concepción, a far larger number than the Communist and Socialist parties in Concepción, and not a negligible amount in Santiago compared to the PS and PC.

Table 2.5. University Council Election Results in Santiago and Concepción for the PC, PS, and MIR, 1965

University Student Council Elections, 1965	Santiago	Concepción
Communist Party (PC)	2,175	198
Socialist Party (PS)	1,590	162
MIR	505	810

*Note:* Reproduced from (MIR Estrategia E1 (1965)

These electoral results show that the three top targets had considerable public support in different areas before the coup that deposed Allende. While elections show public support, they do not necessarily mean that the organizations are embedded in the community at a deeper level than support at the voting booth. Personal interviews with former militants from the three political movements are the second type of source to demonstrate these organizations' level of embeddedness. Militants from the top targets relied heavily on trusted friends, relatives, and connections through the party to change homes often after the military junta consolidated power and the secret police was after them. MIR, PC, and PS militants also had a tightly knit network of informers who gave them intelligence about how close the secret police were getting to them. For example, if the Armed Forces captured a militant, those connected to him or her would be very vulnerable. In those cases, the vulnerable militants relied on informers to learn about these captures as quickly as possible, change homes, flee to another state, and take other precautionary actions (Interviewee 75, April 2017, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 16, April 2016, Santiago de Chile).



At the same time, militants from the three targets faced difficulties as time went on. They reported their options for relying on very trustworthy contacts dwindling. There was widespread fear of aiding militants from the MIR, PS, and PC because those hiding militants would also be subjected to violent repression (Interviewee 66, April 2016, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 44, April 2016, Santiago de Chile). Thus, months and years of clandestine work was taking its toll, but affecting the three political movements in similar ways according to interviews with former militants.

The third type of evidence is a series of archival documents from the three organizations that demonstrate connections to their bases of support. Even as late as 1977, Secretary General of the Communist Party, Luis Corvalán, touted the party's widespread support from the people in the clandestine fight against Pinochet: "The party has been capable, despite the brutality of the repression, of maintaining a strong clandestine organization, rooted in the support of thousands of families from the *pueblo* whom from the first day opened their homes to the persecuted." (Luis Corvalán, Comité Central del Partido Comunista, 1977, p. 91, author's translation). Similarly, in 1974 the PS declared that the party was able to continue their activities underground despite the repression because of the strong organization that they had built throughout years. The PS also emphasized that alliances between all leftists was of utmost importance to continue the struggle, as well as to remain rooted in their bases of support (Comité Central del Partido Socialista, 1974). The MIR repeatedly emphasized in their publications and internal documents the importance of politicizing students, peasants, and other "mass-based" organizations. These efforts demonstrated that the membership base has "high explosive power and is always willing to act as long as there is capable leadership to

guide the way to insurrection” (MIR, 1965a, p. 11). Though the leadership of the top targets had an incentive to overstate their capabilities, including their level of support among the masses, these archival materials are representative of how the parties viewed their position in society and their reliance on deep ties to the community. Embeddedness was not only about survival, however. These statements reflect that their bases of support were instrumental in achieving their most important political objectives as well.

Secondary literature also supports the finding that the three top targets had widespread support and deep ties in the communities where they operated. The Socialist Party, for example, was enormous in size, particularly during the Allende administration. They forged ties in the industrial belt (*cordones industriales*) for decades and thus relied on those workers for their strongest bases of support (Gaudichaud, 2004; Vargas & Díaz, 2007). Similarly, the Communist Party also relied on labor unionists and workers for their bases of support, though they were much more cohesive as a party than the Socialists (Alvarez, 2003, 2011; Daire, 1986). There were at least three factions within the Socialist Party even before Pinochet reached power, and their main point of contention was the use of armed struggle (Gaudichaud, 2004). Research also points to the mass-based support the MIR had in Valparaíso and the Metropolitan Region, as well as in more rural areas where they organized peasants and even indigenous communities (MIR, August 1965). MIR militants organized and responded to the dictatorship in concert on the day of the coup, especially in poor neighborhoods (*poblaciones*) and in the industrial belt. They worked with Communists, Socialists, and MAPU militants in those neighborhoods to try to contain the coup; however, they did not have sufficient stockpiles and the Armed Forces did not break up as they anticipated (Garcés & Leiva, 2012).

In some notable occasions the MIR showed a lack of embeddedness, such as in their Neltume operation in 1981 (Comité de Memoria Neltume, 2013). A group of MIR militants known as the *Destacamento Toqui Lautaro* entered Chile through the mountain range bordering Argentina to establish a base camp for a guerrilla. Shortly after the start of their operation, the secret police detected them when they tried to gather food for the winter months. Their lack of embeddedness in those areas resulted in early detection and the detention of most insurgents. As mentioned earlier, the organizational structure and skills of militants are not sufficient for survival if there is no embeddedness or knowledge of the locality where the movement is operating. Organizational structure and skills go hand in hand with local embeddedness to reduce the likelihood of victimization. Despite examples like the failed Neltume operation, there is considerable evidence suggesting that the three top targets had support among the people they had organized for decades in the case of the Communists and Socialists, and for almost 10 years in the case of the MIR.

Finally, one could argue that the MIR had a lower rate of victimization because of the size of the organization. The MIR was a smaller political movement than the Communist and Socialist parties. The idea is that the smaller the size of the group, the more difficult it is to identify its militants, making it harder for the security forces to victimize them. It is unlikely that the overall size of the group made it more difficult for the secret police to detain their wanted MIR militants. The reason is that DINA did not randomly select people from the streets in order to find MIR militants. Instead, the security apparatus relied on intelligence gathering, infiltration work, and information about the movements they had from the democratic period (Fruhling, 1984). As the kill

lists show, the security forces had specific information about the individuals on the kill lists, sometimes even including their home addresses.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter shows that collective and selective violent repression against specific targets from a capable state leads the opposition to organize underground or to seek exile. Operating in clandestinity, however, requires a different organizational structure and set of skills than public electoral politics. Some top targets were thus more equipped to survive the military junta's repressive campaign when Pinochet reached power in 1973. The MIR, which had developed a semi-compartmentalized structure, as well as trained militants in underground organizing, was able to reduce their rate of victimization relative to the other top targets without these qualities. The more extreme ideology of the MIR, in turn, explains the organizational features that proved helpful to survive a counterinsurgency campaign. In particular, the MIR's ideology was based on a vision of Chile as a socialist utopia, which could only be attained through popular insurrection. Though they had mainly engaged in electoral politics and peaceful actions since their founding in 1965, MIR militants were also preparing for what they viewed was an inevitable revolutionary struggle to carry out land reform and other leftist projects. This philosophy led the MIR leadership to develop, even during the democratic period, a partial cell structure, safe houses, and parallel cadres and take other measures to wage the revolutionary struggle.

The puzzle of why the most important target of the secret police DINA had a lower rate of victimization leads one to inquire about the inner workings of the organization. An examination of ideology, organizational form, and skills, helps explain

the differences among the regime's top targets. The skills in underground organizing and the organizational structure for this mode of action seem to operate in a context of embeddedness in the community. Moreover, these capabilities in this case correlate with the use of armed struggle; however, nonviolent militants could theoretically train and use these methods for their protection against lethal collective and selective repression.

The chapter provides evidence for the argument about survival with an original individual-level dataset comparing those on the government's kill lists to those on the victimized lists. It also supports the theory about ideology leading to a particular organizational form and skills with archival materials, interview data, and secondary literature on the top targets. This is the first study to compare the resilience of various opposition groups facing government repression that overcome the selection problem of only being able to observe the repression the state carries out. Knowing the distribution of the intended victims allows us to discern organizational survival. With solely the victims lists from the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile could easily lead one to question the MIR's organizational capacity, training, and skills because their militants constituted such a disproportionate number of the victims of the dictatorship. Even accounting for the fact that we know the MIR was a top target of the government, it would have been unclear how much DINA's determination was responsible for such destruction versus sheer incompetence on the part of the group. Nonetheless, this chapter shows that the MIR had a far lower rate of victimization than other leftist parties on the regime's kill lists.

While underground organizing skills and a compartmentalized structure helped the MIR in these conditions, there are costs associated with these organizational features.

The type of organizing that the repression forced top targets to engage in after the coup put them at a disadvantage for mass popular mobilization. An organization equipped to survive underground is significantly limited in its ability to succeed in mobilizing large numbers of people for a mass protest movement or for running a public electoral campaign. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, consolidating a mass movement requires the forging of alliances with many different types of organizations, which would hardly be possible underground. At the same time, MIR militants played an essential role in the antecedent organizations that led to mass mobilization. Given that they were more likely than Socialists and Communists to stay in the country during the dictatorship, MIR militants organized in poor communities, near the protective arm of the Catholic Church, to continue educating, politicizing, and mobilizing the working people. Those who went into exile also survived but were less able to play their part in rebuilding the social fabric that violent repression disintegrated in Chile after September 11, 1973.

### **Chapter 3. The Hydra Effect: When Repression Creates Opposition Against Authoritarianism**

Shortly after the coup that deposed Socialist President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, the country's security forces started disappearing people for the first time in Chile's modern history. The "internal enemy" was the primary target of this form of state violence—that is, members of Allende's UP (*Unidad Popular*) party coalition, militants from the Communist and Socialist parties, as well as the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), and other Marxist sympathizers. The military junta's secret police, the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), and the Chilean Armed Forces abducted, interrogated under torture, killed, and hid the bodies of more than 1,300 individuals. The authorities never admitted to detaining those individuals or having them in custody, leaving families with lifelong quests for clues, hope that their loved ones are still alive, and lack of closure due to not being able to bury their remains. At least 40 people were abducted on the day of the coup who are still on the official list of the disappeared in Chile.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, this form of repression started from the very beginning of the dictatorship.

It took months, or in some cases years, for family members to realize and accept that their loved ones had been forcibly disappeared. The search for a missing family member took relatives to police stations, appellate courts, military regiments, and myriad government agencies. Relatives were sent from one detention facility to another, a trip

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<sup>1</sup> The count of the disappeared in Chile comes from the official lists from the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (February 1991), the Vicariate of Solidarity (November 1993), and the Association of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared (*Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos* or AFDD) (September 1995).

that often required days of travel, with false promises of getting better information on their loved ones' whereabouts. Less than one month after the coup, clerics from several Christian churches and leaders from the Jewish community formed an organization to help the victims of the regime called *Comité de Cooperación para la Paz* or COPACHI. They began recording victims' testimonies and providing them and their families with basic health, financial, and psychological assistance. Thus, the journey of family members looking for their loved ones, at least in the Greater Santiago area, started to also include stops at COPACHI and then at the *Vicariate of Solidarity* when Pinochet shut down COPACHI in 1975 (Cavallo, 1991; Hau, 2005). Cardinal Silva Henríquez was forced to close the ecumenical organization COPACHI under pressure from the military junta. The cardinal then immediately opened the Vicariate of Solidarity inside the Cathedral in Santiago. The Catholic Church in Chile began protecting this organization from the start, and it also committed to assisting only people from the opposition who had not used violence against the regime. That way the cardinal felt that he could manage Pinochet's pressure (Hau, 2005).

It was at police stations and religious assistance organizations where victims and their families started listening to stories of other victims. Relatives and victims also started sharing their own stories and realized that what they were going through was not an isolated incident. This process was crucial for mobilization to happen because the government was claiming, at least for the disappeared, that those individuals had crossed the border to Argentina. In 1975 the military junta said that the missing had gone abroad to train in guerrilla warfare, that armed groups had probably assassinated them, or that



they had died fighting the Argentinian military.<sup>2</sup> The families of the victims did not accept these stories from the military junta, recognizing how unlikely it would be that their family members would be engaging in these activities while accounts about the repression circulated about those who had been detained, tortured, and released.

This is the backdrop for the first public protests against the military regime in Chile and for the emergence of the Association of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared (AFDD or *Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos*) and the Association of the Relatives of the Executed (AFEP or *Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos*). AFDD and AFEP chapters, as well as other victims' organizations, began to spread across the country, especially in the areas most heavily affected by the repression. Nonetheless, in some localities, such as Paine and Isla de Maipo in the Metropolitan Region, no AFDD or AFEP organizations formed during the dictatorship despite comparable levels of executions and disappearances. These organizations were not only the first to organize public protests against the regime but were also partly responsible for delegitimizing the Pinochet dictatorship and DINA, as well as for ending the practice of disappearances (AFDD, 1986; Rettig, 1991; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1986). Why were some relatives of victims able to organize against repression and the Pinochet dictatorship while others were not? More generally, under what conditions does public nonviolent mobilization occur when repression is so high that most dissidents are in exile, underground, or demobilized?

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<sup>2</sup> A case in point are the newspaper articles between June and July 1975 that started a misinformation campaign to explain the fate of 119 MIR militants who had disappeared (“*el caso de los 119*”): <http://www.memoriaviva.com/Desaparecidos/119.htm>. DINA’s mission to disappear these 119 individuals was known as Colombo Operation (*Operación Colombo*).

In many cases, state repression has been found to demobilize the opposition. However, in other cases, it has a positive effect on mobilization, while in other studies, dissidents have been found to avoid repression altogether. Rather than adjudicating between these findings, the dissertation takes the position that repression has a multiplicity of effects and that observing certain patterns over others depends on the context. This chapter argues that state repression makes the emergence of *new nonviolent and public opposition* more likely when activists are protected at the local and national levels by a protector institution (PI).

Protector institutions are those that the government relies on for legitimacy and that are willing to lend some safeguards to the opposition. These institutions are spared the worst of the repression because of their relationship to the regime. Meanwhile, they play an indirect role in popular mobilization by decreasing the cost of high-risk activism. Potential activists who are under the protective wing of these actors feel less threatened and alone in their opposition to the regime and are, thus, more likely to organize. These institutions tend to be moderate in nature because they are also connected to the regime in power, thus promoting mobilization that rejects the use of violence and makes relatively more modest claims. However, this new opposition can pose an important challenge to authoritarian governments as they emerge in different localities, grow in numbers, and start making greater demands.

The chapter examines this theoretical proposition by focusing on disappearances and executions as a form of repression; on the relatives of victims as the protagonists of the mobilization; and on the role of Catholic priests, bishops, and cardinals as the protectors. It tests the effect of protector institutions in a multi-method approach that has

three components, including statistical analysis of two original datasets and in-depth interviews with activists from families of victim groups; families of victims in localities that remained disengaged; and priests, nuns, and leaders of the Catholic human rights organization, the Vicariate of Solidarity (*Vicaría de la Solidaridad*). The first dataset (Appendix B) geo-codes all the Catholic churches in the most populated state in Chile, the Metropolitan Region, along with the ideology of the head priest, and whether or not families of the victims organized in that municipality (*comuna*). Controlling for the level of repression, whether the locality is urban or rural, and the political party of the mayor in each municipality, logistic regressions show that there is a hydra effect: in places where the local priests are ideologically aligned with the opposition, the families of the regime's victims are far more likely to form opposition groups. In places where the local priests are pro-Pinochet, the families of the victims avoided forming public nonviolent groups. The national-level support the Catholic hierarchy provided in Chile was also very important, but it worked most effectively through actors at the local level.

The second dataset (Appendix C) was used to examine a similar relationship but across Chile. By coding the political leaning of all the bishops in the country who served at any time during the dictatorship and the location of where families of victim groups emerged, the chapter shows that the pattern holds beyond the Metropolitan Region. The ideology of bishops reflects on the priests' political tendencies at each church in every dioceses and archdioceses. Coding the ideology of all the head priests who served from 1973 to 1989 in Chile would be very difficult, if not impossible, and prohibitively time-consuming. Instead, the research relies on the fact that bishops have considerable power over the assignment of priests to the churches in their dioceses and archdioceses, as well

as substantial oversight of their activities (Cavallo, 1991; Oviedo Cavada, 1979; Visconti, 1997). To analyze the effect of bishops' ideology on mobilization, the chapter leverages the plausible as-if random assignment of bishops given their mandatory retirement at the age of 75. The analysis compares bishops whose appointments were heavily influenced by a more pro-opposition cardinal from 1973 to 1982 (Cardinal Silva Henríquez) and a more pro-Pinochet one from 1983 to 1989 (Fresno Larraín). This instrumental variable design makes the identification of Catholic bishops' effect as a protector institution on the likelihood of mobilization more persuasive. These data are still suggestive, however, given the large standard errors that come with the small sample size of bishops in Chile.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, in-depth personal interviews with the leaders of families of victim groups, as well as families of victims in locations where no such organizations formed until after Pinochet left power in 1990, provide strong evidence for understanding the role of protector institutions in nonviolent public mobilization. According to my interviews with residents of active and inactive communities, in areas where the protector institution was lacking, such as in localities where the priest was pro-Pinochet, these opposition groups were unable to form despite many attempts. Also based on interviews with the protagonists, the chapter discusses the types of protection—and its limits—that came from priests, bishops, and professionals who worked at the Vicariate of Solidarity.

The main finding of this chapter is that the likelihood of nonviolent public mobilization, specifically by the families of the victims of the regime, dramatically increased when the group could count on a protector institution at the local level, such as from Catholic priests and Catholic assistance organizations in their communities. At the

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<sup>3</sup> There are not enough bishops in Chile during this period to create a larger sample size. For a stand-alone article or my book, I plan to expand this dataset to other countries, such as Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, to get a larger sample size and test the argument's generalizability.

same time, local protectors were connected to a national-level hierarchy within the Catholic Church that had resources, powerful connections, and legitimacy within the military junta, all of which the cardinal was willing to use to lend assistance and protection to the regime's victims. These nonviolent public efforts became widespread across Chile and channeled grief and frustration from the population affected by the regime's violence. State violence thus generates nonviolent rather than violent opposition where there are protector institutions to support such mobilization at the local level. These third parties strengthened efforts to open civil society space, mitigate further state repression, and possibly also undermine violent extremism.

### **From Repression to Mobilization**

Extensive work has been done on the unintended consequences of state violence for the regime in power. Counterinsurgency campaigns and other forms of state repression can swell the ranks of armed groups (Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Wickham-Crowley, 1993) or serve as a generative force in protest movements (Earl, 2006; Hess & Martin, 2006; Lawrence, 2013, 2017; Schock, 2004). This section shows that the argument that protector institutions facilitate the emergence of new opposition can be conceived as an extension of the political process model (PPM), as well as a refinement of theories about the role of third parties in conflict and safe spaces.

Repression is at the core of how the political process model explains a lack of mobilization in places where one would expect public dissent, expression of grievances, and demands for change. According to this theoretical framework, dissent is largely a function of three factors: ideological or cultural frames, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities. "The first provides the ideological motivation for claims making,

group identity, and group action; the second provides the means for taking action; and the third provides the ‘perceived’ opportunity within which groups can engage in contentious politics” (Davenport et al., 2005, p. xv). In regimes that are capable and willing to use violence against their citizens, most commonly a characteristic associated with authoritarian regimes (Davenport, 2007; Davenport et al., 2005; Lichbach, 1987), social movement organizations are less likely to emerge. Indeed, repression is a closure of political opportunities.

But the variable political opportunity, or a lack thereof, is much broader than repression. Political opportunities are “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 85). Examples include access to participation for new actors; the evidence of political realignment within the polity; emerging splits within the elite; a decline in the state’s capacity or will to repress dissent; system-wide crises, such as war and depression; and the appearance of influential allies (Goldstone, 1980; Tarrow, 1998). This last category of political opportunity, the presence of influential allies, is particularly relevant here, as the concept of protector institutions—a main explanatory variable in this study—could belong in that class of factors. Even though the political process model captures the most general dynamic of the case of Chile, as explained below, this chapter’s predictions about mobilization derive specifically from repression and local protector institutions. Part of the objective in this chapter is to extend PPM by making the distinction between local- and national-level political opportunities, as well as by refining the category of “influential allies” as a local political opportunity and showing how they make

mobilization more likely. Within this line of research there is far less work on how repression is a political opportunity rather than a hindrance (Goodwin & Jasper, 2009), and that is the gap this chapter examines and seeks to fill.

When it comes to the specifics in the case of Chile, the political process model is useful as a starting point: repression severely hampered mobilization in the first five years of the dictatorship when the most aggressive secret police, DINA, was in operation (Fruhling, 1983, 1984). Moreover, large public protests became widespread during the economic crisis of the early 1980s and when the United States started pressuring Pinochet to improve his human rights record. Further civil society space opened up during the 1989 plebiscite, when Chileans had a chance to express their dissent in a more institutional manner (Orellana & Hutchison, 1991). These political opportunities, however, are less suited to explain the temporal and geographic variation in a wide range of collective action efforts (Davenport et al., 2005; Tilly, 2005), including the emergence of victims' groups as early as 1974 and public actions by labor unions as early as 1976 (AFDD, 1986; Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, August 1976). Given the level of repression at the time, we would not have expected these public demonstrations of dissent in Chile.

Going more in depth regarding how repression can be a mobilizing force, what have researchers found on the subject? What distinguishes post-repression collective action from post-repression demobilization? When state repression is overt and highly disproportionate, it can create a backlash of large mass protests against the government by generating anger, a deep sense of injustice, and moral outrage (DeNardo, 1985; Wood 2000, 2003). Francisco (2004) found that massacres lead to mobilizations that dwarf

previous actions when information continues to be transmitted through the personal networks of the activists or victims, when there is sustained leadership in the movement, and when there is tactical adaptation. This tactical adaptation means that instead of large mass protests and riots in the immediate aftermath of a massacre, which are often met with more violence by the state, the backlash often takes other forms. Once the leadership of the movement re-evaluates and assesses risks, they are likely to advocate for acts of dispersion that are harder to repress, such as strikes and boycotts (Francisco, 2004). Political violence (Lichbach, 1987) and clandestine organizing (della Porta, 2013) are also common tactical adaptations as a consequence of repression.

However, the risk of employing these other tactics may still be great. For example, “[i]n martial-law Poland, the GDR, and the former Soviet Union, party cells in factories and mines reported names of absent employees” (Francisco, 2004, p. 116) This form of repression in the workplace demonstrates that even remaining at home can be dangerous. In an effort to explain participation in high-risk collective action at the individual level, studies have demonstrated the importance of emotions, norms, and psychological mechanisms (Petersen, 2001; Shesterinina, 2016; Wood, 2003).

For Petersen, the social networks of first movers, as well as the norms associated with those groups, can explain individuals’ decisions to join a movement: “as the risks increased, the individual’s set of closest connections, his community, became the key source of information and influence” (Petersen, 2001, p. 2). According to Petersen (2001) and Gould (1995), the key piece for mobilization is the structure of the networks within where the first movers are situated. The denser and more centralized the network, the more likely one threshold will tip over to the next through social sanction, thereby



generating a cascading effect. Community norms and social pressure mitigate the free-rider problem that pervades these situations, as social progress is a non-excludable good (Olson, 1965). There is no reason to think, however, that familial and communal ties were systematically different across restive and non-restive localities in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago.

Shesterinina's (2016) explanation for early mobilization in an armed conflict draws on this idea of personal networks and argues that they serve as the frame through which potential joiners evaluate the level of threat involved in participation. "Without an understanding of who is threatened, by whom, and to what extent, individuals have no basis on which to make difficult choices about whether to risk their lives fighting" (Shesterinina, 2016, p. 411). This idea of threat perception being shaped by the actors around individuals in a community rings very true in the case of relatives mobilizing for their disappeared in Chile. Local priests served the dual purpose of informing about risk, but they went beyond that to provide protection to the families of the victims.

Wood (2003) argued that it is pleasure in agency, or the "value they [peasants] put on being part of the making of history" that explains their participation in high-risk collective action (p. 19). Defiance as a response to repression is valued for its own sake, regardless of whether it results in victory. Wood explained non-participation partly by the location of the armed group. The presence of a rebel group in the area gave an opportunity for peasants to participate, as a soldier or active supporter, in defying the country's armed forces and exploitative regime. Activists from AFDD and AFEP in Chile certainly took pleasure in agency and in defying the military regime, though this chapter is also interested in explaining the differences between the localities where these

opposition groups emerged and those where they did not. Protector institutions can help explain the presence of this type of opposition group and, thus, the opportunity to participate in a nonviolent public effort against the regime as early as six months after the coup.

The works explaining individual motivations to participate in high-risk collective action place emphasis on first movers and their networks. Research on the backfiring of repression also focuses on first movers (i.e., early risers or political entrepreneurs). “The existence of ‘first actors,’ those holding a zero percent threshold, is one of the most important factors in triggering community-level rebellion. Without them, no movement can begin. The essential nature of first actors or political entrepreneurs plays a large role in the literature on collective action in general and rebellion in particular” (Petersen, 2001, p. 66). We know that repression can backfire by mobilizing first movers, who react because of repression rather than in spite of it (Loveman, 1998; Popkin, 1979). Individuals within the social networks of the first movers are also more likely to mobilize following crackdowns, compared to those outside of their community (Lawrence, 2017). McAdam (1986) reported a similar finding regarding kinship and close friendship after examining how Freedom Summer volunteers were recruited to go to Mississippi to register black voters and risk their lives in the process. But what do we know about first movers other than that they are zero-threshold players (Kuran, 1989, 1997; Petersen, 2001)?

Recent work analyzes the heterogeneous effects of repression and points to the fact that a history of repression matters. For one, first movers tend to come from families that have experienced repression in the past. Personal experience with selective state

violence has been found to lead to more effective mobilization in the future (Finkel, 2015, 2017). Political entrepreneurs also tend to come from families that suffered state crackdowns, whether they had a history of activism or not (Lawrence, 2017). These findings are consistent with the case of Chile. All the first movers from AFDD and AFEP were by definition individuals whose families had been affected by the repression—indeed, they were responding to the disappearances or executions of their primarily male family members. But they were also first movers in the larger landscape of mobilization in Chile. The first public protests that the Pinochet regime faced were by activists from AFDD and AFEP, most of whom were women (Rettig, 1991).

However, these theories cannot explain why we observe mobilization in some localities and relative quiet in others. There is a need to unpack the “first mover” category, rather than taking it as a universal type of person across contexts. The women who founded the AFDD, for example, had a zero threshold in a specific circumstance, namely the disappearance of their children and partners, and under some conditions, namely the presence of a protector institution. There are regions in Chile with dozens or hundreds of disappeared and, thus, family members of victims as potential first movers, yet have no public collective action to speak of. It is unclear if the women who mobilized in 1974 would be zero-threshold players in another situation in their communities. Further, the mechanisms through which repression passes down mobilization inter-generationally and through social networks are less clear in the literature. In the case of the AFDD and AFEP in Chile, this chapter shows that repression led to intergenerational mobilization through the process of seeking information and justice for their loved ones.

Heeding the call to investigate how different actors within society react to repression (Davenport & Moore, 2012; Lawrence, 2017), this chapter focuses on how repression made first movers out of the relatives of the victims under some conditions. Political executions and disappearances, as opposed to only political imprisonment (Lawrence, 2017), were the forms of repression that these families suffered. It is unquestionable that the AFDD and AFEP were a direct consequence of repression. However, the fear of subsequent state violence led some families to avoid searching for their loved ones and demanding information from the authorities, let alone engaging in public acts of defiance against the dictatorship. By examining some of the earliest forms of public protest to the military regime, the chapter defines who the first movers were and why they mobilized.

Social movement scholars also point to the availability of resources to explain the emergence of protest and opposition groups, particularly from disadvantaged groups in society (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). “Human time and effort along with money” are the most common resources that movements need to emerge and consolidate. There are also many other types of resources the literature has pointed to, including a “fivefold typology of moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources” (Edwards & McCarthy 2003, p. 117). Allies to social movement organizations—such as political parties (Soule et al., 1999), the media (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), established social movement organizations (Minkoff, 1997), the business and political elite (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977), and religious organizations (Morris, 1986)—provide combinations of these types of resources. Catholic priests, bishops, and the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile, as protector institutions, fit this resource framework because they provided moral,

human, social-organizational, and material resources to the relatives of the victims. The difficulty with this part of the social movements literature is that resource is as broadly defined as the concept of political opportunity, creating an overlap of the two. The type of protector institution of concern here could be conceptualized as a political opportunity in PPM just as well as it could be a resource enabling the emergence of mobilization by the relatives of victims as an opposition group.

By way of getting into the concept and theoretical underpinnings of protector institutions that this chapter proposes, as well as the type of protector institution that Catholic priests, bishops, and the Vicariate of Solidarity represent, the next section incorporates the literature on allies, third-party interveners, and safe spaces in anti-regime campaigns.

### **Protector Institutions and the Catholic Church**

The concept of protector institutions (PIs) sits at the intersection of third-party intervention, allies, and safe spaces in the social movements and conflict literatures. A protector institution in the context of an authoritarian regime and high-risk collective action is an entity that increases the safety of an opposition group or a range of opposition groups. The principal function of a protector institution is to safeguard the opposition—to reduce state violence against them or at least to increase the perception of safety on the part of the opposition. How do protector institutions mitigate state repression against the opposition or at least contribute to a greater sense of security? The provision of information, communication, and symbolic support is most important. While the objective of the protector institution might not be to incentivize collective action, their intervention has a mobilizing effect by virtue of reducing fear among potential dissidents.

Protector institutions intervene in the relationship between the state and the opposition and, in so doing, play an important role regarding information. Protectors may provide information to the opposition about how the regime could react to certain behaviors, thus enabling the opposition to better calibrate their actions by the level of risk involved. In addition, given their access to both parties to the conflict, protector institutions may even gather data about the conflict, thereby becoming key sources of information at a time when media are censored. For instance, if victims feel secure sharing their testimony with PIs, these institutions may start amassing highly detailed information about repression within the country (Navarro, 2001). At the same time, protectors may offer direct channels of communication—sometimes the only channel—between the two parties. For example, leaders of protector institutions may directly appeal to the regime to show restraint by explaining the plight of the opposition, humanizing them, and clarifying their intentions. These functions mean that protector institutions have a local and a national component. PIs have to be local actors with deep knowledge of communities, which allows them to identify potential dissidents and offer information about the risks of participation. At the same time, plentiful resources and connections to the elite at the national level make local actors more successful in their protective role. Indeed, protector institutions can be placed on a continuum from least to most effective in safeguarding potential dissidents. The most effective PIs have a local component that is infused with power and networks by the national component.

Protector institutions are ideologically midway between the state and the opposition, or in another plane altogether, removed from the main cleavage of the conflict. Protector institutions are legitimate in the eyes of both parties to the conflict;

they cannot be associated too closely with the state or the opposition. Given the legitimacy that the protector institution has, both parties to the conflict have an incentive to win it over to their side. Protector institutions, once they emerge, thus change the calculus for both the state and the opposition group. They make state repression costlier for the regime and collective action less costly for the opposition. Knowing that such a legitimate actor is on their side, opponents of the regime feel safer in their defiance. State repression may be less severe, and, if it is severe, at least PIs will document and be witness to the violence (Interview with Ana González Recabarren, May 2017, Santiago de Chile). The violations of human rights will be widely recognized sooner or later, both internally and abroad. Further, in some situations PI leaders may even protect dissidents with their own bodies because they know that the security forces will show much more restraint in that situation (Schneider, 1995).

Secondarily, funding, material resources, and expertise are other ways in which PIs assist opposition groups (Cavallo, 1991). In addition to access to physical and symbolic spaces, protector institutions may also provide spiritual support, which typically happens in religious communities (Harvey, 2012). Private spaces such as the home and some public “protected” spaces, such as the mosque, are examples in the literature of sites where state intervention is not legitimate. Faith-based communities have also played a role in what social movement scholars call “safe” or “protected spaces,” meaning “physical domains and the social organizations within them that institutionally, legally, and *normatively* are off-limits to state intervention” (Tétreault, 1993, p. 277, emphasis mine). They are the “environments in which people are able to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills, and values of cooperation and

civic virtue... they are ‘schools for democracy’ owned by participants themselves” (Evans & Boyte, 1992, p. ix). The function of free spaces is to “also provide the conceptual space in which dominated groups are able to penetrate the prevailing common sense that keeps most people passive in the face of injustice” (Polletta, 1999, p. 33). Other institutions serve as free spaces, not just religious institutions. University dormitories, and college campuses more generally, have also been described as serving this purpose, as in the Tiananmen Square student mobilization (Aminzade et al., 2001).

Protector institutions are in some respects different from free spaces. In order to be considered a PI, the protector does not need to provide a physical space where identities are formed and the discourse for the resistance is created. Protector institutions do not usually go so far as to be sites of recruitment for the opposition or places to forge and acquire leaders, such as was the case for black churches in the South during the American civil rights movement. These religious communities played a much more constitutive role in African-American mobilization than the one protector institutions played in Chile for families of victims’ groups (Morris, 1986). As Harvey (2012) pointed out, the majority of African-American parishes were “agents of mass mobilization” during the Civil Rights Movement, as churchgoers became participants in the struggle and preachers became leaders.

The protection that PIs bestow on potential dissidents is not as geographically delineated either. The concepts of safe spaces and peace communities imply that activists are not safe once they leave those spaces. Rather, PIs make mobilization safer, or to be perceived as safer, because the regime views the PI as legitimate and too costly to repress those for whom it advocates. For example, the secret police in Chile would very often



know if the local priest was protecting the relatives of the victims, because security agents relied on members of the community, including priests, to gather information about dissidents (Interviewee 54, Isla de Maipo, RM, April 2016). Most priests were not forthcoming to the security forces, though some helped the military junta detain leftists (Interviewee 14, Santiago de Chile, April 2016). Further, the police would become aware of the support from local Catholic authorities when relatives of victims publicly protested. The Vicariate of Solidarity in Santiago, for example, would send attorneys to advocate for the relatives who had been detained for protesting. Another way in which security forces learned about the local pattern of support was by the location that relatives chose for their protests. For example, one of the first public protests that the AFDD organized was at a park in front of Cardinal Silva Henríquez's home (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, July 1976). The national-level aspect of the protection—that is, the fact that the cardinal and the Catholic hierarchy in Chile supported these protective efforts—made geography matter less. However, geography was to some extent important because a priest in one locality would not have been able to provide the same protection to individuals who wanted to protest in another locality.

Whether the individuals were meeting in a church or protesting on the street, norms and tradition made repression toward the protected costlier for the military junta. The regime's deference to the Catholic Church in Chile was partly responsible for this change in state behavior. As far as private spaces go, however, in Chile the home was not respected, as the literature on safe spaces implies. The Armed Forces repeatedly and systematically went into homes and conducted forced searches without warrants,

destroyed people's belongings in search for arms, and held people hostage and tortured them in their own homes (Moya et al., 2005).

The idea of peace communities is also tangentially related to protected spaces and protector institutions in that their main function is to protect people from armed groups (Alther, 2006; Kaplan, 2017; Masullo, 2017). Peace communities organize to protect themselves from armed groups in the context of civil wars by negotiating, deceiving, protesting, avoiding, and using other autonomy strategies (Kaplan, 2017). Even though protector institutions are rooted territorially in the sense that local actors and information are central, the source of the protection is different. PIs rely on the role of information, communication, and their own legitimacy to reduce the cost of high-risk activism for potential dissidents. Peace communities, on the other hand, make agreements or deceive armed groups in order to avoid violence, and those engaging the perpetrators of violence are the activists themselves. Instead, PIs are separate actors engaging in third-party intervention.

While it is very costly for the regime to violently repress protector institutions, PIs are also constrained in their actions because the regime places limits on what actions are acceptable to carry out without punishment. Bishops and the cardinal are typically spared from violence; they would not be killed, disappeared, or tortured. However, some priests and Vicariate of Solidarity employees could suffer these forms of punishment if they deviated from the code of conduct that the regime and the PI tacitly negotiated. For example, it would be difficult to imagine Chilean security forces killing a cardinal, but a few priests, particularly those of the liberation theology persuasion, were tortured and killed (Valech, 2005). This repression was rare, however. Generally, priests at the local

level could successfully leverage their authority and channel the Catholic Church in Santiago for support in their efforts (Interviewee 86, Santiago de Chile, April 2017). An important implication of these constraints on the PI is that an entity could not usually play the role of protector in the way described in this chapter if it supported an opposition group that engaged in armed action or if it supported the opposition too overtly. The PI maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of the regime as long as it remained within the bounds of assistance and protection. Thus, the opposition groups that would benefit most from PIs were primarily engaging in nonviolent action.

Protector institutions are also not infallible. Opposition groups under their protection may still be vulnerable to political violence because certain agencies within the repressive apparatus of the state do not respect the PI or do not feel bound by their advocacy. Further, non-state repressive agents that support the regime in power may not be constrained by the PI. For example, right-wing paramilitary organizations may still perpetrate violence against opposition groups regardless of PI support. Even though in Argentina the Catholic Church hierarchy did not lend as much support to the families of the victim groups, such as to the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, many priests did offer their support at the local level to these types of groups. Right-wing paramilitary organizations and death squads in Argentina, along with the Argentinian Armed Forces, perpetrated violence against priests and congregations that deviated from the pro-regime line. On several occasions they bombed churches as punishment for supporting the opposition (Mignone, 1991, 2006). Priests in Argentina lacked the national-level backing, or the legitimacy, connections, and resources that accompany it. When and under what conditions will Catholic priests, bishops and cardinals choose to serve the opposition, and

when and under what conditions will the regime feel bound by those religious leaders are questions that the instrumental variable analysis in part seeks to address. There is also scholarly work on the first question (Cavanaugh, 1998; Smith, 1982), though not much on the second.

There are also unintended consequences of protector institutions. In some cases, international organizations like Amnesty International or the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights may serve as protector institutions, provided that they have a local presence and if the regime feels at least somewhat constrained by these entities. However, there have been cases when advocacy by these organizations in fact increases violent repression against the opposition group they are protecting. In Argentina, for example, visits by international human rights organizations might have resulted in the killing and disappearance of prisoners so as to “clean” detention facilities and show that there were no political prisoners (Mignone, 1991, p. 95).

Having described the functions and limits of protector institutions, the question remains: Which types of entities can serve this purpose? PIs vary by place and conflict; in extreme cases there may be regimes that are not constrained by any institution that is also willing to lend some support to the opposition. There are also types of opposition groups for which there are no protector institutions. Catholic priests, bishops, the cardinal, and the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile, for example, did not protect armed actors in Chile. The Communist Party (PC) and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) supported and served as allies to the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR), an armed insurgency that formed in the mid-1980s. The PC and MIR, however, were not protector institutions—they were also main targets of the Pinochet dictatorship and could, thus,

never help mitigate violence against FPMR. Depending on the circumstances, third parties that could also serve the role of protector institutions include political parties (della Porta, 1988; Wickham-Crowley, 1993); religious communities (Cavallo, 1991; Harvey, 2012; Morris, 1986); universities (Aminzade et al., 2001); labor unions; professional organizations; national and international nongovernmental organizations, including human rights organizations (Loveman, 1998; Navarro, 2001); and political and economic elites (Arrington, 2016).

In light of the diverse set of actors that may serve as protector institutions, it is worth examining the kind of PI that the Catholic Church constitutes in a best-case scenario for a PI (i.e., a protector institution on the most effective side of the continuum). Its reach in society is perhaps the most important unique feature of the Catholic Church and makes it a special type of protector institution. In some cases, the Catholic Church rivals the state in its reach across the territory. Parishes populate the whole nation-state, from the largest metropolis to the most remote areas. This institution does not merely cover every inch of some countries, but it also has faithful followers at all levels of society—from the poorest to the richest. Clergymen and women have access to people from the grassroots and very local levels, as well as from the political and economic elites in the country and internationally. Given the important role of information and communication in how protector institutions function, this potentially unprecedented reach and access are invaluable. Advocating for the opposition to the right people in government, gathering information about the opposition group's intentions and activities, and recording human rights violations to measure the level of repression and track

government actions in specific neighborhoods are all possible for Catholic actors in places where the Church is ubiquitous.

The importance of the Catholic Church's reach for mobilization was also apparent in communities where the congregations were pro-Pinochet. In these areas, the regime could harness the local knowledge of the priests and nuns to help the security forces identify leftist party militants, labor union leaders, and other potential dissidents, as occurred in Lonquén (Interviewee 54, April 2016, Isla de Maipo, Metropolitan Region). A pro-Pinochet congregation could thus actively help the regime overcome the central problem of counterinsurgency campaigns—identifying the enemy of the state—which makes regimes look for local collaborators (Kalyvas, 2006). The Catholic Church's embeddedness is a double-edged sword in that sense; religious communities can be a significant help for the opposition but also a major obstacle for mobilization if they are in favor of the regime. There were also priests that chose to remain neutral, positing that the separation of Church and state required them to be completely outside of politics. Ideologically, priests fell on a continuum from very conservative and pro-Pinochet to pro-leftist and espousing liberation theology, though on the whole the Chilean Catholic Church denounced Pinochet's excesses.

The second most important feature of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis its role as a PI in a best-case scenario is the legitimacy of a sacred institution, which is important at the local and national levels. As explained previously, PIs by definition have to be legitimate in the eyes of the opposition—so that potential dissidents seek their help and trust their protection—as well as in the eyes of the regime in power—so that they may not get repressed themselves and have the chance of mitigating violence against unarmed

activists. There are few, if any, institutions in Chile with more legitimacy than the Catholic Church, including in the 1970s and '80s despite, the popularity of Marxist parties. The anti-religious aspect of Marxism did not take root in Chile in a significant way despite widespread support for leftist political parties (Cavallo, 1991; Stern, 2006). In addition, the Chilean Armed Forces and Pinochet's military junta prided themselves in being pious and aligned with Christian values. "There was . . . a moral battle waged throughout the dictatorship between the Church and the authoritarian incarnation of the State for the hearts and minds of the Chilean people. The regime was not prepared to surrender its pretensions of hegemony, or the [Catholic Church's] hierarchy its right to guide the moral principles of the faithful" (Lowden, 1995, p. 137).

The 1960 and 1970 census show that 89% to slightly over 90% of the population identified as Catholic, with the higher number corresponding to 1970 rather than in 1960. There was no census in 1980 (Valenzuela et al., 2013). A representative survey of Chileans in the Metropolitan Region (the most populated state in Chile, which includes the capital of Santiago) in 1987 also reveals the importance of religion and faith for Chileans. When asked to choose the top two factors that were most important to get ahead in life, 26.4% of the sample chose "faith in God," above all other options, including hard work and personal effort, education, family unity, luck, the political and economic policies of governments, organization, and solidarity with others.<sup>4</sup> Ideally, survey data about the level of trust in the Catholic Church would be available for the 1970s and '80s. However, representative surveys with those specific questions did not exist until 1990 and 1996, when the World Values Survey (WVS) and Latinobarometer

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<sup>4</sup> FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales) Chile, "Encuesta de Cultural Política" Documento de Trabajo Programa FLACSO-Santiago de Chile, Número 366, Diciembre 1987 <http://flacsochile.org/biblioteca/pub/memoria/1987/000281.pdf>.

fielded their surveys in Chile, respectively.<sup>5</sup> The 1990 World Values Survey reveals that Chileans trust the Catholic Church far more than any other institution referenced in the survey, including the Armed Forces, police, labor unions, education system, bureaucracy, press/media, and the legal system (Inglehart et al., 2014). A total of 76% of those sampled said they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Catholic Church, compared to 58.8% for the police, 47.2% for the labor unions, and 40.5% for the Armed Forces. Consistent with these findings, in 1996 Latinobarómetro reported that around 80% of Chileans trusted the Catholic Church “a lot” or “somewhat.”<sup>6</sup>

Nonetheless, during the tumultuous decades of the 1960s and early 1970s in Chile, the Catholic Church was concerned about losing ground to Marxist ideology (Cavallo, 1991). There were thus efforts to better understand the concerns of the poor and focusing on the teachings of Christ, which became crystalized at the Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellín, Colombia in 1968 (Cavanaugh, 1998). In the late 1960s, with the Christian Democrats in power, the Catholic Church dramatically increased their presence at the grassroots level, investing in food programs, education, health, shelter, and after-school programs in the poorest neighborhoods (Bruey, 2007; Cavallo, 1991; Giraudier, 2015). To organize this undertaking in 1964, the Catholic Church further subdivided the territory by regions in Greater Santiago and created the “*vicarías zonales*,” with “Vicarios” assigned to each (Lowden, 1995). At the same time, the Church wanted to avoid the perception that it was becoming leftist and political; it wanted to avoid alienating their right-wing followers. In fact, the Church had antipathy for the Allende administration and did not denounce the military coup when it occurred, though they

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<sup>5</sup> The World Values Survey does not field their survey in Chile in 1980, which is their earliest iteration with the religion questions.

<sup>6</sup> Latinobarómetro 1996.



became firm against the repression that ensued targeting both the laity and non-believers (Cavallo, 1991). The Catholic hierarchy in Chile, at the helm of which was Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, felt that it had to act according to the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lowden, 1995).

In addition to reach and legitimacy, another unique feature of the Catholic Church is the spiritual and emotional support that it can provide its followers. Only religious communities have the ability to wield the power of faith. This characteristic is not crucial for a protector institution, though it makes it more effective. Many relatives of victim groups did not have a spiritual dimension in their struggle. For example, some of the founders and highly committed members were Communist Party militants and non-believers. They admired the Vicariate of Solidarity because their assistance was never contingent on faith, political party, or any other affiliation (Interviewee 37, May 2016, Santiago de Chile). That said, there were opposition groups with important spiritual components, such as the one founded by Jesuit Priest José Aldunate, the Movement against Torture Sebastián Acevedo. This opposition group adhered to radical nonviolence following the teachings of Christ, used prayer during protests, and encouraged its members to support each other through faith.

The Catholic Church has other features that make it a particularly effective protector institution, though these features are not requirements for an actor to be a PI. The Catholic Church has enormous wealth in material resources and international connections. But these do not necessarily set it apart from other PIs. For example, the United Nations in Chile, Amnesty International–Chile, and the Christian Democratic

party are all potential protector institutions with significant material resources and powerful international connections.

Having examined the concept of protector institutions and the Catholic Church as a PI in particular, the next section delves into the dependent variable—the mobilization that emerged as a consequence of repression, organized by the relatives of the families of the disappeared.

### **High-Risk Collective Action by Relatives of Victims in Chile**

This chapter aims to contribute to scholarly work on mobilization under repression. This study focuses on the emergence of public nonviolent opposition groups at the height of the repression. During this period, which lasted roughly seven years, from 1973 to 1980, there were no large-scale protests in Chile or other mass public displays of resistance against the regime. Any other nonviolent or armed resistance took place underground. Those that organized publicly during this period were the relatives of the victims and the religious communities that supported them. There were also a few public demonstrations of dissent by labor unions, which were also protected by local priests, bishops, Cardinal Silva Henríquez, and the Vicariate of Solidarity (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, April 1976, March 1977, October 1977). Though this chapter's empirics focus on the groups that the relatives of the disappeared and executed formed (AFDD and AFEP), there were also other types of victim groups that behaved in a similar way. The relatives of political prisoners unofficially started organizing in 1974 with the family members of Air Force service members who had been imprisoned for disagreeing with the coup, and then it expanded to include other political prisoners (Orellana & Hutchison, 1991). The relatives of political prisoners (AFPP or *Agrupación de*

*Familiares de Prisioneros Políticos*) forged a relationship with local priests, bishops, Cardinal Silva Henríquez, and the Vicariate of Solidarity that protected them, as they did for AFDD and AFEP (Orellana & Hutchison, 1991).

The associations of the relatives of the disappeared and executed were extremely consequential for two main reasons. They were the first to publicly defy the regime and thus to corrode their legitimacy domestically and internationally during a time when the military junta had an absolute grip on power. Shortly before the coup, the Allende administration had been gaining opponents from centrists, such as the Christian Democratic party (DC), as well as from the Catholic Church and other religious communities. The DC publicly supported the coup.<sup>7</sup> The Catholic Church hierarchy did not denounce the actions of the military on September 11, 1973, and were clearly not in favor of the Allende administration (Cavallo, 1991). Many were relieved that the chaos and economic instability surrounding the Allende administration would cease with this transition. For that reason one could argue that the Chilean Armed Forces enjoyed a period of goodwill from many Chileans—far beyond the political right—whereby people were willing to give them a chance to end Popular Unity's government and take the country to new democratic elections, with the expectation that the DC would win (Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1986). In addition, shortly after Allende's deposition the Chilean economy improved. Given this context and the fact that state repression was not very visible, AFDD faced an uphill battle to delegitimize the military—to show their excesses to the average Chilean.

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<sup>7</sup> Patricio Aylwin, who headed the Christian Democratic party at the time, famously agreed with the coup, though the political party was divided on the matter: <http://www.cnnchile.com/noticia/2013/08/14/el-rol-de-la-dc-en-el-golpe-militar-de-1973>.

The second reason these organizations are significant is that they help explain the demise of the secret police, DINA, and the practice of disappearances by the Pinochet regime. AFDD takes credit for ending disappearances in Chile by 1977 (AFDD, 1986), and there is evidence that they at least played a role. The change in the form of state violence bears out in the pattern of violence recorded by the first Chilean truth commission (Rettig, 1991); there are essentially no disappearances after 1977, though political executions, and especially imprisonment and torture, remained commonplace, per the two Valech Commissions (Valech, 2005). This shift in the form of state repression coincided with the replacing of DINA, which was headed by the notorious Manuel Contreras, with another agency called the National Intelligence Directorate (*Central Nacional de Informaciones* or CNI). Declassified documents from the U.S. State Department and National Security Agency (NSA) show that the Carter administration pressured Pinochet to shut down DINA, especially after their assassination of Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, near the White House in Washington, DC (Kornbluh, 2013). The CNI was not dramatically different from DINA—the only real difference was that Manuel Contreras was not at the helm of the new agency. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that pressure generated by AFDD, culminating in a highly publicized trip by the leaders of the organization to the United Nations in September 1977, made Pinochet re-evaluate the cost of disappearing people.

As described in the introduction to this chapter, the relatives of those abducted by the security forces—the majority of whom would later be considered forcibly disappeared—started organizing during the process of searching for their loved ones and seeking information about them. Every door they knocked was a dead end. In the case of

the AFDD, activists wore a picture of their missing relative around their neck and sometimes a red carnation on their lapel when visiting police stations, detention centers, tribunals, and military installations (AFDD, 1986; Díaz Caro et al., 1997; Interviewee 37, April 2016 and May 2017, Santiago de Chile). Government authorities would not recognize having those individuals in their custody. At the same time, they encouraged family members to continue their quest onto the next facility, keeping their hope alive and their reason to publicly protest at a minimum. Meanwhile, the religious leadership began organizing to address the problems associated with repression, and in so doing “embodying the gospel” (Díaz Caro et al., 1997). Bishops, priests, and other religious authorities from the Catholic Church, various Christian denominations, as well as the Jewish community, jointly founded the first six nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) following the coup, just days after September 11, 1973, namely Comité 1, Comité 2,<sup>8</sup> CONAR,<sup>9</sup> CALEX,<sup>10</sup> COMAR, Comité Pro Paz,<sup>11</sup> and FASIC.<sup>12</sup> The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) supported these efforts from the beginning (Orellana & Hutchison, 1991).

The first aim of the newly created Chilean NGOs was to protect the more than 10,000 refugees in Chile, those who had come during the Frei and Allende administrations seeking refuge from dictatorships in Latin America. These individuals were in grave danger because the military junta denounced their presence in Chile, arguing that these foreigners were part of the communist cancer that had to be extirpated

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<sup>8</sup> Comité 1 and Comité 2 are the predecessors of Comité Pro Paz.

<sup>9</sup> CONAR stands for National Committee for Refugee Assistance (*Comité Nacional para Ayuda a los Refugiados*).

<sup>10</sup> CALEX was an offshoot of CONAR, which focused on “irregular” refugees.

<sup>11</sup> The complete name of the organization is Cooperation for Peace in Chile Committee (*Comité de Cooperación para la Paz en Chile*).

<sup>12</sup> FASIC stands for Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches (*Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas*).

(Huneus, 2001; Orellana, 2015).<sup>13</sup> A few months later, Comité Pro Paz and FASIC broadened their objectives to help Chilean citizens. They had concluded their task of helping refugees go into exile, and they began to see that the military junta was also systematically repressing its own citizens. These two NGOs started recording the testimonies from relatives of victims and from victims themselves about abduction, detention, torture, and executions.

When the relatives of the disappeared started realizing that government authorities were not going to respond to their pleas, they decided to organize by going the extra-institutional route and protesting on the streets of Santiago. The relatives began talking to each other at the Vicariate of Solidarity in Santiago, while waiting to be assisted by the organization's social workers and attorneys. Before speaking for the first time the relatives had already seen each other at detention centers, police stations, the courts, and previously at the Vicariate of Solidarity (Interviewee 37, April 2016, Santiago de Chile; Interviewee 73 April 2017, Santiago de Chile; Díaz Caro et al., 1997). According to one of the first members, Mireya García, the relatives decided to take collective action following the publication of a list of 119 missing individuals, many of them MIR militants, that the military junta claimed had fled to Argentina to engage in guerrilla warfare.<sup>14</sup> This media campaign by the military junta made the relatives start to realize that those missing were probably being forcibly disappeared so that their bodies would not be used as evidence of DINA's excesses (AFDD, 1986).

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<sup>13</sup> Shortly after the coup, Army General Oscar Bonilla said that "the armed forces had to 'intervene in order to safeguard the destiny of the country, seriously threatened by extremist elements.' The extremists," he went on, "included Mexicans, Cubans, Hondurans, Argentines and members of Uruguay's Tupamaro guerrilla movement." "Chile Junta Cites Threat by Aliens," *New York Times*, September 15, 1973.

<sup>14</sup> <http://chileddhh.blogspot.com/p/agrupacion-de-detenedos-desaparecidos.html>

The first actions by the relatives of the disappeared included weekly silent protests while holding pictures of their missing relatives and a simple sign with the words “where are they?” They also chained themselves to government buildings and went on hunger strikes, among other nonviolent tactics. The first movers of the main group in Santiago were women who came from MIR or Communist families and were often militants themselves or members of the Young Communist League (*Juventudes Comunistas*).<sup>15</sup> It is therefore not the case that these were uneducated housewives who had never been politically active, as has been written about the women founders of Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (Mignone, 1991, 2006; Navarro, 2001). Their husbands, sons, and fathers were Communist Party militants and MIR militants, some of them with considerable rank. For example, Sola Sierra became a Communist Party militant at age 19 and founded various feminist organizations throughout Chile in the 1950s. After the coup and before her husband was abducted and disappeared by DINA in 1976, she periodically visited detention centers to bring food and clothes to prisoners. Sola Sierra was voted leader of AFDD throughout the entire period of the military dictatorship until she passed away in 1999 (EducarChile, 2007). Ana González de Recabarren, also a prominent member and leader of AFDD, was a Communist Party militant before her husband, two sons, and daughter-in-law who was pregnant at the time, were abducted and disappeared by DINA (Interview with Ana Gonzalez de Recabarren, May 2016, Santiago de Chile).

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<sup>15</sup> Militancy in the Communist Party, Socialist Party, and the MIR is often passed down from generation to generation; it is expected that if one’s parents were Communists the children would also join the Party’s ranks, starting with the Young Communist League. Therefore, if an MIR militant became missing, their relatives who became active on their behalf were also likely MIR militants. The marked intergenerational character of militancy in leftist parties is similar to the way families pass down religious beliefs.

The primary goals of AFDD organizations were finding their family members, making sure they were not being harmed in detention, and getting them home safely. If their family members had been killed they wanted to be able to bury their remains (AFDD, 1986). As an opposition group their central challenge was overcoming the fear of organizing publicly and defying orders from the military junta not to convene and linger in groups larger than two (Fruhling, 1983, 1984). The fear was intense and multifaceted; relatives feared first and foremost that their missing loved ones, if they were in custody, would be further punished for their protesting of their abductions. Active relatives also feared that their public actions might endanger other family members, not just those who had already been taken. Indeed, there were reasons to think that the security forces could come for yet another son or daughter (Interviewee 44, November 2015, Santiago de Chile). Lastly, AFDD protesters also feared for their own lives.

In some cases, by working at the national and local levels, Catholic priests, bishops, the cardinal, and the Vicariate of Solidarity as protectors helped assuage all three fears. In most cases these protectors could mitigate at least one of the three fears. By recording official testimonies from the families of the missing and presenting habeas corpus petitions to the authorities with the help of renowned attorneys, the Vicariate of Solidarity helped mitigate the relatives' fear that their actions would harm their loved ones in prison. Once the national Catholic hierarchy, attorneys, and the courts were aware of family members asking for individuals, it would be very costly for the authorities to harm them (Interviewee 26, April 2017, Santiago de Chile). People who had missing relatives and had gone to the Vicariate of Solidarity or the local priest were known in the



community, as were their other family members. Local priests, even those further from central Santiago and the Vicariate of Solidarity, knew about the organization. These priests would seek help from the Cardinal and the Vicariate of Solidarity, which was how the national organization helped bolster the protective role of local priests. The most effective protection occurred when both the national and local levels worked together. The national level could generally not protect victims' relatives, or at least could not effectively mitigate their fear, if at the local level there were pro-Pinochet priests. This dynamic occurred in Isla de Maipo and Paine in the state *Región Metropolitana*, where no relatives organized during the dictatorship.

Catholic protectors not only provided legal help to find the missing, but they also assisted the entire family with food, shelter, clothes, connections to find jobs, educational programs, daycares, physical and mental health care, and other services.<sup>16</sup> Once relatives reached out to their priest for help, which did not occur when the priest was pro-Pinochet, local religious authorities knew about all family members. This process made them even more integrated in the faith community, especially if they had not been practicing Catholics prior to the dictatorship. As a consequence, with the support of the local priest and with an increasingly tight-knit community around them, the relatives increased the perception that they would be safe (Interviews with Díaz Caro and González de Recabarren). In addition, active relatives in localities with pro-opposition priests knew that if they were killed or imprisoned, their religious community could help take care of their family members. Indeed, pro-opposition local priests, as well as the Vicariate of Solidarity, had already demonstrated being willing and capable of giving assistance. In

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<sup>16</sup> Revistas *Solidaridad* (1976–1988).

localities with pro-Pinochet priests, the relatives did not enjoy any of those safeguards even if the Vicariate of Solidarity still operated from the cathedral in downtown Santiago.

A similar logic applied to the safety of protesters themselves, in that being known by pro-opposition priests and the national Catholic hierarchy as committed members of AFDD made them less likely to be repressed too harshly by the regime. These activists were especially unlikely to be disappeared. Active relatives were often arrested and beaten, but a pro-opposition local priest, often calling upon the Vicariate of Solidarity for help, would immediately send attorneys to advocate on the behalf of those detained (Interviewee 85, April 2016, Santiago de Chile). Activists would make sure that the religious community knew of all public actions, their location and timing, and the participants who would be in attendance (Interview with Díaz Caro). As a result of these connections, the protesters were almost always released within one or two days. But ultimately active relatives repeatedly said that their sacrifice paled in comparison to their pain: mothers who had disappeared sons and daughters, and wives who had disappeared husbands, for example, were willing to give up their lives for their kin (Interviews with Díaz Caro and González de Recabarren).

Given the role of these Catholic protectors, the chapter derives its central hypothesis: In places that suffered high repression during the Pinochet dictatorship, the presence of pro-opposition local priests increased the likelihood that the families of the victims of the regime created opposition groups (**Hypothesis 1**).

The main observable implication of this hypothesis is that in localities where the priest was not pro-opposition, but in particular where the priest was actively pro-Pinochet and thus helping the regime identify its enemies, the families of the victims were much

less likely to engage in collective and public actions to defy the regime and advocate for their loved ones. The next section describes the data and methods that this chapter employed to test this argument.

### **Data and Methods**

This research employed a multi-method approach to examine the conditions under which mobilization emerges as a consequence of state repression. This approach included statistical analysis of two novel datasets, one of which allowed me to leverage a plausible natural experiment and in-depth interviews with key actors. This section of the chapter also briefly explains the reasoning behind selecting Chile's Catholic Church as the main protector institution to examine in this study.

#### **Catholic Priests in the Metropolitan Region of Chile Dataset, 1973–1989**

The first dataset, “Catholic Priests in the Metropolitan Region of Chile, 1973–1989” (Appendix B), compiles the addresses of every Catholic church that operated at any time between 1973 and 1989 in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Records of every church came from the Archives of the Office of the Archbishop of Santiago (*Archivos del Arzobispado de Santiago*). I recorded the name of the church, the name of the head priest(s) who served between 1973 and 1989 if available, and the physical address of the church. The address of each temple made it possible to code the coordinates used for geospatial analysis, as well as a variable for the municipality where the temple is located.

Every church was given an ideology score based on the extent to which the main priest rejected or supported the opposition against the Pinochet regime. This score has nothing to do with the ideology of the congregation or the followers who practiced at that

church. Rather, it scores the beliefs of the church's local leadership, particularly the priest or main nuns. This is a 5-point ordinal-level variable, from very pro-Pinochet to very pro-opposition, and it is based on interviews of key priests and nuns from each locality. I read names of churches to the priests and nuns and tried to jog their memory by telling them the address of the temple and the head priest, if I had his name. If the person remembered the church and/or the priest, it was very easy for them to say if they had been pro or against Pinochet. I also asked the interviewees to mention examples of interactions they had with those priests or experiences at those churches that made them certain about their political tendency.<sup>17</sup>

The repression variables, which denote the number of those disappeared for political reasons in each municipality, come from the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report, also known as the Rettig Report (Rettig, 1991). Importantly, the list of the disappeared in the Rettig Report has the municipality from where each victim was from. This variable allowed me to match the repression to the municipality. This dataset focuses only on the disappeared because it is the form of repression for which we have geographic information. From the lists of those who were tortured, for example, one cannot know if the victim came from the Metropolitan Region or somewhere else. Below is a discussion of the downsides of this limitation in the data. Further, in order to standardize the victimization count, I coded the population of each municipality from the 1982 census. This population variable allowed for the creation of a

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<sup>17</sup> I am currently looking into whether it is possible to gather sermons from each head priest, if the church kept these records, in order to assess their ideology more rigorously than through interviews. Coding ideology with sermons will also allow me to capture yearly variation in ideology. It is of course reasonable to think that repression (and other variables such as regime performance, actions by the opposition, etc.) changed priests' positions vis-à-vis the opposition and the military junta.

repression count that is the number of disappeared per 100,000 people in each municipality.

For the mobilization variable, I searched for groups of the families of the disappeared (*Agrupaciones de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, AFDD*) in the Metropolitan Region in a variety of sources from the library of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago (*Museo de la Memoria y Derechos Humanos*), primarily Patricio Orellana and Elizabeth Quay Hutchinson's book *El Movimiento de Derechos Humanos en Chile* (1991). The variable for mobilization is binary, denoting whether or not there was a group in each municipality anytime between 1973 and 1989. For more information on the covariates and the coding of all the variables in this dataset, see the codebook in Appendix B.

The data have three main limitations that should be noted. First, there is some missing data given that I was unable to find any priests or nuns able to speak about a few churches. More work was done to interview people who lived during the period in those localities where there are missing data. Alternatively, I used sermons from the time to gauge the ideological tendency of the priest. Secondly, the empirical analysis is only focused on the disappeared and the relatives of those types of victims. Victims of executions and torture are not included empirically in the study, nor are their families' efforts, which means that the pattern of repression and mobilization observed in this chapter is limited. Disappearances occurred from 1973 to 1977, and as a form of repression it was mainly perpetrated by the secret police DINA. In addition, by mid-1974, when repression became less indiscriminate, DINA disappeared mainly militants from the top targets of the regime, namely the MIR, the Communist Party, and the Socialist

party. Torture, for example, was far more common and focused less exclusively on those top targets. Chapter 2 has discussed the pattern of repression by form and opposition group, and Chapter 4 will present repression data of all forms—nonviolent and violent—by opposition group and year.

The third drawback of the dataset is that the number of observations is relatively small (N=216), which makes statistical analysis with control variables result in high standard errors. Therefore, the magnitude and sign of the coefficients are informative, though the standard errors are large. In future iterations of this work I am considering coding churches in other states in Chile in order to have more observations.

### **Bishops in Chile during the Pinochet Dictatorship Dataset, 1973–1989**

The second dataset, “Bishops during the Pinochet Dictatorship in Chile, 1973–1989” (Appendix C), compiles the names of each bishop and archbishop in the country who served any time between 1973 and 1989, along with the name and geographical location of the dioceses or archdioceses where they were assigned. Each bishop is given an ideology score that corresponds to his level of affinity toward Pinochet or the opposition. These scores come from assessing each bishop’s writings, public statements, and participation at events in favor of the regime or the opposition, primarily found at the Archives of the Vicariate of Solidarity. I also included basic information about each bishop and archbishop, such as their birth date, the date of when they first started their service and when they ended their service, and the pope and cardinal of Chile in power at the time of the bishop’s appointment.

The repression variables, which denote the number of those disappeared at each dioceses or archdioceses, come from the same source as for the first dataset, the 1991

National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report. The municipality from where each victim was also recorded, which allowed for matching onto the dioceses and archdioceses. The same standardization for the number of victims per 100,000 people was done for this dataset by coding the population of each municipality according to the 1982 census.

For the mobilization variable, the groups of the families of the disappeared (*Agrupaciones de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, AFDD*) and of the executed (*Agrupaciones de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos, AFEP*) in all of Chile were found in a variety of sources from the library of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago (*Museo de la Memoria y Derechos Humanos*). In addition to using the same book as for the first dataset, I use the oral archive, *Colección Archivos de la Memoria en Chile*, that the museum has compiled through years of interviews with victims and activists in all states in Chile in order to code the mobilization variable.<sup>18</sup> As in the first dataset, the variable for mobilization is binary, denoting whether or not there was a group in each dioceses or archdioceses anytime between 1973 and 1989. For more information on the covariates and coding of the variables in this dataset see the codebook in Appendix C.

One of the ways in which I analyzed this dataset was by leveraging a plausible regression discontinuity in the way that bishops were assigned. Once they are named by the pope to serve, bishops have a retirement age of 75 by canon law number 400, and

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<sup>18</sup> Ideally I would also use these archives to code the first dataset on priests in the Metropolitan Region. However, I do not use these archives for the first dataset because the Metropolitan Region is studied more in depth than other regions, and the other available sources gave me confidence in the data. Some of these archives are available online, and others are only found at the Museum in Santiago and to be used at the archive (CEDOC): <https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/audiovisuales/>. Archivo Oral, Archivos de la Memoria en Chile, and Testimonios de la Memoria, Cien Entrevistas

they thus stay in the post until that age or at the time of their passing (Araneda 2016).<sup>19</sup> I argue that it is as-if random whether a bishop retires shortly before or after the key date of 1983, which was when there was a major shift in the ideology of cardinals, from Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, who was more aligned with the opposition, to Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín, who was more center-right. Therefore, it is as-if random which dioceses or archdioceses get replacements and rarely do we see more than one diocese or archdiocese having a new leader in any given year. The cardinal plays an important role in nominating candidates for bishops to the Papal or Apostolic Nuncio (the permanent diplomatic representative of the Holy See to a state), who then gives a shortlist to the pope for the final decision (Cavallo, 1991; Oviedo Cavada, 1979; Visconti, 1997). Therefore, 1983 offers us an opportunity to observe the independent effect on mobilization from a change in the ideology of bishops—from a more pro-opposition bishop (nominated by Silva Henríquez shortly before 1983) to a more pro-Pinochet one (nominated by Fresno Larraín shortly after 1983). Of course, the appointment of Fresno Larraín by Pope John Paul II to be Cardinal of Chile, after Silva Henríquez turned 75 and submitted his letter of resignation to the pope, was not random. However, the retirement or passing of a bishop shortly prior, or shortly after, the cardinal's appointment was more plausibly as-if random.

There are two challenges to this regression discontinuity design. First, the rule about a retirement age of 75 years is open information, which means that either the regime or the opposition could theoretically change their behavior, knowing that there

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<sup>19</sup> I learned about this as-if random variation in the age of the bishop when reading Guadalupe Tuñón's book project summary on her website: <http://www.guadalupetunon.com/book-project.html>. She leverages the age of the bishop and Pope John Paul II's systematic appointment of more conservative bishops to study gender equality.



will soon be an outgoing bishop of a certain type and an incoming bishop of another type. Nonetheless, I think it is fair to assume that this rule is somewhat obscure and not common knowledge. It is possible to think that the regime changed its behavior on abductions, executions, and arrests with the departure of Silva Henríquez and the appointment of Fresno Larraín; however, it is less likely that the change of individual bishops in all dioceses in the country were as closely monitored. The second challenge is common to many regression discontinuity designs, and that is having few observations around the cutoff point. Given that the number of observations is very low around the cutoff point, I widened the bandwidth of the regression discontinuity estimator and showed results with all the observations.

There is very little missing data in this dataset given that bishops were well known figures with significant primary and secondary literature about them, especially compared to priests. However, the problem of sample size for statistical analysis persists, even with all observations (the number of bishops in Chile during the 18 years of dictatorship is less than 100). For future iterations of this work, one option I am considering in order to increase the number of observations is to code the dataset at the bishop-year level, though it will be difficult to have the necessary information at this level of granularity to code ideology, repression, and mobilization. Another option would be to incorporate another country, such as Argentina, where the Catholic Church played a crucial role in mobilization, but this time it was predominantly in favor of the military dictatorship in power (the regime of Jorge Rafael Videla from 1976 to 1983). Just as there was variation within the Catholic Church in Chile, there was variation in Argentina as well. Indeed, liberation theology had an influence across Latin America during this

period. Further, in Argentina there was also an expansion of this type of opposition led by the families of the disappeared, the most prominent example being the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (*Madres de Plaza de Mayo*). There is also evidence that the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo received help from the religious community (Mignone, 1991, 2006; Navarro, 2001).

Currently, this dataset includes all the bishops in Chile from 1973 to 1989. The coefficients and their signs are important pieces of evidence that can help confirm or disconfirm my hypothesis about the role of protector institutions and mobilization, though standard errors are large. I also analyzed this dataset without the regression discontinuity design and instead make more parametric assumptions. I showed that there is also support for the protector institution hypothesis using logistic regression with a variety of controls.

### **Qualitative Evidence**

The last type of method employed in this chapter is qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted in Chile during eight months of fieldwork. I interviewed active members and leaders of the Association for Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared (*Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos*, AFDD), as well as used interview data from the Museum of Memory in Santiago, where there are many hours of footage with dozens of members and leaders of these groups, including the first president of AFDD, who passed away in 1999, Sola Sierra, and others from AFEP.

I also interviewed family members of victims of the regime in localities that were highly affected by state violence and where one would thus most expect mobilization from the families of the victims. The inactive communities of Paine in the Maipo

Province and Isla de Maipo in Talagante Province, in the southern part of the state *Región Metropolitana*, had among the highest per capita disappearance rates in the country and no association of families of the disappeared until 1990.<sup>20</sup> In fact, Paine is the locality with the highest number of disappeared and executed in proportion to its population.<sup>21</sup> It was not until 1992 that Paine's group of families of the victims started to form a group to find the remains of their loved ones and to create a memorial. Interviews with family members of the disappeared in both of these localities reveal the importance of protector institutions through negative cases. I reached families in these localities by going through the memorial sites that the relatives of the disappeared and executed created during the post-dictatorial period. The Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago also put me in touch with families in towns where disappearance rates were highest, and specifically with current leaders of the association of relatives of the disappeared founded in the post-Pinochet period.

## **Empirical Findings**

### **Results from Congregations in the Metropolitan Region Dataset**

The following two maps of the Metropolitan Region contain the distribution of the main independent and dependent variables. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of pro-opposition priests or the leadership more generally of any given church (each cross in dark purple refers to one church's head priest or its leadership). Black squares represent the priests that leaned pro-Pinochet on the ideological spectrum in the Metropolitan Region. The emergence of relatives of the disappeared groups is also coded in this map

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<sup>20</sup> Publicación de FASIC – Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (2008) <http://www.fasic.org/doc/notasmedios/caso%20y%20memorialPAINE.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> With 70 victims of disappearances or executions and a population of 28,300 according to the 1982 Chilean Census, 0.25% of Paine's population was victimized, not counting those who survived detention, torture, and other forms of repression.

(white flags). This map is zoomed out enough to capture the provinces surrounding the City of Santiago that make up the whole Metropolitan Region. Focusing on those provinces, rather than on the City of Santiago, one can observe that there were no families of victim groups that emerged during the 18-year-long dictatorship. To the south one can observe Isla de Maipo and Paine, areas that suffered high numbers of disappeared and executed (81 in total), but no families of victims organized until after the dictatorship ended. Interview data with relatives of victims in these areas reveal that they had very pro-Pinochet priests in nearby Catholic churches. To the north, in Colina, Til Til, and Lampa, there were very few disappeared and executed (one in Colina and none in the other two localities); therefore, it makes sense that we do not see mobilization by the relatives of the victims in those areas.




Figure 3.1. Map of the Metropolitan Region with Pro-Opposition and Pro-Pinochet Congregations, and Mobilization by Municipality

**Note:** Map of the Metropolitan Region (*Región Metropolitana*), the most populated state in Chile. Dark purple crosses represent the pro-opposition priests and black squares represent the pro-Pinochet priests. White flags represent the presence of relatives of the disappeared and executed opposition groups. Map was created with the ArcGis software using data gathered by author and shapefiles from this public site: [http://www.rulamahue.cl/mapoteca/fichas/chile\\_geo/ficha13geo.html](http://www.rulamahue.cl/mapoteca/fichas/chile_geo/ficha13geo.html). To see this map in more detail, given that it is hard to see the detail in this figure, I have made it available on the following public site: <https://arcg.is/1vubH>.

Figure 3.2 zooms into the City of Santiago to observe the distribution of pro-opposition churches (crosses in dark purple), churches that leaned pro-Pinochet (black squares), and the formation of organizations by the relatives of the disappeared (white flags). There are many more white flags in this map than in Figure 3.1, though not as many as one may expect because high-risk collective is still a relatively rare event.

Relatives of victims' groups did not emerge in the municipalities with the most number

of pro-Pinochet priests (Las Condes, Vitacura, and Maipú). The absence of this type of mobilization in Vitacura might be because of the low level of repression. This municipality is also significantly wealthier than average, which means that the proportion of people who were pro-Pinochet was higher and repression was lower (the secret police disappeared one person who lived in that locality and no one from Vitacura was executed, according to the official Chilean truth commission lists of the disappeared and executed).

However, a lack of repression may not fully explain why the municipalities of Las Condes and Maipú did not have mobilization by the relatives of the disappeared and executed. There were 37 victims in Las Condes (out of a population of 175,735 in 1980) and 40 in Maipú, which had a population of 114,117 according to the 1980 census. This is at least consistent with the hypothesis that in locations with pro-Pinochet priests, mobilization by the relatives is far less common, despite the presence of repression.

Localities with some of the highest numbers of disappeared and executed in the Metropolitan Region, namely Santiago Centro (687), Paine (70), and Ñuñoa (78), mobilized except for Paine. There were purely pro-opposition priests in both Santiago Centro and Ñuñoa, and pro-Pinochet priests in Paine. Places like Conchalí and San Miguel, however, were not completely consistent with the protector institution hypothesis. With 89 and 78 victims, respectively, and no pro-Pinochet priests, this chapter's expectations would be that mobilization by the relatives in those municipalities would be very likely.




Figure 3.2. Map of the City of Santiago with Pro-Opposition and Pro-Pinochet Congregations, and Mobilization by Municipality

**Note:** Map of the City of Santiago, capital of Chile. Dark purple crosses represent the pro-opposition churches and black squares represent the pro-Pinochet churches. White flags represent the presence of relatives of the disappeared opposition groups. Map was created with the ArcGis software using data gathered by author and shapefiles from this public site: [http://www.rulamahue.cl/mapoteca/fichas/chile\\_geo/ficha13geo.html](http://www.rulamahue.cl/mapoteca/fichas/chile_geo/ficha13geo.html). To see this map in more detail, given that it is hard to see the detail in this figure, I have made it available on the following public site: <https://arcg.is/1vubH>.

These maps are broadly consistent with the idea that protector institutions—specifically pro-opposition priests in local Catholic churches—make mobilization more likely in areas that suffered high repression during the Pinochet dictatorship. Localities with pro-Pinochet priests were likely to have a dampening effect on mobilization even in

the presence of the national level protection of the Vicariate of Solidarity, but this pattern only makes sense if there were disappearances.

In addition, Figure 3.1 suggests that there may be a rural vs. urban dynamic because most of these municipalities outside of the City of Santiago, which did not mobilize, are more rural. There are also mountains surrounding the Metropolitan Region, with sparse population in those areas. It would make sense that more rural areas are less likely to mobilize, which is why a covariate was included in the model below for whether a municipality is primarily rural or urban in its land use.

It could also be the case that instead of protector institutions, what accounted for the formation of opposition groups was the tradition of organizing of the families that were targeted by the regime. Indeed, if most of those killed and disappeared were militants from the Communist and Socialist parties, and we know that these political parties operated akin to religion in that they were passed down through generations, we would expect that the families of the disappeared were also highly skilled organizers. It could thus be the case that, for example, in localities with high repression and no relatives of victim groups, the victims were not militants from these political parties and their relatives were similarly disengaged. This would explain the lack of mobilization by the relatives post-repression. This alternative theory is implausible given the qualitative data gathered, at least to explain the communities analyzed most in depth and where the author conducted interviews. I interviewed relatives of victims in localities with relatively high levels of executions and disappearances and where there was no mobilization by the relatives until after the Pinochet dictatorship ended.



Isla de Maipo in Talagante and Paine are two municipalities from the Metropolitan Region outside of the city of Santiago that were very active communities during the Allende regime and earlier, especially during the Land Reform period when the Christian Democrats ruled the country (Interviewee 20, October 2016, Santiago de Chile). In fact, the restive history in these communities, by peasants and agricultural unions, is precisely what may explain the high level of repression that they suffered once Pinochet came into power (Rettig, 1991; Valech, 2005). As mentioned previously, Paine is the locality with the country's highest number of executed and disappeared in proportion to its population, yet we observed no mobilization by AFDD and AFEP during the dictatorship despite a history of organizing. Still, it could be the case that rural communities were unique in at least two ways, leading to a reduction in mobilization by relatives of victims. First, rural areas could be socially more conservative, where women were less likely to engage in politics. This is important because the wives, mothers, and sisters of the victims were the main organizers of most families of victim groups. Second, once the father and/or older son was disappeared or executed, families suffered greatly in terms of their economic well-being, especially in rural areas (Interviewee 101, May 2017, Paine; Interviewee 54, April 2016, Isla de Maipo). The father and older sons would work the land and be the only breadwinners, while women stayed in the home and cared for the younger children. This dynamic may explain the reduction in mobilization not because of the more pro-Pinochet priests but because the families of the victims were too busy trying to survive.

Apart from adding the rural covariate to control for these potential confounders, interview data also show that these explanations for the lack of mobilization are not

persuasive. First, the children of the disappeared I interviewed in Isla de Maipo, for example, remained deeply engaged in their local unions, though they were careful to stay out of the realm of politics because of fear (Interviewee 54, April 2016, Isla de Maipo). Second, the relatives of victims from Isla de Maipo and Paine are today active members of the families of victim groups that formed after Pinochet left office (Interviewee 54, April 2016, Isla de Maipo; Interviewee 13, April 2017, Paine, RM). Importantly, whenever I asked why they did not organize in Isla de Maipo in this way during the dictatorship, they would always cite fear and add comments such as “it was too hard to organize here—even the local priest was pro-Pinochet!” (Interviewees 54, 13, 20, 101). In fact, some interlocutors said that the local priest in Isla de Maipo helped the military identify the most subversive peasants, so the local priest there possibly played an active role in the repression (Interviewee 54). In order to avoid priming the interlocutors, I never referenced religion or the Catholic Church in interviews unless they mentioned the topic.

Therefore, it is not the case that these localities were inactive before the dictatorship started, which would explain their subsequent and continued disengagement. It is also not the case that it is about the rural nature of the place, although the model below controls for this covariate. A covariate for the political party of the mayor elected in 1971 was included in the model in order to control for the possibility that less active localities tended to be made up of people who were from political parties that did not engage their citizens as much as the Communist and Socialist parties did.

Finally, and prior to showing the main logistic regression results, it is worth mentioning that the descriptive statistics of ideology provide confidence in the quality of the coding. The ideology variable goes from 1 (very pro-Pinochet) to 5 (very pro-

opposition), and it has a mean of 3.83 in the Priests Dataset of the Metropolitan Region. This is generally the pattern we would expect, given that the Catholic Church was decidedly pro-opposition, but also moderately so—they did not support Popular Unity, Allende, or the leftist parties by 1973 and wanted to mediate with Pinochet to transition to democracy again.

The logistic regression results are based on the following model, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the relatives of the disappeared organized in each municipality (if they organized the variable takes on the value of 1; 0 otherwise), on the main independent variables, which are the ideology of each local priest representing a Catholic church (1=pro-pinochet, 2=neutral, 3=pro-opposition) and level of repression (number of executed and disappeared in each municipality). The control variables are a binary indicator for whether the municipality (*comuna*) is primarily a rural area (rural=1, urban=0) and a categorical variable for the political party of the mayor who won in the 1971 elections at the *comuna*. The model includes robust standard errors and clustering at the level of the municipality (*comuna*). The reason for clustering at the municipality level is that the mobilization and repression variables are measured at the level of the municipality. The priest's ideology is more fine-grained, however, as it is measured at the church level. Appendix E has the logistic regression results without the municipality level clustering.

$$\text{Mobilization}_i = a + b\text{PriestIdeology}_i + b\text{Repression}_i + b\text{Rural}_i + b\text{Mayor1971}_i + e_i$$

(where *i* is each *comuna*)




Figure 3.3. Main Results from Logistic Regression – Effect of Local Catholic Priests’ Ideology on the Probability of Mobilization by the Relatives of Victims

Figure 3.3 lends support to this chapter’s main hypothesis that the probability of mobilization by the relatives of the disappeared increases with the presence of pro-opposition priests. This model controls for level of repression in each municipality, for rural vs. urban, for the political party of the mayor elected in the municipality in 1971, and it clusters at the municipality level. The probability of mobilization doubles—from .15 to .3—with a change from a pro-Pinochet congregation to a pro-opposition one in the Metropolitan Region of Chile.

## Results from the Bishops during the Dictatorship in Chile Dataset

Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 illustrate the countrywide patterns of pro-opposition and pro-Pinochet bishops, along with levels of repression and mobilization by the relatives of the disappeared and executed. Each figure groups two or three states in Chile to improve visibility. The first one contains the states of Valparaíso, O'Higgins, and the Metropolitan Region (Figure 3.4), the second groups the states of Maule, Bío Bío, and Araucanía, and the third one Los Ríos and Los Lagos (Figures 3.5 and 3.6, respectively). The patterns for Chile's northernmost and southernmost states can be found online, where the entire map at any level of detail can be viewed.<sup>22</sup> The dark purple crosses in these maps represent each pro-opposition bishop who belonged to a diocese or an archbishop belonging to an archdiocese. Black squares represent each bishop or archbishop who supported the Pinochet regime. If there are two purple crosses or two black squares in the same locality, for example, it means that there were two pro-opposition (or pro-Pinochet) bishops or archbishops at different points during the dictatorship. One might have retired as expected at the age of 75 or might have passed away and was replaced. The blue diamonds represent neutral bishops, and the black rings are bishops with no available data on their ideology. These last two data points are not in the figures in the chapter in order to avoid crowding the maps, though they can be seen on the map online as well. White flags represent the presence of an opposition group by the relatives of the disappeared or executed.

There are at least four patterns to point out from these maps. First, there is no mobilization in the northernmost or southernmost states in the country (see the map online for these states). Part of the explanation is the relatively lower levels of

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<sup>22</sup> <https://arcg.is/1rLrqD0>.

disappearances and executions in these localities (0–10 disappearances in each of the five northernmost states and the two southernmost states). In terms of executions, Antofagasta had the highest number of cases, with a total of 48, and in the south Puerto Montt had a total of 24. That said, the “Caravan of Death” happened mainly in the northern states, where the Armed Forces, led by Army General Arellano Stark, executed at least 75 people shortly following the coup (Escalante Hidalgo, 2000). While these states are relatively remote and sparsely populated, the main cities (Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Copiapó, and La Serena in the north, and Aysén and Punta Arenas in the south) had populations between 84,000 and 350,000 in 1980 according to the census. Antofagasta, Copiapó, and La Serena are the more puzzling cases given that the bishops were in general pro-opposition and repression was moderate in those areas. The lack of mobilization in Iquique and Illapel in the north and Puerto Montt in the south is expected given the pro-Pinochet bishops in those dioceses.

Second, the relatives of victim groups emerged in five states, Valparaíso, the Metropolitan Region, Bío Bío, Araucanía, and Los Lagos, all with predominantly pro-opposition bishops (in terms of bishop-years in the various dioceses and archdioceses making up a state). The five dioceses with the highest levels of disappearances and executions, including 121 in Valparaíso, 1,892 in Santiago, 142 in Concepción, 104 in Temuco, and 149 in Los Angeles, mobilized except for Los Angeles, which had pro-Pinochet bishops during the entire period of the dictatorship. Valparaíso, despite having a pro-Pinochet bishop until 1983, had a neutral one for the last seven years of the dictatorship. The diocese of Linares in Maule had 65 disappearances and executions between 1973 and 1976, a time when the bishop in charge of that locality; Augusto

Salinas Fuenzalida, was very pro-Pinochet (a score of 1 on a 5-point scale). That does not explain, however, why relatives did not organize after 1976, when the bishop that replaced Salinas was pro-opposition (Figure 3.5).

Third, relatives of the disappeared organized in the places with the highest number of disappearances and executions, the Metropolitan Region and Bío Bío (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The only diocese in these states that is more of an outlier is Chillán, which had pro-Pinochet bishops during the dictatorship and yet the relatives organized in that locality (with 75 victims). There was one neutral bishop in Chillán from 1982 to 2006, who might have helped ease the difficulty that the families faced when organizing in that region. The two bishops who were in charge of Concepción during most of the dictatorship (from 1973 to 1988) were pro-opposition, and the relatives organized in that region. The bishops in Los Angeles were always very pro-Pinochet during the dictatorship, and the relatives did not organize there. Finally, the state of Araucanía fits this chapter's predictions: there were a significant number of disappearances and executions (104 victims in Temuco), the bishops were pro-opposition from 1973 to 1989, and the relatives of the disappeared and executed organized (Figure 3.5).

The fourth pattern worth mentioning has to do with the bishops appointed during the reign of Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín, who was more pro-Pinochet than Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez. Only one organization by the relatives of victims formed out of the 24 dioceses-year observations where the ruling bishop was appointed during the reign of Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín. The archdiocese of Concepción with Bishop Antonio Moreno Casamitjana had an organization by the relatives of the disappeared in 1989, which was after Pinochet lost the plebiscite of 1988. This finding is

consistent with the theoretical propositions about protector institutions presented above, namely that the local and national levels are important. Where the national level protection is missing, such as when the Bishop tended to be more pro-Pinochet, it will be difficult for a local priest to assuage the relatives' concerns about their safety, as well as the safety of their missing family members and of other family members who might be potential targets of repression.




Figure 3.4. Map of Valparaíso, the Metropolitan Region, and O'Higgins, showing Pro-Opposition and Pro-Pinochet Bishops, and Mobilization

**Note:** Map of Valparaíso, the Metropolitan Region, and O'Higgins. Purple crosses represent the pro-opposition dioceses or archdioceses (i.e., the bishops in those dioceses and archdioceses were pro-opposition), and black squares represent the pro-Pinochet dioceses and archdioceses. White flags represent the presence of families of victim groups. To better visualize these states and the rest of Chile, visit the map online at <https://arcg.is/1rLrqD0>.






Figure 3.5. Map of Maule, Bío Bío, and Araucanía, showing Pro-Opposition and Pro-Pinochet Bishops, and Mobilization

**Note:** Map of Maule, Bío Bío, and Araucanía. Purple crosses represent the pro-opposition dioceses or archdioceses (i.e., the bishops in those dioceses and archdioceses were pro-opposition), and black squares represent the pro-Pinochet dioceses and archdioceses. White flags represent the presence of families of victims' groups. To better visualize these states and the rest of Chile, visit the map online at <https://arcg.is/1rLrqD0>.




Figure 3.6. Map of Los Ríos and Los Lagos, showing Pro-Opposition and Pro-Pinochet Bishops, and Mobilization

**Note:** Map of Los Ríos and Los Lagos. Purple crosses represent the pro-opposition dioceses or archdioceses (i.e., the bishops in those dioceses and archdioceses were pro-opposition), and black squares represent the pro-Pinochet dioceses and archdioceses. White flags represent the presence of families of victims' groups. To better visualize these states and the rest of Chile, visit the map online at <https://arcg.is/1rLrqD0>.

It is also worth mentioning that the descriptive statistics of ideology also comport with my expectations in this case. The ideology variable goes from 1 (pro-Pinochet) to 3 (pro-opposition), with 2 being neutral, and it has a mean of 2.29, which is the average ideology of bishops in Chile. The mean ideology of bishops is within the expected range

given that the bishops were generally more conservative than the priests in the Metropolitan Region. That said, the bishops were decidedly pro-opposition overall, as the Catholic Church was as an institution in Chile.

What follows are the logistic regression results from regressing the dependent variable, which is a binary indicator for whether the relatives of the disappeared or executed organized in a given diocese or archdiocese (if they organized the variable takes on the value of 1; 0 otherwise), on the main independent variables, which are bishop ideology (1=pro-pinochet, 2=neutral, 3=pro-opposition) and level of repression (number of disappeared and executed in each diocese and archdiocese). The control variables are a binary indicator for whether a locality is primarily a rural area (rural=1, urban=0) and a categorical variable for the political party of the mayor who won in the 1971 elections at the locality where the diocese or archdiocese is based. The model is as follows and includes robust standard errors clustered at the diocese or archdiocese level:

$$\text{Mobilization}_i = a + b\text{BishopIdeology}_i + b\text{Repression}_i + b\text{Rural}_i + b\text{Mayor1971}_i + e_i$$

(where  $i$  is each diocese or archdiocese-year)

As illustrated in Figure 3.7, the results are broadly consistent with the protector institution hypothesis. Compared to places where there was a pro-Pinochet bishop, the probability of mobilization was more than twice as large when the bishop was neutral, controlling for repression, the rural/urban variable, and the political party of the mayor in 1971 (.23 compared to .52). Furthermore, compared to neutral bishops, the probability of mobilization by the relatives of victims dipped slightly compared to when the bishop was pro-opposition. The standard errors are quite large, however, given the small sample size

after clustering at the diocese or archdiocese level (there are 36 dioceses and archdioceses in Chile). Results for a similar model using an interaction term of the two main independent variables (bishop ideology and repression) are similar to Figure 3.7 and in Appendix F. Results are also the same if the repression variable is standardized by population size.




Figure 3.7. Main Results from Logistic Regression – Effect of Bishop Ideology on the Probability of Mobilization by the Relatives of Victims in Chile

Finally, to start probing the data by leveraging the natural experiment, I conducted a t-test to see if the difference in means of the dependent variable (mobilization) was statistically significantly different between the bishops that were chosen with the influence of Cardinal Silva Henríquez (a cardinal who was pro-opposition) compared to

the bishops that Cardinal Fresno Larraín chose. Cardinal Silva Henríquez would have helped choose the shortlist of bishops from 1973 to 1982 and Fresno Larraín from 1983 until 1989; therefore, the cutoff point is 1982, the year after which we would expect more conservative bishops being appointed in Chile. I have not restricted the data to a specific bandwidth around the cutoff point of 1982 given the small sample size. Therefore, these are not local effects results. However, at least this naïve test of the hypothesis lends support to the proposed theory in this chapter. As Table 3.1 shows, the difference in means is statistically significantly different at the 95% confidence interval (standard error is 0.09 and mean is 0.303). During the reign of Cardinal Silva Henríquez, the bishops nominated in Chile were 0.3 points more pro-opposition on a scale from 1 (pro-Pinochet) to 3 (pro-opposition) with a standard error of 0.09.

Table 3.1. T-test Results for a Difference in Means for Mobilization and Whether the Bishop Was Chosen during the Reign of Cardinal Silva Henríquez or Cardinal Fresno Larraín

	Observations	Mean	SE
Bishop nominated during Cardinal Silva Henríquez	296	0.34	0.027
Bishop nominated during Cardinal Fresno Larraín	24	0.04	0.041
<b>Difference in means</b>		<b>0.303</b>	<b>0.09</b>

## Conclusion

This chapter develops the concept of protector institutions, which are agents that the government needs for legitimacy and are willing to lend some safeguards to the opposition. These institutions facilitate public nonviolent mobilization in response to state repression because they reduce the cost of high-risk activism by assuaging the

intense fear associated with mobilizing. Protector institutions make nonviolent organizing in particular more likely, as opposed to armed resistance, by virtue of the position they hold vis-à-vis the state. A legitimate institution in the eyes of the state would not remain so if it aided and abetted armed resistance against the regime in power.

Empirically, this chapter demonstrates that there was a hydra effect. From the perspective of the state, the relatives of victims formed organizations throughout the country (where there were local protective priests) and like the monster with multiple heads in Greek mythology, the more the military junta repressed—disappeared or executed people—the more heads the mobilizing “monster” would grow. The families of the victims were able to mobilize against the Pinochet dictatorship where there were local priests with affinity for the opposition, even when the rest of civil society lay dormant or underground due to repression. One of the implications of this work is not that the families of the victims remained idle or apathetic in places without protector institutions. That is one possibility, which occurred according to my interviews. Another option was to join relatives of victims’ organizations in other localities, which also occurred. My observations also suggest that the children of the disappeared, executed, and tortured channeled their grief and anger through other means when these nonviolent and public organizations were not available in close proximity. In particular, the emergence of the armed group Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (*Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez* or FPMR) and other rebel groups offered these frustrated youths an outlet when there were no other viable options to advocate for their victimized families. This resulted in more instability in the country and further repression. Indeed, state violence against participants of the FPMR was ruthless.

This chapter contributes to the literature on third-party intervention in authoritarian contexts to mitigate victimization, open civil society space, and assist nonviolent grassroots mobilization. Recent literature on this topic has thus far found indeterminate effects on the role of third parties in these types of conflicts (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). This chapter argues that it is because of the need to further disaggregate third parties and specify the conditions under which they may assist or not protest movements. Indeed, “the most important remaining challenge for researchers is to better specify the conditions under which institutions matter” (Chenoweth, 2015, p. 373).

## **Chapter 4. From Onset to Sustained Protest: How Mass Nonviolent Movements**

### **Consolidate**

In a matter of days after the military coup of 1973, Chile went from being a vibrant democracy to a closed society. The junta consolidated power by disappearing, killing, imprisoning, and torturing its opponents. In response to this assault, much of civil society and the political elite demobilized, went into hiding, or left the country. At the same time, proponents of armed action gained traction because of the perception that violence was the only way to end the dictatorship. This conflict did not escalate into civil war or large-scale political violence, however. Chile transitioned back to democracy after largely peaceful protests in 1989. What explains the emergence of mass mobilization against the Pinochet dictatorship in the early and late 1980s?

This chapter seeks to explain how opposition to authoritarian rule develops and consolidates in the face of repression. It seeks to uncover the process through which civil society is able to mount a significant challenge against the state by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people. At the most general level, in regimes that are capable and willing to use violence against their citizens, most commonly a characteristic associated with authoritarian regimes (Davenport, 2007; Davenport et al., 2005; Lichbach, 1987), we will be less likely to observe mobilization. Social movement scholars explain this phenomenon through the political process model, which also treats repression as one of the most important explanatory variables. Political opportunities, ideological or cultural frames, and mobilizing structures counter the dampening effect that repression has on mobilization (McAdam et al., 1996). Resources, be it moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material, can also explain the emergence of social



mobilization against repressive regimes (Francisco, 1995, 2004, 2005; Klandermans & Roggeband, 2007; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Schneider, 1995). These ideas are consistent with findings in the literature on insurgency and civil war, which also considers human resources such as organizing experience, networks, and local embeddedness to be of fundamental importance for the emergence, survival, and resilience of rebel groups (Finkel, 2015, 2017; Lewis, 2013, 2017).

Despite these general similarities between findings in the social movements and civil war literatures, there are notable differences. Research specifically focusing on civil resistance has recently found that the civil war onset model does not explain the emergence of nonviolent mobilization (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Most of the explanatory factors in civil wars, such as mountainous terrain, weak states, civil wars in neighboring countries, and a declining GDP per capita, are not significant or are reversed in the case of nonviolent action (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). A comprehensive examination of the four major theoretical frameworks to explain the emergence of nonviolent mass movements finds that “grievance approaches, modernization theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity approaches” do not satisfactorily explain the onset of major movements (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 298). In fact, some of the variables, such as key repression indicators, appear to reduce the accuracy of the nonviolent onset models.

Scholars have mainly derived these arguments inductively from qualitative case studies or large-N cross-national studies of movements that have already succeeded organizationally (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Davenport, 2014; Goodwin, 2001; Sharp et al., 2005). The main theoretical problem with this approach is that these studies do not

have insights from failed attempts to mobilize. By focusing on the movements that emerged, these studies completely miss the effects of repression. We know more about the effects of repression conditional on emergence than about how repression affects the onset and consolidation of movements. Have state crackdowns mostly been successful in demobilizing attempts to challenge the status quo? Or is state repression rarely able to prevent citizens from revolting? The question has for the most part remained under-theorized, and the data that we have are inadequate to answer it.

Empirically, the problem is difficult to address. In the case of cross-national studies, the datasets on which the arguments stand include cases of campaigns, movements, and insurgencies that have been able to organize large-scale resistance. They exclude mobilization that remains small or medium in size, as well as those that outright failed without reaching a critical mass of people. Most studies compare the localities where a large movement emerged with the places where no such movements were present, to make inferences about the conditions of onset. More recently, cross-national studies on political violence have been able to include many more cases by using PRIO/UCDP datasets with a reduced the threshold of 25 battle deaths, though not to explain onset (Harbom et al., 2008). No such cross-country studies exist for mass popular struggles because of a lack of granular data that could systematically capture small-scale, nonviolent, anti-regime actions, or the patterns of repression against them. This information is missing with good reason because the data-gathering effort required to have full global coverage of small-scale nonviolent opposition would be gargantuan.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) at Swarthmore College led by George Lakey has small-scale nonviolent actions and global coverage, though it does not systematically include cases. The third iteration of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, NAVCO 3.0, includes “politically relevant events from 1991–2012,” which expands the cases that it observes. However, the

Subnational studies, as well as case studies based on qualitative evidence, also tend to have the bias of focusing on larger movements. There are two notable exceptions, namely Blee (2014) and Lewis (2013, 2017), the first of which focuses on the emergence of nonviolent activism in a U.S. city, and the second examines the onset of armed insurgency in Uganda. Their insights and empirical strategy inform this chapter, given their focus on networks and their effort to include small and failed organizations. The dissertation expands this research by including antecedent organizations, namely civil society organizations that are not traditionally associated with resistance movements. These are cases that transform their organizations to espouse more extreme objectives and that often emerge from clandestinity to publicly oppose the regime (Johnston, 2005; Lawrence, 2013). The chapter also builds on the body of research by examining an authoritarian context, as well as by including armed, nonviolent, and mixed anti-regime campaigns. The chapter also advances our understanding of repression and mobilization by theorizing and studying various forms of nonviolent and violent state repression.

It finds that alliance formation enables mass mobilization and that repression conditions the forging of ties among civil society organizations. Rather than focusing on resources or on political opportunities generally, this research contends that violent repression has to remain below a certain level for mass mobilization to occur. Regardless of attenuating circumstances, such as dense networks, committed militants, or financial support from the international community and others, hundreds of thousands or millions of people are very unlikely to participate in collective action if the state is perpetrating frequent indiscriminate or collective violence against large segments of the population.

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dataset is limited to “21 countries, the majority of which had major nonviolent or violent campaigns during this period” (Chenoweth et al., 2018).

This chapter overcomes a variety of biases in the literature by dramatically expanding the observed cases. It also improves the conceptualization and measurement of mobilization and repression. In particular, the chapter uses a novel dataset of more than 1,600 opposition groups that operated during the Pinochet dictatorship to explain how a largely peaceful struggle from underground emerged and prevailed after a decade of state violence. An opposition group is broadly defined as an association of individuals, regardless of its size and level of formality, which had, at some point during the Pinochet dictatorship, the goal of resisting the military government directly or indirectly. The goals can be reformist, such as changing economic, political, and/or social policies of the regime, or maximalist, such as seeking regime change. The list of opposition groups comes from going through thousands of pages of Chilean and U.S. government archival materials, secondary literature, and personal interviews with the protagonists of the conflict. The purpose of the dataset is to catalog all the opposition groups that existed in the most populated state in Chile, the Metropolitan Region, from 1973 to 1989, as well as yearly observations of various forms of government repression against each target during the same period. The dataset also contains organizational characteristics of the opposition groups, such as ideology, information about founders and leaders, factions, splinter groups, alliances, resources, and international support. By including all civil society organizations even before they started adopting overt anti-regime positions, this dataset allows us to glean insights into the stages prior to mass mobilization, specifically, on the relationship between repression and the consolidation of popular struggles.

In addition to this dataset of opposition groups, I also qualitatively compiled information about all public actions against the Pinochet dictatorship using the secret

reports of the Vicariate of Solidarity (Vicariate of Solidarity, 1977–1989). In these monthly reports, the Vicariate of Solidarity tracked all demonstrations of dissent, from very small protests and public letters to the Ministry of Interior, to medium-size protests and May Day events by labor unions. These reports also include the repression that resulted from these events. The documents are the primary source from which this chapter derives information about public demonstrations of dissent, narrative about alliances between groups, and their interaction with repression.

To further elaborate on the argument, the chapter contends that mass mobilization emerges and consolidates through a process of alliance formation and that repression shapes the alliances that form in a very significant way. An alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their objectives, where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political, or economic) associated with violating the agreement. For mass mobilization to occur, civil society organizations have to form alliances. There is not any single group in society, especially in a country under authoritarian rule, with the convening power to generate mass mobilization, except perhaps political parties if they exist and are allowed to operate in public. Therefore, if they are to mobilize the masses, organizations have to build coalitions.

For any civil society group confronted with the choice to form or join an alliance with other opposition groups in an authoritarian regime, there are two main competing considerations. The first is reducing the probability of suffering violent repression, and the second is achieving political success (i.e., changing government policies or overthrowing the regime). These priorities mean that each group wants to be part of a

coalition that is large enough to win but not so large—or threatening in another way—that it increases repression to unmanageable levels. By unmanageable levels of repression, I mean frequent targeting of militants with executions, torture, or forced disappearances. This level of repression forces opposition groups to operate underground, if they continue to organize at all. In general, opposition groups that are targeted in this manner cannot survive in the realm of public action. Therefore, in making a choice to join an alliance, the size of the membership base of an opposition group and the level of repression against that opposition group are the most important explanatory factors. The larger the group, the more attractive it is as an ally because large-scale participation makes success more likely. The more participants there are, the less likely it is that each individual will be repressed, though this only applies to the average militant during protest crackdowns. The regime may perpetuate violence far beyond the protest, arresting and killing the leadership and mid-level organizers in their homes, for example. In fact, larger demonstrations may actually be more deadly because the state may respond to a larger threat with more force.

In addition to the size of the group, a history of being a target of unmanageable levels of repression makes the group very unattractive as an ally. Organizations will be extremely unlikely to join coalitions with groups that suffer high levels of repression. One exception is a group that operates under the umbrella of a protector institution, as described in the previous chapter. Opposition groups that enjoy some level of protection from the Catholic Church have more leeway in their ability to join a group that suffers a higher level of repression because increasing violence against protected groups is costlier for the state. In short, it is in every group's interest to be part of the largest possible

coalition without increasing repression beyond a certain point. Given that groups cannot predict repression perfectly, they will adjust with experience in an iterative process, in which an alliance is unlikely to continue if it generates unmanageable levels of repression.

This theoretical framework places repression at the center of mass mobilization in authoritarian contexts. It acknowledges that the state can subject different groups within society to very different patterns of repression (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017; Sullivan, 2016) and that these patterns are subject to change over time. Conceptualizing and measuring repression at the state level or restricting observations to the state's response to protests, as most studies about the onset of mass mobilization do, has impeded our ability to understand the process through which small-scale opposition consolidates into mass mobilization. This chapter's argument about alliance formation being driven by numbers and repression also suggests that in confronting a capable and repressive state, ideology and identity are comparatively far less important predictors of alliances.

The following section reviews the scholarly literature on the emergence of movements more in depth. It also provides a detailed discussion about the patterns of repression the state perpetrated against different actors and how it changed through the 18 years of the dictatorship. The chapter then presents the theory explaining the emergence and consolidation of mass mobilization. A section on methodology and data then follows. Thereafter, the chapter presents descriptive statistics, parametric results, and network graphs in support of the theory, though there are some unexpected findings with respect to nonviolent repression. Finally, the conclusion details the main findings and implications.

## **Explaining Mass Mobilization**

My research question is most directly related to the literature on how mass popular struggles and armed insurgencies transition from onset to building a sustained opposition. Maintaining a mass popular struggle, especially against strong states willing to use repression, requires persistent alliances between organizations that are able to operate in difficult circumstances. In what follows, the chapter describes the three main theories that provide explanations for the emergence and consolidation of mass mobilization. It first examines the political process model, which incorporates opportunities; mobilizing structures, such as organizations and networks; and framing processes. Then the chapter discusses arguments about resources and organizational structure, followed by theories that focus specifically on repression.

### **The Political Process Model**

The first approach comes from the literature on contentious politics, particularly on social movement organizations (SMOs), and it is mainly concerned with major public movements. The political process model (PPM) seeks to explain the emergence and development of popular mobilization by focusing on three factors: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing (Snow et al., 2013).

#### ***Political Opportunities***

Political opportunities are temporary, dynamic, or more stable advantages that facilitate protest activity, or circumstances that weaken the regime and thus make mobilization more likely. The relative openness or closure of the political system, elite cohesion, the regime's allies, and the state's capacity and propensity for repression are all examples of opportunities or threats to mobilization (Jasper & Goodwin, 2011; McAdam



et al., 1996; McAdam et al., 2001). In the case of Chile, factors such as the closure of civil society space and the regime's capacity and willingness to repress have some explanatory power. When the secret police DINA operated with few restraints in their efforts to eliminate leftists, Chileans did not mobilize in large numbers. At the same time, the Catholic Church's protection and Chile's historic ties to the West and to international organizations enabled mobilization by decreasing the cost of mobilization and increasing the cost of state violence. These opportunities are important factors to consider in understanding the general pattern in the country.

However, Chileans faced severe constraints with the level of repression concurrently with considerable opportunities given the Catholic Church's protection and the international community's outcry. The PPM is not as helpful for analyzing these situations. It does not bring the analysis to a level specific enough to draw inferences about the resulting effect of these competing threats and opportunities. This chapter specifies the form, frequency, and target of state repression, and their effects on the processes that antecede mass mobilization, such as alliance formation.

Beyond the distinction between short-lived and structural advantages, scholars have theorized about other categories of political opportunities, such as discursive and perceived ones. Discursive opportunities get at the idea that the claims and identities of the social movement organization may or may not relate well to the prevailing discourse in the public domain. Moreover, political opportunities are not objective; activists cannot identify them independently and without context. Rather, specific actors interpret them in the moment. In the case of Chile, and more broadly in regimes that are not totalitarian, the process of framing the movement and building a discourse that resonates does not

apply as fittingly to explain mobilization. This chapter argues that there were more than enough people in Chile who disliked the Pinochet dictatorship, supported the Allende administration, and wanted to change the economic and political system. There was also information about how much repression people would be willing to bear without demobilizing, in part due to the small and medium-sized protests that were ongoing throughout the dictatorship. These facts suggest that preference falsification and a lack of a common discourse may not have as much explanatory power in non-totalitarian settings (Kuran, 1989, 1997). This chapter also contrasts with the view that opportunities are subjective by identifying a threshold above which mass mobilization is exceedingly implausible. Instead of being subjective or contextual, repression's effects are complex and require specificity. Theorizing the pattern of repression (Gutiérrez Sanín & Wood, 2017) and its varying effects on mobilization are how this dissertation manages the complex interaction between punishment and high-risk collective action.

### ***Mobilizing Structures***

Mobilizing structures is the second factor of the PPM, which posits that established organizations make mobilization more likely because they provide networks and other resources (Klandermans & Roggeband, 2007; McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). Similarly, Sutton et al. (2014) and Francisco (1995, 2004) found that protests with organizations behind them are more likely to be resilient to repression: “We find evidence that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression . . . . From this we argue that attacks on spontaneous protests are unlikely to result in political jiu-jitsu” (Sutton et al., 2014, pp. 559–563). Organizations can also create new

opportunities (Tilly 2008). Public actions by the relatives of the disappeared, such as their hunger strike in May 1978, led college students to show their dissatisfaction with the regime by organizing a demonstration in support of the hunger strike. One could argue that students saw an opportunity to publicly protest along with the hunger strike given that the risks were controlled: the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity were protecting the relatives of the disappeared in their action,<sup>2</sup> students had observed the relatives carry out with their public action without state violence for a few days, and there was international and national attention in the media. The question is why this political opportunity and others did not lead to mass protests. Chile did not mobilize at a large scale until 1983.

Scholars of Chilean political history have also found organizations to be important for mobilization, though not just because of their networks and resources. Schneider (1997)—in a similar approach to Putnam and Nanetti's (1994) on democracy and civic traditions in Italy and Varshney's (2003) on inter-communal violence in India—explained the emergence of persistent anti-Pinochet protest in shantytowns in Santiago through the organizing work of the Communist Party. The Communists had, during the democratic period, cultivated political operatives and community leaders in various areas in the country. Even though these were precisely the places hardest hit by the military junta, Schneider argued that they were also the quickest to regroup after the coup, sustain activism, and consolidate public protests as soon as the repression permitted some level of action. The networks, organizations, and experience from the past allowed these communities to effectively oppose a very different regime.

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<sup>2</sup> The hunger strike took place in a Catholic congregation. Priests were there to support their effort spiritually, and the Vicariate of Solidarity set up health, psychiatric, and other types of support for the strikers (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, May 1978).

While Schneider made a compelling case about the shantytowns in Santiago that she studied, there are questions that arise about mechanisms and scope conditions. First, it is not clear if other aspects of the ideology and socialization of the Communist Party were also at play, or if it was the organizing during intense periods of party activism that was responsible for successful mobilization. In order to adjudicate between organizing capacity and aspects of the Communist ideology (such as that it attracted the most fervent and committed activists), Schneider could have studied communities where other political parties, such as the Christian Democrats, forged ties with the local community and developed operatives. If the same pattern of successful mobilization were observed in active Christian Democratic communities as were observed in active Communist communities, then Schneider's theory about pre-existing organizing would be more persuasive.

Further, the evidence that Schneider provided is compatible with a different argument, which Finkel (2015, 2017) put forth. Instead of arguing that a community is organizationally successful in spite of the violence, Finkel argued that it is because of past experience with selective repression that learning takes place and that dissidents develop better organizing skills. Finkel placed more emphasis on the learning and skills that flow from past experience with selective repression, while Schneider focused on pre-existing organizations, networks, and structures from which to build future dissidence. Even if pre-existing organizing is reduced to militant skills, one would have to show that the skills and networks created during peacetime are those that will serve people in building an opposition in a dictatorial and extremely repressive setting.

Secondly, given that the Catholic Church in Chile also organized those communities, and even more so during the dictatorship, it is unclear how one can attribute the capacity to the Communist Party. Even though Schneider included the religious community in her narrative, it is unclear how it connects to her theory about successful mobilization. In short, an explanation that centers on alliance formation and repression is not necessarily incompatible with Schneider's account of mobilization in Santiago's shantytowns. Instead, it seeks to further explore what the Communist Party did in these *poblaciones* to foster organizing and alliances to sustain mass mobilization. It was not only the Communist Party that was involved in alliance formation, however. The chapter argues that it was the work of hundreds of civil society organizations, political parties, religious organizations, unions, and others that mobilized the opposition.

Moreover, the dataset of opposition groups presented in this chapter is in part designed to test this theory about whether or not sustained mobilization has strong organizations behind them compared to public actions that die down. This chapter shows that dozens, if not hundreds, of public actions that did not consolidate were organized, led and drew people from strong organizations (i.e., cohesive groups without factions or splinter groups), even the same ones that were then able to consolidate them in the early 1980s. Further, when it comes to political parties, the case of Chile does not support Sutton et al.'s (2014) example of the Ivory Coast, which argues that political parties do not draw different sectors of the population together for mass mobilization to occur. The main political parties in Chile, such as the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists, were major institutions that connected many sectors in society, including

labor unions, the working poor, people of faith, the economic elite, intellectuals, and the middle class.

### ***Resource Mobilization Theory***

Social movement scholars also point to resources to explain the emergence of protest and opposition groups, particularly by disadvantaged groups in society (McCarthy & Zald 1977). “Human time and effort along with money” are the most common resources that movements need to emerge and consolidate, though there are many other types of resources that the literature has pointed to, making a “fivefold typology of moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2003, p. xx). Opposition groups will develop into successful organizations depending on their material resources, networks, and social embeddedness (Lewis, 2013; Staniland, 2014). In explaining how rebel groups in Uganda were able to transition from onset to sustained mobilization, Lewis (2013) argued that the most important factor was avoiding government detection until the insurgency was able to withstand repression. Groups that worked through (ethnically) homogenous networks were able to maintain secrecy and enjoy a higher level of security than those that did not have deep ties to the communities in which they were based. Local networks and social embeddedness are crucial not only for survival, but also to ensure growth and sustained mobilization. Indeed, locals are also the most important source of recruits for incipient rebel organizations.

Lewis’s theory is designed to explain insurgencies in weaker states with particular ethnic compositions and historical divides. It may not be possible for weak rebel groups in strong states, for example, to maintain secrecy while procuring arms and recruiting people by only working through ethnic networks. Tight networks and forging relations

with locals were not sufficient to ensure secrecy and a secure environment for opposition groups in Chile. The Pinochet regime had enough capacity and will to persecute groups even in remote areas of the country.

Staniland (2012, 2014) attributed the success and cohesion of a rebel group to the pre-war networks in which it is embedded. Depending on the level of integration of the members of the rebel group (horizontal ties) and the level of integration between the members and the local community (vertical ties), there are four types of insurgencies that can develop: the integrated, parochial, vanguard, and fragmented. The most successful organization is the integrated, as its leaders are embedded in social bases with strong vertical and horizontal ties. The organization that is least likely to succeed is the fragmented, as its horizontal and vertical ties are both weak. Even though the pre-war networks determine the kind of organization that rebels can create during wartime, these designations are not static. The dataset that this chapter presents can partly test Staniland's argument in the context of an authoritarian regime rather than civil war. Instead of rebel groups, one can measure the level of cohesion and fractionalization of civil society organizations, as well as the background of their founders and leaders. That said, the case of Chile shows that cohesion and embeddedness are not sufficient for large-scale opposition to consolidate, as Chapter 2 demonstrates. These two variables are also not strong predictors of alliance formation, which this chapter argues is a key part of the process of mass mobilization.

In short, the PPM is helpful but insufficient in explaining how mass mobilization emerges and consolidates. Its imprecise terminology makes the concepts of political opportunities and resources overlap, and the lack of specificity makes it difficult to

theorize the confluence of political opportunities and threats (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Meyer, 2004). This chapter explores the idea of mobilizing structures and their networks in the PPM and extends it by focusing on the antecedent civil society organizations that enable mass mobilization. However, the presence of organizations is not enough for high-risk collective action to become probable. Groups have to forge ties for actions to grow and be sustainable. The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter thus specifies the conditions under which these civil society organizations will forge alliances and build their capacity to convene the masses.

### **Organizational Structure**

The second set of arguments emphasizes organizational structure to explain the success of opposition groups. The literature on organizational structure has also extensively studied the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical and decentralized or networked organizations. Heger et al. (2012) argued that hierarchy is a sufficient though not necessary condition for dissident group efficiency. Specifically, the authors argued that hierarchical insurgencies benefit from clear agenda-setting, centralized command and control, better accountability, and specialization within units, which makes them more lethal and more organizationally successful as armed groups (Heger et al., 2012).

On the other hand, clandestine groups organized in small cells with weak communication links to leaders avoid government detection, mitigate the effects of repression, and increase the likelihood of survival (Comas et al., 2014). Network scholars argue that decentralized dissident organizations benefit from increased “adaptability, resilience [even if through redundancy], a capacity for rapid innovation and learning, and wide-scale recruitment . . . better at exploiting new modes of collaboration and



communication” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008, p. 8). As Gutiérrez Sanín and Giustozzi (2010) argued, insurgencies do not face the same strategic challenges. Some are better off being “nearer to civil society” through embedded networks, while others will be more organizationally successful if they organize like an army, prioritizing internal cohesion (Gutiérrez Sanín & Giustozzi, 2010).

There is also research pointing to the possibility that mass protest movements benefit from decentralization and multiple leadership hubs to disperse power and increase resilience (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Norms of reciprocity, trust, and reputational concerns hold members in line in these types of organizations, while more formal accountability and punishment mechanisms are possible in hierarchical organizations. This organizational form is important for mass mobilization because of the imperative to not only increase the membership base, but also to diversify constituencies (Gutiérrez Sanín & Giustozzi, 2010).

As these arguments demonstrate, there are tradeoffs to the type of organizational structure and important consequences that flow from the form. While Heger et al. (2012) argued that hierarchy is best for efficiency by showing that hierarchical groups are better at carrying out interventions (e.g., killings) than decentralized insurgents, it may be the case that group strength is responsible for efficiency rather than structure. Networked insurgent groups tend to be weaker—relative to the state they are confronting—than groups that are able to develop a hierarchy. The structure an organization takes is endogenous to its strength and thus to its ability to carry out interventions efficiently. As Podolny and Page (1998) pointed out, researchers that focus on the functionality of structure are “prone to neglect constraints that underlie the formation of network forms of

organization” (p. 59). The dataset on opposition groups in the Metropolitan Region of Chile will help overcome some of these methodological challenges given that it is time-series. Though it cannot give us the confidence of an experiment by coding organizational form and repression at the group-year level, as well as a host of other variables, this dataset can show the conditions under which certain structures are more likely to lead to successful antecedent organizations, then to groups that are able to sustain small and medium-sized protests despite high levels of repression, and eventually to mass mobilization when hundreds of organizations build alliances. In particular, this dissertation argues that the optimal organizational structure depends on the pattern of repression the opposition group is facing. As argued in Chapter 2, a clandestine cell structure increased the likelihood of survival given the secret police’s relentless infiltration campaign and practice of detention and torture. The structure of the victims’ groups—open and hierarchical—was very different and effective in organizing public protests and degrading the regime’s legitimacy.

Another approach to organizational structure emphasizes the category-network nexus and the importance of inclusivity, or how much of one’s life the organization absorbs. The “more extensive [the] common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group” (Tilly, 1978, p. 63; see also White, 1965). An organization is made up of a category component and a network component, and they both go from low to high. An example of a group that is low on both category and network is a casual crowd; low on networks but high in category are all Brazilians, for example; low on category but high on network is a friendship network; and high on both category and network is a local union. The amount of time and commitment an organization requires of its members—

“inclusivity” as defined by Tilly (1978)—is also an important feature of group structure. An organization like the FARC, for example, is very high on inclusivity because fighters have to leave their families, live in remote camps, and change their lives completely. While inclusivity can ensure a superior level of socialization, discipline, and efficiency, burnout rates are much higher in these types of organizations than in less demanding ones (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014).

A mass people power campaign, on the other hand, may be low on inclusivity, as some participants may protest sporadically and take part in low-cost boycotts. These kinds of organizations may be able to generate large numbers of supporters (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012), but they will almost certainly be less disciplined and more prone to collapse as time goes by and the costs of participation increase. This relationship between size and discipline is important to consider in alliance formation. The chapter’s contention is that groups will still choose to join alliances with larger groups as long as repression does not become unmanageable. But a testable alternative hypothesis is that as the size of alliances increases, there is a point after which there is a decreasing marginal return to joining another alliance, thereby making the relationship more of an inverted-U shape.

## **Repression**

The third set of explanations places most emphasis on repression to explain successful mobilization. Finkel (2015, 2017) argued that sustaining resistance requires skillful rebel leaders, and these skills are acquired through past personal experience with selective repression. The “resister’s toolkit” that Finkel proposed focuses on the routine day-to-day operations of rebel groups rather than on goal setting, framing, resonance, etc.

Davenport's (2014) theory about demobilization posits that groups can survive if they effectively vet members to avoid infiltration, build trust inside the group, and develop the capacity to predict and prepare for the kind of government repression that the group will face. Through his study of the Republic of New Africa in the United States, Davenport argued that, to mitigate the effects of repression, opposition groups can experiment with a few aspects of their organization: level of radicalism they embrace in terms of objectives, the clarity of their goals, their level of openness, and the hierarchical nature of their organization.

While a history of selective repression partly explains the MIR's survival, it is less clear how the resister's toolkit could be extended to skills that are useful for mass mobilization. The qualities of those who survive frequent and targeted assassinations by going underground, as well as the organizational structure developed to cope with this pattern of repression, are very different from those required for mass mobilization. Connections and alliances—the opposite of cell structures and compartmentalization—are what makes mass public mobilization possible. The dissertation finds that mass mobilization emerges from groups that are able to operate above ground because repression against them is not as severe. Militants who are subject to the deadliest force can, however, also play a role in mass mobilization by avoiding being identified with the targeted group and by organizing through other opposition groups (as long as they are not part of the leadership or are easily identifiable members of the targeted group).

This chapter builds on Sullivan's (2016) approach to studying repression, which does not consider state repression exclusively as a consequence to overt mass mobilization—covert and small-scale actions, as well as a variety of forms of repression,

are theorized and measured empirically. While Sullivan is concerned with explaining variation in state repression, this dissertation examines mobilization and its relationship to repression. Sullivan (2016) argued, and this chapter is consistent with the idea, that governments “aim to improve the specificity of their expectations by monitoring their citizenry to identify the observable indicators heralding the development of the most threatening overt collective challenges” (p. 1167).

However, this chapter departs from Sullivan’s model of state repression and mobilization in two ways. It finds that the military junta in Chile not only responded with repression when there were overt actions that signaled radical transformations as their objectives. Though repression was less lethal against groups with moderate objectives, the regime considered threatening actions by groups with reformist objectives because of the understanding that they might become so in the future. The formation of alliances signals challenger development and is thus threatening to the regime in power, even if the coalition’s objectives are not anti-regime yet (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, September 1977). The size of the alliance that is formed, and the reputation, legitimacy and the ideology of the groups joining forces, are important factors that states consider when choosing to repress. The reason is that the government recognizes that some groups and alliances may be making moderate demands to avoid the worst of the repression, but their intention is to make more radical demands in the future. The larger the coalition, the riskier it is for the regime.

But there are also constraints on repression against these groups because, as Sullivan observed, using violence against nonviolent and moderate groups is far costlier than against more radical and/or violent groups. In the case of Chile, though, the source

of these costs was not only domestic, but also international. Pinochet and the military junta were concerned about their reputation, which suffered after reports of gross human rights violations that the United States, as well as regional organizations such as the OAS and international NGOs like Amnesty International, were used to shame the regime (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, May 1978). These constraints, coupled with the protective force of the Catholic Church, enabled the formation of alliances and the consolidation of mass mobilization in the early 1980s.

Second, Sullivan's model seems to imply that there is a clear-cut rule that states use to repress. His hypothesis 2b predicts that "[i]ncreases in political repression are not expected to take place when mobilizers support less radical demands" (p. 1170), which is confirmed by data from Guatemala. In Chile, repression was certainly not limited to organizations with revolutionary or maximalist objectives. As becomes clear in the descriptive statistics of the dataset in this chapter and in Chapter 3, as well as in the Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports, the junta repressed victims' groups, art organizations, and women's groups asking for social reforms, and even led libelous campaigns in the media and harassed people connected to the Vicariate of Solidarity and other faith-based organizations. This finding by Sullivan is surprising, especially because he included covert forms of repression, such as surveillance and initiating investigations. Instead, this chapter works from the assumption that even reformist groups can be repressed and that alliances make organizations a higher risk to the government. Further, the process of alliance formation and thus of mass mobilization can be—and is often—derailed when the government decides to crack down more harshly. Activists test the

limits of their actions and adapt their tactics through this iterative process with the regime.

Beyond these points of departure for this research question, there are currently no satisfactory explanations for the emergence of mass civil resistance campaigns. As Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) showed, models that predict civil wars are woefully inadequate for mass nonviolent movements. The main attempts to theorize the onset of mass movements, such as the political opportunities approaches,<sup>3</sup> the grievance model,<sup>4</sup> and the modernization perspective,<sup>5</sup> do somewhat better than the civil war model (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). But there is still a considerable amount of unexplained variance in large-scale popular mobilization. One of the most important factors in these theories is repression, and findings on how crackdowns affect mobilization remain unclear. By including cross-national indicators for repression, some of these models become even less accurate than without this information, suggesting that “generalized repression makes the onset of nonviolent episodes relatively unpredictable” (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 18).

There are four primary challenges with determining the effects of repression on mobilization. The first challenge concerns temporality. Most research examines mobilization once it has been able to consistently produce disruptive large-scale actions. But this snapshot does not allow us to observe its antecedents, thereby making it difficult if not impossible to understand onset. This chapter shows that civil society organizations

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<sup>3</sup> Fearon and Laitin (2003); Levitsky and Way (2010); Robertson (2010).

<sup>4</sup> Carey, (2006); Davenport (2007); Francisco (2004, 2005); Khawaja (1993); Koopmans (1993); Kurzman (2004); Lee, Maline, and Moore (2000); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001); Oberschall (1994); Rasler (1996); Tarrow (1998); Tilly (2003).

<sup>5</sup> Goldstone (1991); Gurr (1970); Lipset (1959); Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson (2014).

can become incubators of mass resistance through a process of alliance formation when the state response to public actions is not as violent.

Secondly, scholars have generally not made distinctions between the specific targets of repression and the segments of society that are mobilizing or could potentially mobilize.<sup>6</sup> Recent work on violence in civil wars by Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017) recommended best practices for those examining violence and its effects. Instead of characterizing state repression at the national level as “high,” “medium,” or “low,” for example, the pattern of violence perpetrated by an actor has a specific targeting, frequency, and technique. The Chilean Armed Forces and secret police DINA targeted leaders and mid-level operatives from leftist and ultra-leftist political parties (targets), and systematically tortured, executed, and disappeared them (frequency and technique). During the same period of time in Chile, the relatives of the victims, who tended to be women and politically active on the left (targets), were frequently harassed and arrested but quickly released (frequency and technique) by the Chilean security forces.

Therefore, within the same year and in the same locality, the same security agencies used repression in different ways. This chapter submits that lower levels of repression (in terms of frequency and technique) make public mobilization far more likely, and that mass public opposition is nearly impossible when there is indiscriminate or broad targeting and frequent use of severe forms of repression. Making these distinctions elucidates the fact that depending on the pattern of repression, first movers—from where mass movements emerge—in a particular time and place may be very different from one another. Thus far, the literature has discussed first movers as a general

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<sup>6</sup> Exceptions are Finkel’s work on Jewish resistance against the Nazis and Janet Lewis’s work on how rebellion begins in Uganda (Finkel, 2015, 2017; Lewis, 2013, 2017).



category or a “type” of individual (Bueno de Mesquita, 2010). These are important conceptual and theoretical shortcomings that this dissertation attempts to overcome in the case of mass mobilization in Chile.

The third challenge that has made disentangling the effects of repression very difficult is empirical. The lack of fine-grained data on repression, targeting, and mobilization has not allowed for the testing of more complex relationships across time.<sup>7</sup> States have an impressive array of techniques of repression, including but not limited to different forms of violence. The Pinochet dictatorship used searches, forced displacement, various forms of harassment, mass layoffs, libelous propaganda campaigns against individuals and organizations, states of emergency and curfews, legal restrictions against unions, and other forms of nonviolent repression. There are few if any scholarly works that examine these forms of repression, let alone in conjunction with violent forms of repression and targeting different types of actors. Mobilization research is also quite restricted and siloed. Most research either investigates armed insurgencies or large-scale protest movements and civil resistance campaigns. There is some research on mixed movements—those that combine the use of armed and unarmed action—and far less on smaller groups regardless of strategy. There is even less on underground or clandestine mobilization (della Porta, 2013). A key insight to be gained from including the range of repression and being precise about the repertoire, as well as from examining the full range of mobilization, is that people can organize regardless of the level of repression. When a group is targeted with frequent disappearances and executions, their chances of

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<sup>7</sup> One notable exception is the work by Brockett (2005), in which the author examined protest life cycles and their relationship to repression.

consolidating public opposition is nil. But those are the groups that challenge the state from the underground, as I show with the MIR and Communist and Socialist parties.

Finally, the fourth challenge to studying repression pertains to its highly endogenous relationship to mobilization. Although this chapter does not experimentally address this difficulty, the dataset presented here makes progress on this matter by including a representative sample of all documented attempts to mobilize, however small, as well as time-series data on alliances, a variety of repression indicators, and many other covariates. Therefore, in addition to theorizing on the endogenous relationship between mobilization and repression, this chapter is empirically equipped to evaluate it as best as it can be done with observational data.

### **How Public Opposition Emerges and Consolidates**

This section describes the process that led to the first large-scale demonstrations against the Pinochet dictatorship, which is mainly based on the Vicariate of Solidarity's confidential reports. This discussion is followed by a summary of the mobilization that we should observe from different sectors of the population depending on the pattern of repression against each. It also teases out the theoretical implications in a more abstract way and discusses counterfactuals in determining the generalizability of the theory.

### **The Process of Mass Movement Consolidation in Pinochet's Chile**

In the weeks and months following the coup of September 11, 1973, the Chilean Armed Forces called a state of emergency and perpetrated an intense campaign of collective and indiscriminate repression. The violence was collective in the sense that the military junta, while consolidating power after the coup, sought to demobilize the recently deposed Popular Unity government, militants from other leftist and ultra-leftist

political movements, and powerful organizations closely aligned with the left such as labor unions. The repression was also partly indiscriminate because the Armed Forces used proxies to identify opponents and potential opponents of the regime: they arrested college students in public universities and working-class people, for example, assuming that they were likely Communist, Socialist, MIR militants, or leftist sympathizers. Individuals also became victims because they unfortunately happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time (Rettig, 1991).

During this time, there was also extensive legal and nonviolent repression. The military junta stripped away the power of labor unions. Most importantly, the government removed their rights to collectively bargain and strike and prohibited union members from electing their own leaders. Instead, the junta removed those who had been elected, in many cases disappeared or executed them, and appointed new union leaders (Araya, 2015). The new military government also closed down independent media, including newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, and banned all leftist and centrist political parties. Even the Christian Democrats, whose most prominent leaders initially supported the coup, were outlawed. Finally, the regime installed a countrywide state of emergency and a nighttime curfew, whereby no one could be seen on the streets between midnight and 6 a.m. (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, 1976–1981).

In this context, mobilization changed in four respects. First, the majority of the population became atomized and isolated because the collective and semi-indiscriminate repression disrupted ties to neighbors, coworkers, and even family members (Interviewee 33, April 2016 and April 2017, Santiago, Chile). Not knowing what sort of precedent, comment, or action could put them at risk, or who could be an informer for the security

forces, most people became extremely fearful of expressing their views. Chileans even avoided casual socializing (Interviewee 117, April 2016, Santiago, Chile). Even though these conditions significantly reduced mobilization, and a mass protest movement would have been extremely unlikely, it did not preclude all types of organizing by all actors. The most committed leftist party militants went underground and continued to organize in clandestinity and labor unions were largely demobilized. Strikingly, this pattern of repression completely eliminated public opposition for a few years from the two most powerful sectors of civil society during the Allende administration—political parties and unions.

The first domestic public actions opposing the military junta came from the family members of the victims of the regime. This mobilization occurred in response to repression, and their political demands were very minimalistic; they simply wanted to know the whereabouts of their loved ones. During this period, there were also other forms of public dissent, though in the form of statements and letters, particularly from the international community. The United Nations, the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Red Cross were the most persistent organizations demanding information about the human rights violations reported by the Vicariate of Solidarity. There were also a few of these types of public statements from the elite within Chile, such as by the wife of Nobel Literature Laureate Pablo Neruda, Matilde Urrutia de Neruda.<sup>8</sup> Whether it is public actions by the relatives of the victims, or public statements by the international community and the domestic elite, their government demands always

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<sup>8</sup> Pablo Neruda, a known member of the Communist Party of Chile, died soon after the coup of September 11, 1973. The military junta might have assassinated him: [https://elpais.com/cultura/2015/11/09/actualidad/1447089245\\_554884.html](https://elpais.com/cultura/2015/11/09/actualidad/1447089245_554884.html).

remained narrow. There are no cases of public maximalist claims with these levels of repression.

By 1974 and 1975 repression became less indiscriminate, with DINA and armed forces focusing on eliminating the threat of Communism and Marxism by killing or disappearing leaders, medium-rank militants, and sometimes low-level operatives of the major leftist parties—the Communists, Socialists, Popular Unity—and of ultra-leftist and armed organizations, such as the MIR, GAP and Red September.<sup>9</sup> Given the high intensity (i.e., frequency and lethality) of violent repression against these actors, the most committed leftist party militants continued to organize underground, if at all. Many militants were forced to flee the country and seek asylum.

Further, the systematic targeting of leftist party militants mirrored the repression that labor union leaders suffered. The reason is the high degree of connection between the two sectors. Indeed, the unionized working poor made up the base of the Communist Party of Chile, and many prominent Communist leaders also held powerful positions in labor unions. But by the second year of the dictatorship, recently demobilized labor union leaders, many of whom were unemployed, started organizing in secret. Through apolitical programs run by the Catholic Church to help the working poor and the unemployed, labor union leaders started regrouping. At this point they made no demands and focused their efforts on planning major activities to continue uniting workers around May Day (May 1,

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<sup>9</sup> GAP were the Group of Personal Friends (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), the security service of President Salvador Allende that tried to protect the presidential palace of *La Moneda* as it was being bombed by the Armed Forces rebelling on September 11, 1973. Red September was a small armed group that tried to form shortly after the coup, but it was detected by the Chilean and U.S. intelligence services and completely eliminated (United States Embassy, Chile. Confidential, Cable. March 31, 1977: 11 pp. National Security Archive Collection: Chile and the United States).

an international day honoring workers). Interestingly, labor unions and the families of the victims both started organizing under the protection of the Catholic Church.

The relatives of victims' groups flourished during this period by the side of the Catholic Church given the continued assault on leftist party militants. The more collective and less indiscriminate repression meant that the families of the killed and disappeared had a lot in common and were relentless in their efforts: they were not only grieving for the loss of a loved one (or many loved ones), but they also had political affiliation in common. Even though in many cases these women were also leftist party militants themselves, as party identification and commitment were passed down intergenerationally, repression against them was limited to detentions, beatings during arrests, and harassment and threats, in large part given the protection of the Catholic Church and their narrow demands (Interviewee 37, May 2016 and April 2017, Santiago, Chile).

At the same time, a vast number of civil society organizations started emerging at a very local level with narrow, subsistence-based objectives in order to alleviate poverty at a time of economic restructuring, mass layoffs, and families losing their primary breadwinner because of repression. The poverty rate doubled from 20% to 40%, and unemployment reached 17% by 1985.<sup>10</sup> Supported with resources from the Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches and the wider religious community in Chile and abroad, hundreds of neighborhood associations started forming in shantytowns (*poblaciones*). While the resources for these efforts came from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the local congregations, those running the day-to-day operations and

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations Development Program Report by Frances Stewart and Gustav Ranis (1994): [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/frances\\_stewart\\_and\\_gustav\\_ranis.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/frances_stewart_and_gustav_ranis.pdf).

participating in the programs were the working poor, shantytown dwellers, and militants recently demobilized from the leftist parties, hiding from state persecution. Demobilized MIR militants, for example, who found it too risky to continue organizing in clandestinity and following the movement's orders, moved into different *poblaciones* and joined these sorts of neighborhood associations to help the poor.

By 1978 Pinochet had dissolved the secret police DINA under pressure, especially from the families of the victims and President Jimmy Carter of the United States. There were no more forced disappearances after this point, though high (in terms of lethality and frequency) selective repression continued against leftist party militants. Restrictions against labor unions and other types of legal repression, such as the state of emergency, continued. However, in March 1978 the military junta ended the nighttime curfew. The Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports also document a significant decrease in arrests by this point, though it is not because of a reduction in public actions, as described below. In addition, Pinochet released hundreds of prisoners through the “*ley de extrañamiento*” (Decreto Supremo 504), which dictated that people who violated the curfew would have their sentences commuted to forced exile. They were essentially expelled from the country and could not return unless they obtained written permission from government authorities.<sup>11</sup>

During this period (mid-1978) and for the first time since the coup, we observe sporadic medium-size protests connected to protected activism (i.e., activism with some level of support from the Catholic Church as the protector institution). For example, the first medium-size gathering recorded in the secret reports is a demonstration by hundreds

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<sup>11</sup> Pinochet signed this executive mandate in 1975, but it was not until 1978 that people were actually getting their sentences commuted: <http://www.cedocmuseodelamemoria.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Decreto-504-Joaqu%C3%ADn-Sáez-Salazar1.pdf>.

of university students in June 1978 (almost five years into the dictatorship). The students rallied in solidarity for the women on hunger strike seeking information about their disappeared family members. Approximately 400 students were arrested during the action, beaten, and threatened while in prison. But the authorities released all the students the following day. While the demonstrators suffered beatings and arrest, these actions and the repression that followed started delineating viable ways of publicly opposing the regime. Demonstrations alongside protected activism became more common during the latter half of 1978 and into 1979, and the repression that followed each action communicated that some forms of mobilization (with specific goals, size, and protagonists) could be organized without a high likelihood of being killed, severely tortured, or disappeared.

Labor unions also increased their mobilization by holding larger rallies around May Day and organizing their first major strike since the coup, which happened at the copper mine of Chuquicamata in northern Chile in September 1978 (there were 69 detentions as a result). These actions were not more ambitious in terms of their political objectives, however. Labor unions were still making minimalist demands to the authorities. Labor unions also started writing public letters and making petitions advocating for the end of the state of emergency, which had stripped them of their right to strike and to collectively bargain. In their letters to the government, union leaders argued that their rights should be reinstated because labor had not broken any rules up to that point and the country was not under internal or external threat (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, March 1978). In some letters sent toward the end of 1978, union leaders did mention state repression and demand information about the disappeared.



Elite-level petitions, public statements, and letters, especially to the Minister of Interior and the President of the Supreme Court, vastly increased during this period, but they were still limited to questions about human rights violations and requests for information about the disappeared. No letter or public statement from within the country explicitly called for an end to the dictatorship and a return to democracy, which would constitute maximalist objectives. The pressure from the international community also increased through public reports documenting human rights violations and hearings held at the United Nations and Organization of American States meetings about repression in Chile.

Given this public outrage from the domestic elite and the international community, which seemed coordinated in terms of messaging with the cause of the relatives of the victims, the military junta started pressuring the Vicariate of Solidarity. Starting in early 1978, according to the secret reports, the pro-Pinochet press and the military junta led an intense propaganda and libelous campaign to discredit the cardinal, bishops, and priests. The Vicariate of Solidarity staff, particularly the attorneys and social workers, also started receiving harassment and threats at home and on the street from anonymous civilians.

Finally, large-scale mobilization in Chile occurred when civil society organizations started building persistent alliances. Mass public opposition consolidates by the building of alliances between groups because it is very difficult for any single organization to generate enough participation in order to sustain mass public actions. The process in Chile started when the small-scale and consistent mobilization of protected activists connected with the sporadic, medium-size actions by different segments of the

population. At the same time, hundreds of subsistence-based groups started becoming more political and joining the small and medium-level actions. This process occurred by repeatedly testing repression through action. Take the example of the students demonstrating in solidarity with the hunger strike: they were arrested, released, and mostly safe, and they assumed that future similar actions would provoke a comparable response, with some risk that the crackdown would be worse. Dozens of these types of actions started revealing the open spaces in society, however limited, for participants and would-be participants.

In addition, as soon as repression became more manageable, hundreds of atomized and apolitical neighborhood associations started hosting political meetings and slowly evolving into incubators of opposition. The reason is that the majority of those working in neighborhood associations were leftist party militants who were demobilized due to the repression (Interviewee 33, April 2017, Santiago, Chile). As described above, MIR militants who wanted to reduce their chances of being persecuted changed their identity, moved to another neighborhood, and started helping the poor through apolitical organizations sponsored by the Catholic Church. These activities carried far lower risks than doing party work in clandestinity (Interviewee 35, November 2015 and April 2017, Santiago de Chile).

### **The Logic of Alliance Formation Preceding Mass Mobilization: Hypotheses**

But what is the logic by which these alliances formed? Which organizations were going to cooperate? Under what conditions should we expect the process of alliance formation to stall, thereby making it less likely for sustainable mass protests to occur? First, to clarify the definition, an alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two

organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their objectives, where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political, or economic) associated with violating the agreement.<sup>12</sup> At the most general level the chapter argues that an alliance between two opposition groups is likely to form when they provide each other with numbers—people to protest, strike, petition, etc.—and when they are perceived to help reduce state repression or at least maintain it at the same level. Had repression remained lethal and indiscriminate, or had it continued to systematically subject large swaths of the population to torture, executions, and disappearances, we would be less likely to observe the building of alliances between hundreds of civil society organizations. Without these coalitions, efforts would have remained localized, atomized, and even underground, without the possibility of large-scale public challenges.

These two conditions for alliance formation are based on the logic of how mass civil resistance campaigns succeed against repressive regimes: the priorities are recruiting as many participants as possible and reducing or maintaining repression to manageable levels.<sup>13</sup> Increasing the number of people participating in public actions reduces the likelihood that the average participant will be repressed, thus lowering fear among activists and individuals who have yet to join the movement. The reduced likelihood of getting repressed leads others to join the movement in a cascading effect (Kuran, 1989, 1997). In addition, bigger actions are more likely to attract media attention, both

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<sup>12</sup> This definition is adapted from Fotini Christia's conception of an alliance between insurgent groups in civil wars (Christia, 2012).

<sup>13</sup> As described above, extremely high levels of repression preclude all mass public action and most public action with the exception of that around protector institutions. The type of mobilization that exists in those situations is predominantly underground. Moderate levels of repression toward most of the population can lead to medium-size and large protests. Opposition groups may not necessarily desire zero repression because they benefit from public outrage. In fact, there are cases where activists purposely generated state repression in order to get media attention and recruits (Morris, 1986). However, in this case of a military dictatorship with a willingness to use extreme force, I would argue that in general activists desire a reduction in repression.

nationally and internationally, which makes it more costly for the state to respond with violence (McAdam, 1990; Nepstad, 2015; Wisler & Giugni, 1999). Finally, another reason for civil society organizations to increase numbers through alliances is that the larger the mobilization, the more likely they are to achieve their political objectives (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). That said, smaller groups are also attractive as allies because they increase the number of participants (however small the contribution), as long as they do not exacerbate repression.

On the other hand, from the perspective of civil society organizations there are also costs to a growing movement. First, the level of perceived threat from the part of the government is likely to surge with the number of people publicly opposing them. As a consequence, repression may increase toward those growing organizations, even if separately the groups had not attracted high levels of state violence prior to the alliance. Larger coalitions of people are also less likely to be cohesive and disciplined, which can reduce their likelihood of success (Sharp et al., 2005).

Beyond numbers, the identity of the groups joining to publicly oppose the regime also matters in the context of repression. Given the backdrop of the Cold War and the military junta's political project to eradicate Marxism from Chile, the most threatening joint actions would be those organized by Marxists and other leftists, especially those advocating for maximalist claims. Organizations taking up arms or condoning the use of violence would also be subject to higher levels of repression than those that were purely nonviolent. On the other hand, groups associated with the Catholic Church, other religious groups, international human rights organizations, to some extent the Christian Democratic Party, and the business elite would be less subject to repression and thus—all

else being equal—constitute more desirable allies. The first hypothesis is thus that organizations whose militants suffer from targeted killings, torture, or forced disappearances are very unlikely to be part of alliances, despite the fact that they have enormous mobilizing potential (**Hypothesis 1**). More generally, the lower the repression that the regime is perpetrating against the opposition, the more alliances we should observe (**Hypothesis 2**).

Given that alliance formation can lead to more repression for some reasons and to less repression for other reasons, a change in crackdown is very difficult to predict in any one instance. It is the military junta, along with the security forces and their civilian counterparts (paramilitary groups) that weigh those factors—and others—to ultimately perpetrate state violence and nonviolent repression. Nonetheless, activists, thinking of which coalitions to build, make their own evaluations about how the state is likely to respond to their joint public actions with other groups. While they may think of all the factors affecting repression mentioned above to make their own decisions, I find that activists tend to use a proxy given the complexity of the repression–mobilization relationship (Interviewee 85, April 2016, Santiago, Chile). In particular, civil society organizations assume that they will suffer a similar level of repression as the group they are joining.

After an alliance is formed and the state responds, the coalition is maintained if repression stays the same or does not increase to unmanageable levels. In that case, it is likely that there will be further alliance formation with other groups. The alliance breaks, at least temporarily, if repression against the new coalition increases to include systematic executions, torture, and disappearances (i.e., unmanageable levels). Through

this iterative process, mass movements emerge if repression is maintained at low to moderate levels because alliances continue to form between civil society organizations. In line with this idea, the third hypothesis is that if there is an alliance in time  $t$  and repression increases (to systematic executions, torture, and/or disappearances) in time  $t+1$ , we should no longer observe the alliance in time  $t+2$  (**Hypothesis 3**). This hypothesis is not testable with the large-N dataset presented in this dataset but is supported by the narrative derived from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports. The fourth hypothesis is that, more generally, if repression is very severe, in terms of form, frequency, and targeting, we should not observe mass mobilization (**Hypothesis 4**).

The pattern of state violence thus determines if public opposition groups will forge alliances, and it also shapes the alliances that emerge and make up the mass movement if it does consolidate. Even if an organization is able to provide a large number of participants, the state could broaden the targeting of extreme repression to make joining that group undesirable. The result of such an alliance would be demobilization or going underground to survive. Civil society organizations will make decisions about with whom to form an alliance based on how they perceive its impact on the level of repression that will result and the likelihood of their achieving success by increasing the number of participants.

For this iterative process to yield more alliances and lead to the consolidation of a mass movement, severe repression cannot be indiscriminate, or collectively or selectively target large segments of the population. These actions by the government lead to demobilization and atomization. Under indiscriminate violence individuals cannot properly evaluate the level of risk from engaging in civil society organizations, let alone

find ones that are safe, because there is so much uncertainty. This uncertainty and fear leads individuals to avoid all forms of social and political gatherings. The first few months of the Pinochet dictatorship described above exhibited this pattern. Table 4.1 below is an example of the pattern (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017) of state repression for some groups in 1978, when the first alliances and medium-size public actions started taking place. The groups subject to collective torture and executions were not forming these alliances. Instead, coalitions started building between the relatives of the victims' groups and labor unions, both of which had the protection of the Catholic Church, and college students.

Table 4.1. Pattern of State Repression

<b>Target/ Form of repression</b>	<b>Disappearance</b>	<b>Killing</b>	<b>Torture</b>	<b>Detained and released</b>	<b>Harassment</b>
Leftist political parties	Communist Party, Socialist Party, MIR <i>Frequent</i>  MAPU, IC <i>Rare</i>	Communist Party, Socialist Party, MIR <i>Frequent</i>  MAPU, IC <i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	Leaders <i>Rare</i>  Average militant <i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Rare</i>
Armed groups	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	<i>Very rare</i>	<i>Very rare</i>
Religious hierarchy	<i>Never</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Relatives of victims' groups	<i>Never</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Neighborhood associations	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Student groups	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>

One implication of this logic is that alliances will tend to form between organizations that suffer relatively similar patterns of state repression, which is another testable hypothesis (**Hypothesis 5**). The reason is that if there is inequality in repression, the one suffering from less repression will be hesitant to join a group subject to worse treatment because the state may respond in the same manner toward both. If there were coalitions among organizations suffering very different patterns of repression, I would expect the group with the lower level of repression to be working closely with protector institutions. The reason is that organizations that enjoy some level of protection from the Catholic Church, for example, are not very likely to be subject to the worst forms of violence because the cost for the government is too high. It is therefore no surprise that alliances in Chile started forming between the relatives of victims' groups and organizations with slightly higher levels of repression, students, and with organizations with similar levels of repression, neighborhood associations. By 1981, there were a sufficient number of organizations suffering manageable levels of repression that mass mobilization consolidated.

The fact that territorial organizations were narrow in their objectives would not have been sufficient to avoid worse crackdowns. There are cases of the military junta cracking down on civil society organizations that were also far from demanding an end to the regime. For example, the secret reports show that the security forces would end plays and other cultural performances and arrest the organizers if they were mocking Pinochet, even mildly and implicitly. These actions reveal that the military junta was not naïve about seemingly apolitical or narrowly framed civil society organizations having the ambition to organize more broadly and for maximalist goals.



But even with a reduction in violence, mobilization may not result in some cases. For example, hidden preferences and preference falsification (Kuran, 1989, 1997) could account for a lack of mobilization even after a reduction in repression. While preference falsification may explain the lack of public resistance in certain places, it is less helpful in the case of Chile. The reasons are that armed forces forcibly deposed a democratically elected president who had a sizable backing from the population. *Unidad Popular* and the Allende regime were still fresh in Chileans minds after the coup and during the 18 years of military rule. The dictatorship did not last generations, which would make it harder for people to know through their own networks and experience other people's preferences. In addition, Chile did not become a totalitarian state, as did the Soviet Union, Kuran's main case study. There were numerous ways in which Chileans, at least privately, could express their views after the initial phase of indiscriminate and mass collective violence ended. Hundreds of civil society organizations flourished during the dictatorship, which were independent from the state, though the regime did try to co-opt many of them. These organizations served as sites where people connected and to some extent expressed their views with whom they trusted. However, the dissertation agrees with Kuran's argument, in the sense that consolidation hinges on local and contextual factors, in my case on the form and frequency of repression perpetrated against specific targets.

Contrary to how alliance formation occurs in civil wars (Christia, 2012), which is about building a "minimum winning coalition," the logic of alliance formation in mass civil resistance campaigns is about building the largest possible movement. The idea behind the smallest winning coalition is that rebel groups want to win the war while reducing the number of groups with which to share power after regime change.

Therefore, insurgents considering an alliance with a group also consider the potential ally's size, as a large disparity between the allies may mean the smaller group getting sidelined when distributing power in the post-conflict order. Civil society organizations are far less likely to consider the group's own gains in the post-conflict distribution of power when building alliances. The reason is that even if individual staff or volunteers of civil society organizations aspire to form part of the government upon the return to democracy, their organizational mission has nothing to do with running the country. One exception would be if political parties were the main actors building the mass movement. In that case, even though alliances still hinge on repression and numbers, parties are likely to consider their future in power as part of their alliance-building calculus. The counterfactual in this case would be this: had political parties in Chile entered the fray of mass mobilization before protests consolidated, alliances would have been much more influenced by ideology and would have thus not been as expansive.

Other factors, such as ideological affinity and physical distance, may influence alliance formation among civil society organizations. But these are either secondary to repression and numbers or are endogenous to repression. Take ideology, for instance. I argue that ideology matters for alliance formation in two ways. First, as mentioned previously, organizations subject to low and moderate levels of repression will avoid collaborating with groups that are top targets of the regime, and ideology will partly determine which groups the regime considers its top enemies or threats (Staniland, 2015). Second, ideology may also influence alliances through the protector institution (PI). As discussed in Chapter 3, protector institutions are constrained in the organizations that they can lend support because they also have to stay in relatively acceptable terms with

the regime. Given the importance of mobilization that emerges alongside protector institutions for the beginning of the process of alliance formation—indeed, PI-supported public actions are the first to challenge the Pinochet dictatorship—ideology has an indirect effect on alliance formation. In particular, the Catholic Church as the main protector institution in Chile had a policy of not assisting activists who had taken up arms against the regime. Building an alliance with an armed group or a group that condoned the use of violence was impossible for the Catholic Church in Chile. The sixth hypothesis is thus that protector institutions such as the Vicariate of Solidarity and other faith-based organizations should have the largest number of alliances (**Hypothesis 6**).

Given the imperative of numbers for sustaining mass mobilization, the fact that there is a common opponent in the military dictatorship and that they are not looking to hold power after regime change, civil society organizations are unlikely to avoid alliances purely on the basis of ideological disagreements. Instead, they will articulate narrower positions, such as “family members should be able to know the whereabouts of their loved ones,” or thin and more general objectives such as ending the military junta and holding democratic elections. Political parties, on the other hand, will tend to behave more akin to insurgencies. The smallest winning coalition is attractive to organizations that expect to hold office if they succeed in deposing the regime. Political parties care about the reputation they perpetuate through their alliances as they launch into a political campaign following a successful mass movement. In addition, when the opposition spokespeople negotiate the details of the democratic transition, ideological differences become far more important. But as I describe earlier, the political parties that would in this case oppose the Pinochet dictatorship were subject to extreme repression, which

forced them to stay underground. This meant that political parties did not take part in the initial alliance formation that consolidated mass mobilization in Chile in 1980. That said, while political parties would be more exclusionary in their alliances given their power ambitions, they would still not behave exactly as insurgencies in civil war because they were operating under the logic of mass mobilization, where numbers were of essence.

The resemblance of organizations may also facilitate alliance formation. All else being equal, I would expect two labor unions to build an alliance more easily, for example, than a labor union and a student group. Similarly, an alliance between two organizations that are closer to each other in terms of physical distance—or that their leaders are within the same networks—would be easier to forge. Empirically I incorporate these factors with indicators in the dataset for group type and locality.

### **Data and Methods**

Hundreds of major nonviolent and armed movements have developed against authoritarian governments in all corners of the world, and though most have faced state-led repression as a result, studies have found that nonviolent campaigns are more than twice as successful than armed insurgencies (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015). These and other studies have also drawn important implications for post-conflict peace and stability, as nonviolent transitions are correlated with less conflict recurrence, a reduction in violence, and more durable democracy (Dudouet 2008; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004). One of the cases on which these conclusions are based is the peaceful mass protest movement in the late 1980s that led to regime change in Chile. However, none of these studies even considered that there were at least four terrorist groups in Chile throughout the Pinochet dictatorship, including the FPMR, with

at least 1,500 soldiers. Rather than studying Chile as a single instance of a nonviolent movement that succeeded in countering repression and imparting peaceful change, the methods and data of this chapter are designed to show that the opposition to the military dictatorship was far more diverse. Importantly, it was not a given that the nonviolent side would gain the momentum it did and effectively prevent more widespread political violence.

Following recent work by Janet Lewis (2013, 2017), who examined rebel groups in the initial stages in Uganda, and Kathleen Blee (2014), who investigated how grassroots activist groups emerged in Pittsburgh, I created a dataset that maps the observable universe of cases of opposition to the military dictatorship in Chile's Metropolitan Region (*Región Metropolitana*). An opposition group in this study is an association of individuals, regardless of its size and level of formality, that had the goal of opposing the military government directly or indirectly, at some point during the Pinochet dictatorship (from September 11, 1973, and the plebiscite in 1988). Opposition organizations in this dataset employ armed, nonviolent, or mixed strategies. The goals encompassed were either reformist, such as changing economic, political and/or social government policies, or maximalist, such as regime change. Given these criteria the study includes a broad set of actor, such as banned political parties, faith-based organizations, labor unions, student and professional associations, victims' groups, art and cultural resistance groups, human rights and women's rights NGOs, neighborhood associations and territorially-based groups, armed groups, and protest command groups.

The main empirical challenge of this chapter is thus to include the negative cases of mobilization, namely those that failed to consolidate or pose a threat to the military

junta. Given their size, these groups are very difficult to observe. The press does not report on public gatherings of 20 people to protest a government policy, for example, or a group of students walking out of their classrooms to protest the military junta's takeover of the university. One also cannot rely on how the media characterizes the social mobilization that they do cover given the authoritarian nature of the regime. In Chile, as is common in other autocratic contexts, the press was not allowed to operate freely. The junta closed down media outlets for reporting on government repression and the opposition, such as was the case with Radio Chilena (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1977). In order to find as many emerging grassroots efforts as possible, I use a combination of primary and secondary sources, as well as personal interviews with leaders of opposition groups. Among the sources used to locate opposition groups are:

1. The Vicariate of Solidarity, which was part of Chile's Catholic Church and by far the most important organization "measuring the pulse" of the country and recording abuses, left an invaluable archive in Santiago (*Fundación Documentación y Archivo de la Vicaría de la Solidaridad, Arzobispado de Santiago*). This organization produced during the dictatorship the three most important sources that this study uses to identify opposition groups, containing tens of thousands of pages: all the issues from their biweekly magazine *Solidaridad*; their secret monthly reports (*Informes Mensuales*); and boxes with materials on peasants, *pobladores* (people living in shantytowns), and students.

2. Reports, pamphlets, and other documents from groups categorized as “social organizations” in the National Archive of Chile, 20th Century records, during the period of the dictatorship (1973–1989).
3. Publications by the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEPU), a major human rights organization, found at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago.
4. Official reports from Chile’s three truth commissions: Rettig (The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in 1991), Valech I (The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report in 2004), and Valech II (The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report in 2011).
5. The collection of U.S.-Chile documents from the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, which includes declassified U.S. government documents from the FBI, CIA, and State Department.
6. Secondary sources, including PhD dissertations, books, articles, and reports.

This process resulted in a dataset of 1,685 opposition groups that operated in the Metropolitan Region between 1973 and 1989. Coding yearly observations of all these cases, for all the organizational and repression indicators, was prohibitively time-consuming. Thus, to make the study tractable, I (along with Peter Aronow and Fredrik Savje) developed a method of case selection that combines advantages from qualitative case knowledge and random selection (Amat et al., forthcoming). This technique has the benefits of random sampling—namely, avoiding bias, promoting representativeness, and being able to recover the probability population mean—and the benefits of purposive

case selection—namely, harnessing in depth knowledge about cases and not leaving it up to chance to exclude extremely important cases that are needed to understand the phenomenon of interest. The key is that in the end, all 1,685 organizations will have a non-zero probability of selection—some will be sampled with 100% probability, and the rest will have a range of probabilities of being selected through the stratified random sampling.<sup>14</sup>

The first step consists of selecting opposition groups that need to be included in the study because of their importance—these are the “must-do” cases. Organizations that provide a significant amount of information about how the opposition emerged and consolidated in Chile in an environment of repression are to be included in the study with certainty. In other words, these are the opposition groups that are most likely to update our priors, per the Bayesian worldview (Humphreys & Jacobs, 2015). One also cannot afford leaving it up to chance to exclude these groups from the study because of practical reasons. People with any knowledge of Chile’s history are very likely to know something about the must-do cases. Including them in the study allows readers to engage with the research in a more meaningful way. Regardless of whether this chapter’s propositions comport with or challenge common knowledge on these cases, people will be more equipped to assess the work if it includes the must-do cases. The research design in this chapter, which aims to overcome the selection problem of exclusively studying large-scale mobilization, means that many of the groups in the dataset will likely be small and obscure. Other than including the must-do organizations, the case selection method

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<sup>14</sup> The Horowitz-Thompson continues being an unbiased estimator of the population mean with unequal probabilities.



involves stratified random sampling, which does not ensure that well-known cases of general interest will be incorporated.

In order to select the must-do cases I consulted with three of the most important scholars of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile: Psychology Professor Elizabeth Lira of Universidad Alberto Hurtado, who served as one of the eight members heading the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture and was also a member of the team consulted to create the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago; History Professor Mario Garcés of Universidad de Santiago de Chile; and History Professor Cristina Moyano of Universidad de Santiago de Chile. I provided my working definition of opposition group, given how broad it is, and asked them to make a list of the most important such groups that existed during the Pinochet dictatorship. Specifically, I asked them to make a list the most important groups according to criteria such as the level of state repression they endured, how well they evaded repression, and how impactful they were in the resistance against the dictatorship and in the process of achieving democracy. Other less important factors I asked them to consider included the opposition group's size and level of internal cohesion and formalization (see Appendix G for a copy of the email that I sent to these three professors). I also independently made a list of the cases that I thought should be included with 100% probability based on my case knowledge. The final list of 12 must-do cases emerged from including all the groups that the professors recommended, except for the think tanks that Professor Moyano suggested because I did not include this type of organizations in the study. There was significant overlap between our lists. Mine only had three groups that were not in any of the professors' lists, and I included one of those, the Movement Against Torture

Sebastián Acevedo. I incorporated this group based on my interviews, which revealed its uniqueness as a resistance group and influence on other opposition movements. The final list of must-do cases is as follows:

1. Vicariate of Solidarity
2. Communist Party of Chile
3. Socialist Party of Chile
4. Christian Democratic Party
5. MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement)
6. Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR)
7. Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (AFDD)
8. Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEPU)
9. The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches (FASIC)
10. Committee for the Cooperation of Peace in Chile (COPACHI)
11. Chilean Human Rights Commission
12. Movement Against Torture Sebastián Acevedo

The second part of the selection process consists of defining the variables on which to stratify, coding the stratifying variables for all 1,685 cases, and conducting the stratified random sampling without replacement. The variables on which I stratify all cases are the most basic indicators: a binary indicator for whether the organization was founded before or after the coup of September 11, 1973, and a categorical variable for the type of organization, which could be banned political parties, faith-based organizations, labor unions, student and professional associations, victims' groups, art and cultural resistance groups, human rights and women's rights NGOs, neighborhood associations

and territorially-based groups, armed groups, or protest command groups. Then there are two types of organizations that are further stratified, the labor unions by industry (primary, secondary, tertiary, or multi-industry coalition) and the territorially based groups by geographic location (North, East, West, South, and Central Santiago; the other provinces making up the Metropolitan Region, namely Chacabuco, Cordillera, Maipo, Melipilla, and Talagante, and coordinating organizations).<sup>15</sup> Table 4.2 shows the distribution of cases across all strata. In parenthesis is the number of must-do cases. For example, four of the 14 political parties that emerged before the coup that deposed President Salvador Allende are must-do cases and thus have a 100% probability of being sampled.

Table 4.2. Distribution of Opposition Groups by Type and Date of Founding

<i>Type/ Group formed before or after coup</i>	Pre-coup	Post-coup
Political party	14 (4)	34
Union/workers org	495	62
Religious	33	39 (3)
Human rights NGO	5	21 (2)
Professionals	41	55
Students	58	42
Women's groups/ feminists	1	18
Victims' groups/ denunciation orgs	1	16 (1)
Armed groups	0	9 (1)
Shantytown orgs/ neighborhood associations	22	148
Art/ cultural orgs	7	63
Informal protest group/ protest command	2	52 (1)

<sup>15</sup> In this study, however, I do not use these last two sub-categories for unions and geographic location to conduct the random sampling because the sampling scheme would have resulted in too many cases to code.

After coding these variables for the 1,685 groups, I sample all strata with an equal probability of 15%. In addition, I set a maximum and a minimum number of cases that can be sampled from each cell in order to control the size of the final dataset and to make sure that we gain enough information from the less populated cells. At least 10 opposition groups are selected from each cell and if the cell has fewer than 10 cases, they are all selected. The maximum is 40 cases per cell. The max-min makes sure that there will not be that many labor unions in the dataset or too few cases in cells with fewer than 10 cases. The total number of groups in Table 4.1 is 1,250 rather than 1,685 because of missing data. There are 435 cases for which I could not code the type or founding moment with certainty and 15% of those missing data cases will be selected to code more in depth. After implementing the sampling scheme outlined above, the dataset has a total of 328 cases (236 observations selected through stratified random sampling + 12 must-do cases + 80 randomly selected cases from missing data). Appendix H shows the list of selected cases through stratified random sampling and the 12 must-do organizations.<sup>16</sup>

The dataset of 328 cases is time-series (at the opposition group-year level), and it includes all the years of the Pinochet dictatorship, 1973 to 1989. It therefore has 5,904 observations. A series of variables are coded to conduct statistical analysis of the main relationship of interest, the effect of repression on alliances, with control variables to address omitted variable bias as much as possible and to disconfirm alternative hypotheses. Factors such as the segment of society from where the opposition group's leadership and first movers came, the level of resources, foreign support, indicators for internal cohesion, organizational structure, political objectives, and strategy, are included.

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<sup>16</sup> The 80 cases with missing data will be selected and coded after the rest of the dataset is finished.

Mobilization is not one of the variables, though it would ideally be included in the dataset to model it as one of the dependent variables. The reason is that it would be extremely difficult to find group-year information about participation in protests. Instead, the number of alliances is the main dependent variable, and a series of repression variables are the explanatory factors. The years when mass mobilization occurred are highlighted in the descriptive statistics graphs in order to observe how they overlap with an increase in alliances. In addition, the chapter shows how alliances and mass mobilization track together by leveraging qualitative evidence from the Vicariate of Solidarity's archive. See Appendix D for the complete list of variables and codebook.

In terms of the limits to the dataset, there are three important ones to point out. First and foremost, there is still missing data given how small and obscure some of the groups are. Organizations for which we (my research assistants and I) cannot find written records require personal interviews with individuals from the area where the group was active. I am confident that we will be able to have a much smaller percentage of missing data as we conduct more interviews. Second, I certainly cannot be sure that the dataset contains all opposition groups that existed, and given how small some of the cases are, it is likely that the dataset does not in fact contain them all. Nonetheless, this dataset provides a remarkably wide view at the full range of opposition and their origins in Chile, and it brings us closer to overcoming the selection problem of studying mostly major movements. Third, the dataset does not contain information about the participation of groups in protests by year. Therefore, the chapter does not have mass mobilization as its dependent variable in the quantitative analysis. Rather, the main dependent variable in the quantitative analysis is number of alliances and the independent variable is repression.

Qualitative evidence, in particular from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports, is provided to show how alliance formation leads to mass mobilization.

The opposition groups dataset provides a rich picture of the constellation of resistance that existed in the most populated state in Chile (and beyond, as many of them had a presence outside this region), their origins, and variation across time on how their objectives, tactics, formalization, cohesion, and alliances changed alongside government repression. The dataset does not, however, inform us about the progression from acquiescence or underground resistance to public action—how and when the opposition went public and a mass movement consolidated. The first chapter of the dissertation examines the underground resistance that a segment of the opposition was waging against the Pinochet dictatorship, and the second chapter analyzes the type of opposition group that conducted the first public protests against the regime, which were a direct result of the repression. This chapter traces the first signs of public opposition all the way to the start of mass mobilization in the early 1980s by going through every monthly secret report (*Informes Mensuales*) that the Vicariate of Solidarity produced from their founding in 1976 to the end of the dictatorship in 1989. In these reports the Vicariate of Solidarity documented repression in great detail, with individual testimonies, statistics, and evaluations of the patterns of repression that month. In addition, these reports also record public expressions of dissent that they could identify, including some instances of individual resistance; public statements from elites, unions, the international community, and others; strikes; hunger strikes; small protests; and major protests.

These archives provide a very detailed view of how public resistance emerged in the Metropolitan Region, and they show the iterative process of alliance formation with

repression at the center. While these reports are an invaluable resource, and I am confident that they contain the most accurate and complete account of public opposition in the Metropolitan Region that is publicly available, there may be some actions that are excluded. First and foremost, the Vicariate of Solidarity was founded—and started these reports—in 1976; therefore, actions between the last months of 1973 through the end of 1975 are missing. The first reports in 1976 provide an overview of what had been occurring in the country since the coup, but the information is nowhere near the level of detail of contemporaneous events.

Second, the Vicariate of Solidarity was primarily concerned with documenting state repression; therefore, actions that were not punished in any way (not even resulting in a layoff, a few hours of detention, or a home search) are unlikely to be included in these reports. That said, it is probably safe to assume that any public action critical of the military junta, no matter how subdued, resulted in some level of state repression, at least during the first few years of the dictatorship. Two examples of the types of actions that resulted in state repression in the 1970s are illustrative. The August 1978 secret report documents that unemployed individuals organized a show of Folkloric music to raise funds to subsist, but the main organizer was detained. The same report mentions the case of a woman who yelled at Pinochet's motorcade as it was passing through a *población* and she was detained, questioned, and mistreated. But already by the early 1980s, state authorities were preoccupied with large protests and thus potentially less likely to respond to small acts of resistance, even if they existed at all. In short, since the Vicariate of Solidarity was documenting virtually all instances of repression and the military junta likely repressed all acts of public opposition, the secret reports should not underreport

certain types of public opposition (namely those that did not result in some form of state repression).

But even if the public display of opposition did not result in state repression, the secret reports should include those actions too as long as the organizers and/or participants are somehow connected to the Catholic Church. Being connected to the Catholic Church in this case is not too restrictive, however. As explained in Chapter 2, the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity had immense reach in society during this period of repression and need. The institution had projects in poor neighborhoods (*poblaciones*); protected and served victims, their relatives, and their advocacy groups; and worked on behalf of peasants for their plight, particularly as the economy began to worsen in 1977. The work of the *Pastoral Obrera*, which was the Vicariate of Solidarity's department for workers, covered the needs of the industrial sector and labor unions. Hence, the Catholic Church had a deep connection to almost all segments of society that could attempt to oppose the regime.

When it came to individuals using armed action, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez and the Vicariate Solidarity drew a red line (Cavallo, 1991). Most certainly to prevent the military junta from closing down the Vicariate of Solidarity, the institution's policy was that perpetrators of what they called "crimes of blood" (*crímenes de sangre*) would not be protected or assisted by the Catholic hierarchy (Cavallo, 1991; Hau, 2005). As a result, victims from the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez and MIR members who had been engaging in armed action were usually not assisted by the Vicariate of Solidarity.<sup>17</sup> While

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<sup>17</sup> CODEPU was founded to fill this gap left by the Vicariate of Solidarity. They provided legal and other assistance to victims of torture, families of victims, and others connected to armed action. Lay people and a nun who was part of MIR's Central Committee, Blanca Rengifo, founded CODEPU. Its leaders and members suffered far more repression than those from the Vicariate of Solidarity, including detention,



this policy might have allowed the Vicariate of Solidarity to operate during the years of the dictatorship, it did not prevent the military junta, especially via newspapers sympathetic to the regime, from slandering the Vicariate of Solidarity, bishops, and even the cardinal. Dozens of pages from secret reports of May to October 1977 are dedicated to outlining all the accusations leveled against the Catholic hierarchy, as well as to pasting the various articles from *El Mercurio* and the recurrent (almost identical) “letters to the editor” expressing concerns about the Catholic Church. The most common accusations were that the Cardinal, bishops, and priests were aiding and abetting Marxists and “terrorists.”

The other segments of society that were more disconnected from the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity were students, though not entirely. There were some exceptions with regards to after-school programs that the Church organized for those in need, as well as with the outreach of the Vicariate of Solidarity’s department for the youth, called *Vicaría Pastoral Juvenil*. Perhaps given its emphasis on those most in need during this period, the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity did not focus on professional associations and universities as much. Finally, women’s rights and LGBTQ rights groups did not find a natural ally in the Catholic Church given the latter’s conservative stance on those issues.

In addition to the time restriction of these reports and the bias toward documenting actions that led to repression and actions organized by people connected to the Catholic Church, distortions can be introduced depending on the source. These secret reports sometimes mention public acts of resistance that the Vicariate of Solidarity only

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torture, sexual abuse in prison, and the burning of their premises (Interviewee 34, Santiago de Chile, April 2016).

learned through newspaper reports from *El Mercurio* or from military junta statements. I exclude those actions because the government might have fabricated them to justify repression. For example, a tactic that the military junta adopted to justify killing its political opponents was to say that they had detained them, but they had to shoot them in the back because they tried to escape (Fruhling, 1983, 1984; Rettig, 1991). The government also fabricated “armed encounters” with militants, claiming that the police or armed forces had responded with lethal force in self-defense. The Vicariate of Solidarity started learning about these practices even during the dictatorship, as the actual victims of the violence or their family members came to them with competing accounts of the events. The reports also show the government’s own contradictory statements on the same incident, thereby calling their credibility into question.

Having described the dataset of opposition groups, as well as the archives on which I rely to identify the emergence of public resistance in the Metropolitan Region, the next section presents the descriptive statistics and analysis from the dataset. I present evidence for the five hypotheses outlined above.

### **Findings**

The Opposition Groups in the Metropolitan Region (OGMC) dataset has nine binary indicators for repression, which are these chapter’s main explanatory variables. They indicate whether or not an opposition group, on any given year, suffered at least one disappearance, execution, case of torture, detention, forcible displacement, raid, forced exile, politicized layoff, or harassment. To view and analyze the data, I indexed the violent repression indicators and the nonviolent repression indicators separately. Violent repression is the addition of the binary variables of disappearance, execution, and torture

for each group-year. For example, if a group in 1973 had at least one case of execution and one case of torture but no disappearances, the violent repression variable score is 2. Similarly, nonviolent repression is the addition of the binary variables of detention, forcible displacement, raid, forced exile, politicized layoff, or harassment for each group-year. Figure 4.1 shows the mean level of the index violent repression variable, as well as the mean level of the nonviolent repression variable, toward all opposition groups in the dataset by year. While the average level of violent repression steadily decreases, with the exception of a few spikes during mass protests in the 1980s, mean nonviolent repression remains relatively high and dramatically increases in the early 1980s.




Figure 4.1. Average Level of Nonviolent and Violent Repression Toward All Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset, 1973–1990

Note: The shaded area represents periods of mass national protests, including the first one during the Pinochet dictatorship, from 1983 to 1986. The protests in 1988 were around the October 5 national plebiscite that ended the Pinochet dictatorship.




Figure 4.2. Average Number of Alliances of all Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset by Year, 1973–1990

Note: The shaded area represents periods of mass national protests, including the first one during the Pinochet dictatorship, from 1983 to 1986. The protests in 1988 were around the October 5 national plebiscite that ended the Pinochet dictatorship.


Generally consistent with this chapter’s main hypothesis (Hypotheses 2 and 4), Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 together show that the lower the repression the regime is perpetrating against the opposition, the more alliances we observe, and that mass mobilization does not occur when violent repression is the highest. These graphs are suggestive evidence that as *violent* repression in particular diminishes—though not necessarily nonviolent repression—the alliances between opposition groups will increase. Also congruent with the idea that mass protests require alliances between opposition groups, alliances peaked during the mass protests that changed the course of the Pinochet dictatorship from 1983 to 1986. By the end of 1986, the frequent mass protests calling for

the overthrow of the regime had subsided, and instead the proposal of waiting for the Constitutional 1988 plebiscite took hold. The mass protests that followed were around the electoral campaign, to bring awareness for the October 5 vote and to make sure that the government would hold free and fair elections and respect the results.

It is important to note that the rise in mass protests was not abrupt as Figures 4.1 and 4.2 suggest. Medium-size protests started occurring more frequently, followed by sporadic larger protests, and then larger more frequent protests, and so forth. This increase in mobilization should track more closely with the rise in alliances. Unfortunately, the OGMC dataset does not contain mobilization variables by opposition group-year. It would be extremely difficult to find information about whether or not each group participated in a given protest. Even though this dataset cannot show the slow rise in public mobilization, tracking more closely with alliances, the narrative from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports is meant to fill this gap. It shows how in reality mass mobilization emerged slowly through this process of alliance formation.


After disaggregating violent repression and alliances by type of opposition group, as Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show, political parties, armed groups, as well as student and professional associations, were the victims of the highest levels of violent repression. These descriptive statistics are largely consistent with the findings of the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (otherwise known as the Rettig report). The political parties in opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship were primarily from the left, with the exception of the Christian Democratic Party, which is centrist. The top targets of the Pinochet dictatorship were these leftist and ultra-leftist political movements, which reflects that the highest level of violent repression was directed toward them.

Surprisingly, unions do not appear to have been subjected to such high levels of violent repression. Three reasons may explain the observed pattern. First, many of the labor union leaders who were disappeared and executed were also leftist party militants, and the repression is thus counted under political parties. Another reason is that labor unions faced very high levels of nonviolent repression and legal restrictions, which might have replaced some of the violent repression. They were subjected to extensive mass layoffs of people believed to be associated with leftist parties, detentions of labor union leaders, and the stripping of the union's right to collectively bargain and strike. Finally, the organizing that unions did during the dictatorship did not happen in the workplace as much as in Catholic parishes and under the protection of the religious leadership (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, 1977–1981; Araya, 2015). This relationship contrasts with that of political parties. Leftist political party militants went underground to continue organizing, and they did so largely without the protection of the Catholic Church.



N=2,107

Figure 4.3. Average Level of Violent Repression by Opposition Group, 1973–1990



N=2,143

Figure 4.4. Average Number of Alliances by Opposition Group, 1973–1990

Figure 4.4 is also generally consistent with this chapter's expectations about the number of alliances and the level of violent repression that the types of opposition groups faced (the higher the violent repression the fewer the alliances). Protest groups had the highest number of alliances, as well as human rights NGOs, victims' organizations, and women's groups. However, political parties have an unexpectedly high average number of alliances given the level of violent repression that they experienced. This may be because the number of alliances that political parties forged skyrocketed shortly after violent repression decreased, pushing the average up from the early 1980s on. The network graphs below illustrate this dramatic change. In addition, the Christian Democratic Party was not the subject of such high levels of violent repression; therefore, its ties during the entire period of the dictatorship pull the average of alliances for political parties up as well.

Figure 4.5 provides evidence for the first hypothesis, which is that organizations whose militants suffer from targeted killings, torture, and/or forced disappearances are very unlikely to be part of alliances, despite the fact that they have enormous mobilizing potential (Hypothesis 1). Figure 4.5 is the representation of all alliances between and among the types of opposition group in 1973, the year that the Chilean Armed Forces deposed Allende and established a military junta. The color of the nodes or vertices represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle



represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). Finally, the thickness of the links represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups, the thicker the line is connecting the two.

Figure 4.5. Alliances in 1973 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset

The first thing to note is that, as expected, most opposition groups faced high levels of violent repression the year that the military junta consolidated power following the successful coup. Consistent with this chapter's hypotheses about repression and alliances, there were very few alliances between opposition groups at this stage, with the

exception of groups building ties with protector institutions (religious groups and human rights NGOs). In 1973 the thickest alliances were between groups of the religious type and neighborhood associations (primarily in *poblaciones* or shantytowns), which faced occupations by the Armed Forces, as well as frequent raids and detentions followed by disappearances, as the Armed Forces searched for leftist party militants. The Vicariate of Solidarity and Catholic parishes in those communities became highly involved to assuage the pain of the repression. This observation is also consistent with this chapter's sixth hypothesis, which contends that protector institutions such as the Vicariate of Solidarity and other faith-based organizations should have the largest number of alliances (Hypothesis 6).

It is also important to note that nearly half of all types of groups did not have a single alliance among organizations of their same type. As I describe in the narrative above about the stages of repression and alliances, derived from the Vicariate of Solidarity's confidential reports, civil society became atomized during the phase of widespread, and largely indiscriminate, violent repression. My main contention in this chapter is that under this environment of high repression, it is not possible that we will observe mass protests. The same regime, however, changes the pattern of violence against civil society and ties begin to grow, making mass protests possible and likely in Chile given the context described above.

Figure 4.6, illustrating the alliances in 1977, contrasts with Figure 4.7, which depicts the 1978 alliances. The crucial changes that occurred from 1977 to 1978 are that the secret police DINA was dissolved (1977), disappearances as a systematic form of repression perpetrated by the regime against the opposition ended (also 1977), and

violent repression generally saw a precipitous drop during this period (as seen in Figure 4.1). One can observe that the number of alliances increased and that only armed groups suffered a high level of repression by 1978. Political parties experienced a medium level of violent repression, and they began forming alliances with diverse types of opposition groups. In addition, by 1978 most opposition groups have ties with organizations within their same type (square nodes), and there are increasingly thicker links between different types of opposition organizations.




Figure 4.6. Alliances in 1977 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset

Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line is connecting the two.




Figure 4.7. Alliances in 1978 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset

Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line is connecting the two.

These network graphs are also consistent with the fifth hypothesis, which derives from the logic of alliance formation. Alliances will tend to form between organizations that suffer relatively similar patterns of state repression (Hypothesis 5). Indeed, most of the ties in these figures are between types of groups that have the same (low) level of repression (represented by the yellow vertices). Appendix I contains graphs for all the years not displayed in the body of the chapter. Further, Figure 4.8 shows the dramatic increase in ties between types of opposition groups that exist when the first mass national protests against Pinochet start in 1983. The number of ties is significantly larger compared to what we have seen up until this point, and especially between 1973 and

1977. The social fabric (*tejido social*) of Chilean civil society is reconstructed during this period, and mass protests become possible (Bustamante Olguín, 2010).




Figure 4.8. Alliances in 1983 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset

Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line is connecting the two.

During the 1988 mass protests one also observes a highly inter- and intra-connected landscape of civil society, spanning across political parties, labor unions, student groups, etc. Armed groups are still relatively isolated, as the hypotheses in this chapter would predict, with a few exceptions. There is one tie between a human rights NGO and an armed group, which is the relationship between CODEPU and the Patriotic

Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR). As I describe earlier, CODEPU was founded to supplement the work of the Vicariate of Solidarity, as the hierarchy of the Catholic Church refused to assist victims of state repression who had used arms against the state. The connection between FPMR and neighborhood associations was also forged, as they recruited from shantytown and Communist Party strongholds from 1983 onward (FPMR was the armed wing of the Communist Party of Chile). This connection also explains the relationship between armed groups and political parties—leftist and ultra-leftist political movements either had armed wings or supported them given their desire to overthrow the regime and establish a new social and economic order.




Figure 4.9. Alliances in 1988 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset

Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line is connecting the two.

## Hypothesis Testing

Finally, I test the main hypotheses of this chapter in fixed effects models (to account for the panel data) with key covariates and different specifications. In addition to testing the simplest form of the relationship with one independent variable (violent repression) and the main dependent variable (average number of alliances by year), I include two main confounders, namely ideology and the primary political objective of the opposition group. These two variables are potential confounders because they are likely associated with both the number of alliances and the level of repression to which groups

are subjected. Ideology is an ordinal-level variable that describes the ideology of opposition groups as centrist, leftist, or ultra-leftist. The more radical the group ideology, the idea is that they would be more likely to be repressed and thus have fewer alliances. With respect to the primary objective of the opposition group, this is an ordinal-level variable that describes whether the organization had reformist or more maximalist objectives on any given year (see the Codebook in Appendix D for the details). The expected relationship here would be that the more extreme the objective, the higher the likelihood of suffering violent repression and the fewer alliances the group would have. Ideally, mobilization would be tested as the dependent variable in another model; however, as mentioned previously, the OGM dataset does not contain specific participation information by group-year.

Importantly, I find that after including these two covariates the negative relationship between violent repression and the average number of alliances becomes more substantive (a larger coefficient). All the coefficients for violent repression are statistically significant and show that higher violent repression is associated with a lower number of alliances, regardless of the specification.

The six fixed effects models tested in this chapter are as follows:

1. Average Number of Alliances<sub>it</sub> =  $a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + e_{it}$
2. Average Number of Alliances<sub>it</sub> =  $a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + e_{it}$
3. Average Number of Alliances<sub>it</sub> =  $a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + b_3 \text{Objective}_{it} + e_{it}$
4. Average Number of Alliances<sub>it</sub> =  $a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + e_{it}$
5. Average Number of Alliances<sub>it</sub> =  $a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + e_{it}$




$$6. \text{ Average Number of Alliances}_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + b_3 \text{Objective}_{it} + e_{it}$$

(where  $i$  is each organization and  $t$  is each year from 1973-1990)

Figure 4.10 is the coefficients plot with the results from these models. The hollow symbols are the models with violent repression as the main explanatory variable, and the filled symbols are the coefficients of the models with nonviolent repression as the main independent variable. A change from an organization not suffering any form of violent repression to experiencing at least one disappearance, execution, or case of torture is associated with a reduction in the average number of alliances by approximately half of a tie, controlling for the ideology and primary objective of the opposition group.

Considering that the average number of alliances for an organization in the OGMC dataset is 2.5, half of a tie is a substantively important change. Interestingly, the nonviolent repression coefficients show the opposite relationship, which is that the higher the level of *nonviolent* repression the higher the average number of alliances by year. Though not anticipated by the theory in this chapter, perhaps this is the case because when repression is manageable, civil society is able to act publicly to defend itself and pursue its political objectives, which require the forging of alliances.

Though some of the coefficients of the covariates are statistically insignificant at the  $p < .05$  level, they have the expected direction: the more radical the ideology and the more extreme the objective of the group, the lower the average of alliances by year.



All fixed effects models at the year-group level

Figure 4.10. Effect of Violent and Nonviolent Repression on the Average Number of Alliances by Year Between and Among Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset, 1973–1990

## Alternative Explanations and Implications

The theory and analysis on alliance formation leaves a few open questions. First, if the regime is observing a rise in ties between organizations and the slow increase in frequency and size of public actions, why does not repression increase? Why did not the military junta respond with sufficient force to prevent these alliances from forming and disrupt mass mobilization? There are two main reasons there were more limits to repression after 1977. The secret police DINA had been dissolved in 1977 due to international pressure, particularly from the United States President Jimmy Carter. The relatives of the disappeared, who had been organizing and gaining media attention

domestically and internationally, also pressured the regime to end this form of repression.<sup>18</sup> In other words, extreme repression, such as the systematic torture, execution and disappearance of leftist party militants, became very politically costly for the military junta. The Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports show that Pinochet was concerned about his image in Latin America (represented by the Organization of American States), the United States and the United Nations, which were all exerting pressure for improved human rights in Chile. The fact that the junta led a libelous propaganda campaign against the Catholic Church, which greatly intensified after Cardinal Silva Henríquez met with OAS spokespeople about the human rights situation, shows that Pinochet was concerned about the international community shaming and isolating his government (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, September 1978). For economic, political, and social reasons, the United States and Western institutions had leverage on the Pinochet regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

In addition, part of the reason repression was not so extreme against the groups that started building alliances with a potential to consolidate a mass movement—shantytown associations and to some extent labor unions—is that their mobilization occurred at a time when the poor in Chile were suffering greatly. The economic crisis might have caused the regime to have information problems about the nature of the mobilization: these groups could credibly signal that they were only concerned with the regime's economic policies and that they did not have greater ambitions to depose the military government (Debs & Monteiro, 2014; Weiss, 2014). Civil society organizations focused on subsistence were also useful to the government because they alleviated the

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<sup>18</sup> Following DINA's assassination of Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. Orlando Letelier and his assistant Roni Moffitt in a car bomb in Washington, DC, the United States pressured Pinochet to rein in DINA and its extreme human rights abuses (Kornbluh, 2013).

grievances of the poor. Soup kitchens and programs to help the unemployed were genuinely concerned with improving the lives of those most affected by the crisis. Alliances grew until they were massive without inviting unmanageable levels of violence, and then they started making maximalist demands.

Another question that remains unanswered after this analysis concerns the competition between opposition organizations. Work on social movements has pointed to competition among opposition groups, particularly for members, funding, and political attention, leading to innovation in tactics and to changes in strategy (Soule & King, 2008; Zald & McCarthy, 1979). This research suggests that alliances between civil society organizations may not primarily be a function of violent repression, but rather serves as competition among opposition groups (McGroary, 2018). I find that competition among groups was not an important factor determining alliances prior to the protests. Instead, political competition became much more salient once the military junta started negotiating an exit and certain organizations were excluded from those talks. Once the movement became more electorally driven and focused on the plebiscite, the opposition became more divided. During this time, political parties took the lead and became more prominent in the public opposition against the regime than they had been up until this point. In fact, most of the work by political parties from 1973 to 1979 happened underground or abroad because of the very high levels of violent repression. But as soon as the mass national protests started and the military junta opened the possibility for a transition, political parties emerged to seize the opportunity. However, the prospect for negotiations led to infighting.

During the height of the protests there were two distinct groups that political parties formed that had this ideological and strategic divide. The Democratic Alliance (*Alianza Democrática*), which represented more moderate leftists, and the Democratic Popular Movement (*Movimiento Democrático Popular*), which coordinated the more radical leftist political parties, both existing from 1983 to 1987. By 1986, the military junta was pressured into accepting going to negotiations, at which point they chose to do so with the moderates, empowering the Democratic Alliance and excluding the Democratic Popular Movement (Ortega Frei, 1992). The Communist Party and the MIR, which had not repudiated the use of force to overthrow the regime, did not play a major role during the transition despite their considerable membership base. The imperative of winning the national plebiscite did not prevent these divisions among leftists, though the Communists and other more radical leftists would vote for the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*) instead of providing support to Pinochet and the military junta. The Median voter theorem operates in this case, leading more extreme leftists to choose the option that is closest to their view even if they are not directly included.

The proliferation of civil society organizations after the coup in 1973 is thus not a consequence or symptom of competition, but rather of the repression and economic crisis. Violent repression atomized the population and the public organizing that happened, for subsistence purposes or to cope with repression, took place at the very local level. This led to the emergence of hundreds of civil society groups during the height of the repression, which seems counterintuitive. During this period, ideological differences and competition for funding, for example, became far less important than during times of

relative peace. Civil society had a very clear common opponent—Pinochet and the military junta—and the challenges were so vast that they required a concerted and united effort (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, August 1977).

Nonetheless, this chapter takes into consideration the process of differentiation that occurs during the mass protests, by including the type “protest groups” as opposition organizations, which are essentially these coalitions of mainly political parties that formed around the protests. In addition, by controlling for ideology and political objective, the parametric models described above account for the most important differences between these groups leading to competition. The process of alliance formation nonetheless takes place and a reduction in violent repression is strongly related to it.

On implications, this chapter’s theoretical framework and empirical strategy are helpful to make sense of findings in the literature on mass mobilization. They may also shed light on the puzzling and contradictory work that we have seen on the relationship between repression and collective action. First, on the civil resistance literature, cross-national studies usually include country-level measures of repression, which seek to measure crackdowns against protesters, though sometimes it is unclear who the target of the repression is that is being measured. These studies have found that repression reduces the probability of success of nonviolent movements by an astounding 45%. Instead of theorizing on the relationship between repression, mass mobilization, and the success of civil resistance campaigns, these cross-national studies simply “control” for repression in order to show that the relationship between strategy (nonviolent vs. violent) and success rate holds (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 2008). The chapter’s theory, on the other hand,

puts repression at the center of mass mobilization and makes sense of this empirical pattern. As mentioned previously, when repression reaches very high levels (in terms of frequency and form) against the groups that are protesting, the alliances that had formed and produced mass public actions will likely wither. As alliances are destroyed, the continuation of the mass movement becomes less likely.

Furthermore, the datasets on which these studies are based only include civil resistance campaigns that have already mobilized tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people. They have all proven to be organizationally successful, at least at a given point in time. This dissertation has argued that organizationally successful campaigns emerge from the alliance formation process of hundreds of civil society organizations. This process can then be disrupted with an increase in repression against the mobilizing groups, if they include systematic and frequent killings, for example. In the case of Chile, civil society organizations first built coalitions with the Catholic Church as the protector institution, from where they were able to expand as repression was maintained at manageable levels. This means that the mass movement grew out of a place in society that was slightly more open, that the regime could not or would not repress more brutally. Instead, given their finding that nonviolent campaigns emerge in “flatter terrain, and older, more durable authoritarian regimes” compared to armed insurgencies, Chenoweth and Lewis (2014) concluded that civil resistance campaigns seem to be “emerging where resistance is supposedly ‘difficult’” and armed insurgencies where it is “easy” (pp. 421–422). Presumably their model suggests that the environment from which nonviolent campaigns emerge is easy because flatter terrain makes it easier

for security forces to repress, and because more durable regimes suggest that they are stronger governments.

This chapter's theory and empirical results suggest otherwise: mass movements occur in flatter terrain because they are common in urban areas and unlikely to emerge in remote areas of the country. The fact that the armed forces could theoretically use force more easily on flatter surfaces than on rugged terrain does not mean that they can: as explained above, systematically using lethal force against unarmed civilians is costly domestically and internationally, especially when regimes have linkages to the United States, Western Europe, and international human rights organizations. The targets of extremely high repression by the Pinochet regime went underground, and the same regime used different levels of force against protesters. In fact, mass public actions by the opposition did not occur until the state response was manageable. Therefore, while mass civil resistance campaigns can manage moderate levels of repression, this dissertation shows that large-scale protests will end or the movement will go underground if systematic and lethal violence is used. This chapter is more consistent with work by Levitsky and Way (2010) on competitive authoritarian regimes, which argues that authoritarian regimes that start to tolerate public dissent may be more likely to experience an uprising, as "new freedoms allow people to participate who otherwise would be too afraid" (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 308). Similarly, Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Meernik et al. (2012, p. 237) found that a certain level of "openness" is necessary for human rights organizations to operate locally, and for naming and shaming campaigns to be successful.



Another finding from the civil resistance literature is that the effect of international intervention on mass movements is indeterminate, though there is very little academic research on the subject (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008, 2011).<sup>19</sup> The dissertation finds support for the idea that political and economic pressure from the United States, as well as naming and shaming from the OAS and the UN, in general make repression—especially the gravest forms, such as forced disappearances and systematic torture of prisoners—more costly for the regime. Given the varied effects that repression has on mobilization, as this dissertation has shown, how international actors affect mobilization by influencing state violence is difficult to assess in general terms.

There are four caveats to my observation that international pressure makes repression costlier and that it will thus lead to a reduction in state crackdowns. Repression may increase in specific instances, such as when international actors like the Red Cross visit detention facilities. In order to prevent the international community from learning about the conditions of the prisoners, the armed forces may transfer prisoners to other facilities and threaten prisoners and their families with retaliation if they provide their testimony to human rights organizations (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1976). Second, the international community usually focuses on the most violent forms of repression, which may lead to a reduction in those but an increase in other forms that are also damaging to mass mobilization. At the same time, some international actors such as the United States at times send mixed signals. For instance, the United States supported the anti-Marxist campaign that Pinochet was waging in Chile, especially in the context of the Cold War, but also started pressuring the military

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<sup>19</sup> There is more policy research on this question, such by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict and the U.S. Institute of Peace (especially by Maria Stephan). Scholars such as Matthew Cebul, Jaime Jackson, Erica Chenoweth, and Maria Stephan are currently working on this question to fill the gap.

junta for its “excesses” and gross human rights abuses. At other times the United States, or other countries in Western Europe, may support a regime for economic or other reasons in spite of its human rights violations. Meanwhile, international human rights organizations expose violations and demand better behavior.

Third, at least in the case of Chile, international pressure worked to make repression costlier for the Pinochet regime because of local human rights organizations like the Vicariate of Solidarity, FASIC, and the Chilean Human Rights Commission. These reputable organizations did the essential work of recording human rights abuses within the country in great detail and of connecting international actors to key players within the country to learn more about the situation. Research on human rights organizations in other settings has also found that the linkage between local organizations and international actors is essential for impact (Bob, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). Fourth, as explained above, it is clear that the United States and Western institutions such as the OAS and UN had leverage with the Pinochet regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Without leverage it is difficult to see how naming and shaming, or political and economic pressure, would have an effect on the regime’s behavior.

An important finding in the civil resistance literature, particularly from the resource mobilization model, is “that prior demonstrations and riots—which are generally not maximalist in nature—are useful indicators in predicting onsets of nonviolent uprisings in subsequent years” (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 22). This chapter’s theoretical framework not only is consistent with this finding but can also provide an explanation for this empirical connection, as well as the conditions under which we will

observe these reformist and smaller attempts to mobilize becoming larger and more challenging to the state.

From Sutton et al. (2014), we know that “a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization ... after violent repression” (p. 559). The idea is that what they call “spontaneous protests” can be overcome by government propaganda and have difficulties adapting to repression. In contrast, this chapter puts forth the view that protests against repressive authoritarian regimes are very unlikely to be “spontaneous” in the sense that they completely lack “a campaign infrastructure.” Tracing all the public actions that took place against the Pinochet regime from the Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports, it becomes clear that even the smallest protests—of 20 or so women protesting in front of *La Moneda* presidential palace asking about the whereabouts of their loved ones—had an infrastructure behind them. The difference between the protests that became larger and more consistent, which were able to dilute repression, were those that emerged from the alliances of many civil society organizations that were not so threatening to the regime. Protests by more threatening actors would have likely resulted in greater repression, which would make subsequent protests less likely.

Finally, studies on economic crises and mass mobilization have generally shown a positive relationship between the two (Grasso & Giugni, 2016; Walton & Ragin, 1990). There are some conditions under which economic crises will be unlikely to yield mass protests, however. This chapter argues that systematic lethal force against participants of a mass movement will not allow for large-scale public actions, even with the aggravating circumstance of a failing economy. In Chile, mass protests did not start until 1983, well

after a major economic crisis hit in 1982 that started in 1980 (*Crisis Económica 1982*, Memoria Chilena). In addition, I specify two ways in which the economic crisis in Chile made mass protests more likely. The first is the fact that hundreds of civil society organizations emerged for subsistence purposes—they mitigated unemployment, hunger, and lack of health care, as well as offered basic necessities when the state and the economy were failing many Chileans. These neighborhood associations, largely funded by the Catholic Church and the international community, kept the population connected and served as a mobilizing locus once repression decreased toward those operating them. The mobilizing potential thus vastly increased as a consequence of the economic crisis in a way that could avoid the worst of the repression from the state. Second, as mentioned earlier, economic crises may make the information that states can extract from protests less clear. Authoritarian governments may allow protests on economic matters, for example, hoping to diffuse popular anger for a lack of civil and political liberties, to show its domestic and international audience that the government allows public dissent, or to gain information about the performance of local officials (Weiss, 2014). However, these protests may either transform themselves to demand regime change once enough alliances have formed and participants have less fear of repression, or they may have been operating from the beginning under the assumption that they will challenge the state in more maximalist ways as soon as they are able to do so.

### **Conclusion**

By examining the universe of opposition organizations and the precursors to direct regime opposition, as well as the pattern of repression directed toward each, we are more likely to observe where mass mobilization emerges and consolidates. The level of

repression that the state may perpetrate is not constant across time or targets; therefore, whether there can be or not mass mobilization also varies significantly. It is not “one” opposition movement or “one” campaign that leads hundreds of thousands or millions of people to the streets. Mass protests are a result of various segments of the population, through their work (NGOs, labor unions, students, professional associations), in their neighborhoods (shantytown associations), and via their activism (relatives of the victims), coming together by building alliances. Alliances are forged when violent repression is manageable, and they are dissolved when the consequences of maintaining them are systematic executions, torture, or disappearances. As Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) pointed out in their recent publication on the onset of nonviolent movements, “[c]onventional approaches regarding popular grievances, political opportunities, and resource mobilization tell us something about where nonviolent uprisings have emerged, but not as much as one might expect. . . . Their modest performance may be partly a function of the limitations of available data, but we believe it is partly a function of the limits of the theories themselves as well” (p. 318).

This chapter seeks to innovate empirically and theoretically to try to answer this question. I contend that we have been formulating questions regarding repression too broadly. State repression has a multiplicity of effects, which demands fine-grained measurement in order to disentangle some of these questions. Theoretically, this chapter puts forth the idea that alliance formation is crucial to understand the emergence and consolidation of mass protest movements.

An alliance between two opposition groups is likely to form when they provide each other with numbers—people to protest, strike, petition, etc.—and when they are

perceived to help reduce state repression or at least maintain it at the same level. Had repression remained lethal and indiscriminate in Chile after 1977, or had it continued to systematically subject large swaths of the population to torture, executions and disappearances, we would be far less likely to observe the building of alliances between hundreds of civil society organizations. Without these coalitions, efforts to counter or overthrow the regime would have remained localized, atomized, and even underground, without the possibility of large-scale public challenges. These two conditions for alliance formation are based on the logic of how mass civil resistance campaigns succeed against repressive regimes: the priorities are recruiting as many participants as possible and reducing or maintaining repression to manageable levels.

Unmanageable levels of violent repression—such as frequent executions, torture, and disappearances—makes alliances extremely difficult, unless they are to protector institutions, such as was the Catholic Church and to a lesser extent human rights NGOs. I find that mass participation is not primarily about persuading others that the costs of protesting are worth it—there is a threshold over which people largely demobilize, organize locally, and go underground. To gain followers far beyond first movers who are willing to demonstrate publicly, there has to be some measure of restraint from the part of the government. This idea leads to the inference that mass protest movements in fact occur in places with relatively favorable conditions, most likely following extremely unfavorable conditions. This is contrary to the conclusion that Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) reached after comparing the models that predict civil wars in and those that predict nonviolent uprisings: “The only significant correlates of nonviolent campaigns are flatter terrain and older, more durable authoritarian regimes. . . . The substantive findings

are counterintuitive and paradoxical: violent campaigns seem to emerge where resistance is ‘easy’, whereas nonviolent resistance is emerging where resistance is supposedly ‘difficult’” (pp. 421–422).

The question then becomes what restrains regimes from using frequent lethal force against the opposition. The particularities of the case of Chile become important in this regard. First, Chile had a long and proud history of democracy, which included military servicemen and women who were for the most part subservient to the civilian elected leadership. The democratic tradition, as well as the high level of citizen participation associated with leftist parties and Allende’s Popular Unity government in the 1970s, can also account for the culture of organizing. Second, the economic, political, and social links between Chile on the one hand, and the United States and Western institutions on the other, gave the latter leverage to pressure the Pinochet regime to improve their human rights record (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Third, the important role of the Catholic Church in Chile, which was willing to serve as a protector against human rights abuses and even as an advocate for democracy, is undeniable. Mass mobilization would likely emerge and consolidate differently—if at all—in a totalitarian state spanning generations, without a history of democracy and a strong civil society, without links to Western institutions, and no institution able to protect victims of the state. But even in those localities, it would be extremely unlikely to observe mass mobilization at a time when the state was systematically killing, torturing or disappearing the opposition.

This chapter suggests that, had violent repression continued with the pattern from 1973 to 1977, we would have not observed mass mobilization, underground activities would have probably continued, and importantly, the proponents of armed action to

overthrow the regime would have gained traction. The reason is that by early 1983, ten years into the dictatorship, people were losing hope for a peaceful exit and return to democracy. The Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez, which was 1,000-strong at the time, was entering Chile after getting training in Cuba with the hopes of fighting the Chilean Armed Forces. The armed group was largely sidelined by the mass national protests that followed shortly thereafter thanks in large part to a reduction in state violence against most opposition groups and the forging of alliances. The United States government understood that the armed option would become more prominent if Pinochet did not improve its human rights record and agree to negotiations with the opposition, evidenced by a declassified “Special National Intelligence Estimate” by the CIA from October 4, 1983. In this report the CIA outlines the downsides of the Armed Forces continuing to repress protests, and of allowing the MIR’s and FPMR’s “ploy” to use violence in order to get the military junta to respond with more repression, thereby strengthening the radical left. The United States without a doubt laid out the possible scenarios to its connections within the Pinochet regime and relied heavily on the growing dissatisfaction of generals in the Chilean Armed Forces with how Pinochet was conducting himself.



## **Chapter 5. Conclusion**

The Pinochet dictatorship in Chile sought to consolidate power by destroying leftist political parties and their sympathizers and sowing fear among potential dissidents. Even at the height of the regime's coercive campaign, we observed some small and medium-size public protests, some of which were a direct consequence of the repression. There was also a dramatic increase in the number of civil society organizations almost as soon as the military junta started ruling the country. The top targets of the regime suffered severe losses, but they continued organizing in clandestinity and resurfaced during the mid-1980s. At the same time, we did not observe mass national mobilization in Chile until 1983. While the state always uses its coercive power to suppress challenges, particularly authoritarian regimes, the effects that those actions have on the people vary widely (Davenport et al., 2005).

The relationship between repression and mobilization has seemingly contradictory and counterintuitive effects. Scholars have found that high levels of repression increase the likelihood of mobilization—often called the backfire effect—by seizing the press coverage and creating outrage in the larger population (Hess & Martin, 2006; Francisco, 1995, 2004, 2005; Soule & Earl, 2010). At the same time, there are findings linking high levels of repression to demobilization, such as when security agencies successfully infiltrate dissident organizations and eliminate them (Davenport 2014). There is also support for an inverted-U shape relationship, whereby mobilization is far more likely at moderate levels of repression and unlikely at very low or very high levels of repression (Brockett 2005; Muller 1985). Can we reconcile these findings? How do we make sense of the varied and contradictory effects of state repression on mobilization?

Rather than adjudicating between these findings, the dissertation takes the position that the relationship between repression and mobilization is conditional. I first review the dissertation's findings concerning Chile and then assess its contributions to the broader literature.

### **Summary of Arguments**

First, indiscriminate and collective violence against large segments of the population immediately following the coup, including the systematic torture, execution, and disappearance of individuals, led to the elimination of mass mobilization. There were no large-scale protests in Chile during this period. Instead, the top targets of the regime either went into exile or organized underground. Not all opposition groups fared the same while organizing underground, however. I argue that the survival rate of militants depended on their organizational structure and organizing skills, and that ideology largely explains these factors.

Specifically, I find that opposition groups at least partially organized in compartmentalized cells and whose militants had experience in underground organizing prior to the coup were less likely to become victims of the regime. The most ideologically extreme groups tended to be the ones with these skills and organizational structure. Even during the Socialist regime of Allende, leftist extremists believed that Chile would eventually have to face a revolution of the masses that would require an armed insurrection against the bourgeoisie. These beliefs led political movements like the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) to adopt a partial compartmentalization and cell structure and to train militants in underground organizing. Those groups that had been operating publicly and had an open hierarchical structure, with militants without

experience in clandestine activity, were not able to adapt to the underground after the coup. Militants from these opposition groups were far more likely to become victimized. Chapter 2 develops this theory of underground organizing. Empirically, the strategy is to first estimate the rate of survival of the state's main opposition groups with an original dataset. Then, through qualitative analysis of archival materials and personal interviews with former dissidents, the chapter provides evidence in favor of the theory about organizational structure and underground organizing skills explaining the survival rate of the top targets, and about ideology explaining both organizational structure and skills.

In short, the first main argument of the dissertation is that there is a threshold of repression over which we are extremely unlikely to observe mass mobilization as long as it is directed indiscriminately or collectively to large segments of the population. We will also not observe public mobilization by the top targets of a capable state, but we are very likely to observe a transformation in mobilization to the underground. Once the top targets go underground, extremists are more likely to survive than moderates given the former's compartmentalized organizational structure and underground organizing skills.

But even collective and largely indiscriminate violent repression, however, does not preclude all actors from engaging in public opposition. The relatives of the disappeared organized the first documented public protests after the coup, demanding information about the whereabouts of their loved ones and denouncing the regime's human rights record. Labor unions, despite being associated with the Communist Party and other leftist political movements, were sometimes able to organize public demonstrations of opposition. These groups were able to publicly oppose the regime, albeit at a small scale and by making modest demands, thanks in large part to the

protection of the Catholic Church and the Cardinal's Vicariate of Solidarity. The Catholic Church played the role of a protector institution—an organization that the government needs for legitimacy and is willing to lend some safeguards to the opposition. Chapter 3 develops the theory about protector institutions and their role in lowering the cost of high-risk activism, thereby explaining public demonstrations at a time when the state was using indiscriminate and generalized collective violent repression against its citizens. It tests this proposition through quantitative analysis of two original datasets, including instrumental variable analysis of the effect of Catholic bishops' ideology on the likelihood of mobilization by the relatives of the victims of the regime throughout Chile. The chapter also leverages personal interviews with relatives of the disappeared who organized, as well as with relatives of victims in localities where collective action did not occur.

The dissertation's second main argument is thus that public opposition is possible in environments of indiscriminate and generalized collective violent repression if a protector institution supports those who are dissenting. It is far costlier for the regime to violently repress activists that the Catholic Church is protecting. Mobilization can thus be a direct consequence of extreme violent repression when a protector institution lowers the cost of high-risk activism, as the Catholic Church did for the relatives of the disappeared.

The Pinochet dictatorship also faced mass public mobilization, but not until 1983. By the early 1980s the military junta was neither indiscriminately nor collectively killing and torturing people. There were considerably fewer victims of violent repression, and

the security forces had long ended disappearances as a form of punishment.<sup>1</sup> State repression during this period was far more reactive to specific actions by dissidents. For example, the police (*Carabineros*) would detain protesters in response to mass actions, but the regime would usually release them soon thereafter. Some protesters would be beaten or killed during demonstrations, as *Carabineros* often used batons and live rounds to punish them. But the secret police CNI would usually not then seek to systematically destroy the organizations responsible for the mobilization, with the exception of armed groups. Chapter 4 presents the theory of alliance formation and mass public mobilization. In order to evaluate this theoretical framework, the chapter presents a fourth novel dataset. The Opposition Groups in the Metropolitan Region dataset, 1973–1989, allows for the time-series analysis of violent and nonviolent repression against opposition groups and their relationship to the number and type of alliances that each organization formed.

The third and final main argument is that with a reduction in violent repression, civil society organizations were able to start forging alliances among themselves. Mass mobilization became possible and more likely with the formation of these alliances. Without alliances mass mobilization is not possible because there is no single group with the convening power to rally hundreds of thousands or millions of people.

For any civil society group confronted with the choice to form or join an alliance with another opposition group in an authoritarian regime, there are two main competing considerations. The first is reducing the probability of suffering violent repression and the second one is achieving political success. These priorities mean that each group wants to be part of a coalition that is large enough to win but not so large—or threatening in

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<sup>1</sup> There is at least one exception to the end of disappearances as a form of repression. Following the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez's (FPMR) assassination attempt of Pinochet in 1986, the Armed Forces disappeared five FPMR insurgents (Orellana, 2015).

another way—that it increases repression to unmanageable levels. By unmanageable levels of repression I mean frequent targeting of militants with executions and torture, or forced disappearances. This level of repression forces opposition groups to operate underground, if they continue to organize at all.

### **Contributions**

The dissertation makes several contributions, both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of how repression affects popular mobilization. The level of aggregation with which most studies theorize the effects of repression has led to seemingly contradictory findings, such as that at high levels of repression we observe both more and less mobilization. For example, recent work contends that “it is not repression that destroys a movement . . . [i]t is repression plus lack of preparation” (Lakey, 2018, as cited in Smithey & Kurtz, 2018, p. 1). In contrast to this view, the dissertation argues that repression can destroy movements, regardless of the level of preparation of activists. Preparation and organizational structure can help organizations increase their rate of survival in the underground, and most likely also in public protests, but there are patterns of violence that do not allow for mass public mobilization.

The dissertation also contributes to scholarly understanding of the onset of nonviolent movements, a research agenda in which little progress has been made (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). The civil war onset model is not appropriate to predict the emergence of public nonviolent movements. The only variables in the civil war model that are statistically significant in predicting the emergence of nonviolent movements are “flatter terrain, and older, more durable authoritarian regimes” (Chenoweth & Lewis,

2013, p. 421; Chenoweth et al., 2017). The authors thus concluded that the emergence of nonviolent movements occurs in more difficult settings than armed insurgencies, as the latter are more likely to occur in rugged terrain and newer authoritarian regimes. These studies are based on cross-national large-N datasets that aggregate repression to the country level, rarely leveraging panel data to capture within-country changes in repression, let alone differences in repression across targets. The dissertation instead argues that mass public mobilization is very unlikely to occur in the most challenging settings, such as where the state is capable and willing to perpetrate indiscriminate and generalized collective violence.

The dissertation draws on a definition of “pattern of political violence” as the “configuration of repertoire, targeting, frequency, and technique in which it regularly engages” (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017, p. 20) that allows for better theorizing, more precise testing of rival theories, and the resolution of some contradictory findings in the repression-mobilization relationship. The dissertation finds that mass public movements are able to emerge after repression has become more manageable, and less indiscriminate and collectively based. These changes in repression allow civil society organizations to build alliances that summon hundreds of thousands of people, thus ending a period of atomization.

By theorizing on the emergence of mobilization as a consequence of repression, the dissertation also makes a contribution to the backfiring literature (Schock, 2004; Sharp et al., 2005; Kurtz & Smithey, 2018). In particular, focusing on a specific form of repression—disappearances—and on the conditions under which certain actors are likely to mobilize, namely the relatives of the disappeared, the dissertation furthers our

understanding of how repression can cause public mobilization. The protective role of the Catholic Church becomes crucial to explain the emergence of mobilization of families of victims after episodes of extreme violence by the state. This argument extends research on third-party intervention in movements, such as work examining unarmed civilian peacekeeping by international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Organizations like Peace Brigades International accompany people who are threatened in the community to reduce the likelihood of repression against those targets. These organizations also reduce fear and repression by increasing the cost of repression (Lahey, 2018; Gonzales, 2013).

Finally, the dissertation contributes to the mobilization literature by theorizing on the survival and emergence of various types of organizing, ranging from underground movements, armed groups, mixed-strategy campaigns, public and small-scale protests, and public large-scale mobilization. Distinguishing between the types of mobilization and theorizing the relationship of each to repression is helpful in reconciling some seemingly contradictory findings on the violence-collective action nexus. For example, how can a dissident group have a relatively high rate of survival despite its being the number one target of the secret police, as was the case for the MIR? The dissertation highlights the importance of ideology in the analysis of organizational form and skills. Also, how can there be small public protests during the height of the repression, especially given what we know about large numbers reducing the likelihood of repression for the average protester (Kuran, 1989, 1997)? The dissertation brings in the Catholic Church hierarchy as a protector institution, specifically the ideological position of priests and bishops, to



explain this type of mobilization in the highly polarized and violent context of Chile in the mid-1970s.

Empirically, the dissertation contributes by gathering four original datasets on repression and mobilization in Chile at different levels of analysis (at the individual, congregation, bishop-year, and group-year levels). These datasets contribute to our understanding of the 18-year period of Pinochet's rule, triangulating data from different sources given that the security forces of the dictatorship have not shared their archives with the public. To my knowledge the Targets and Victims of Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1989, dataset is the first to compare the intended-to-repress population with the victimized population in a way that allows for the examination of the relative capacity of militant groups to curb repression that was intended toward them. Most studies on repression only measure the state violence that was carried out, which hinders our ability to fully understand the resilience and capacity that groups have to protect themselves from counterinsurgency campaigns. The two datasets on the role of the religious leaders as protectors is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the ideological variation within the Catholic Church hierarchy to explain mobilization. This contribution is especially important in the case of Chile by augmenting and challenging the collective wisdom that the Catholic Church in Chile was decidedly against Pinochet and the military dictatorship. The dissertation shows that variation within the Catholic hierarchy is a significant explanatory factor for mobilization and the lack thereof.

Finally, the fourth dataset contains all the opposition groups in one state in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, including armed, nonviolent, and mixed strategy movements; small and failed organizations; and large groups that challenged the state.

The dataset also includes civil society organizations that did not have explicit anti-regime agendas. This expansion allows for more accurate analysis on the emergence and consolidation of mass mobilization by including antecedent organizations (Davenport et al., 2005). These data significantly reduce the bias that most studies on social movements have of focusing on major organizations. This focus is especially problematic when seeking to explain the onset of mobilization. Including failed attempts is crucial because they allow us to capture the differences between those and successful ones.

### **Further Research**

Testing the arguments advanced here concerning the relation between repression and collective action beyond the case of Chile within the relevant scope conditions is the most relevant research agenda arising from the dissertation.

The first argument of the dissertation explores the effects of extreme repression by a relatively strong state against its own citizens. The survival of the top targets of a regime depends on the group's compartmentalized organizational structure and the underground organizing skills of militants. These characteristics allow opposition groups to reduce the likelihood of infiltration, as well as to mitigate the effects of repression if the secret police infiltrates the group. There are many countries other than Chile where this scope condition holds, such as authoritarian regimes or countries in civil war without weak state security forces. In Latin America, for example, Argentina during the Rafael Videla dictatorship is a prime example.

The second argument of the dissertation has two scope conditions. Public mobilization is likely to emerge even when the state is perpetrating indiscriminate and generalized collective violence as long as the activists receive the support of a protector

institution. The two crucial characteristics of a protector institution are that they are willing to protect the opposition from repression and that the regime needs them for legitimacy. Not all protector institutions are created equal, however. The Catholic Church in a majority Catholic country like Chile is an especially powerful protector institution because of its ability to safeguard the opposition with its resources, omnipresence in society, and authoritative moral appeals. At the same time, the Catholic Church has an unparalleled ability to provide legitimacy to a regime in power, as well as to damage its legitimacy. This capacity is what restrains leaders with religious ties from using violent repression against them and activists they protect. The scope conditions are thus that there is an institution that the regime depends on for its legitimacy and that this institution is also willing to protect the opposition. Even if other types of protector institutions are not as powerful as the Catholic Church in a Catholic-majority country, potential protector institutions include labor unions, political parties, INGOs, and religious authorities other than the Catholic hierarchy.

The third argument of the dissertation has two scope conditions as well. A lowering of the level of repression by the state leads to the formation of alliances among civil society organizations, making mass mobilization likely. The first scope condition is a history of democracy, which means that there is a rich tradition of civic organizing and that the country's Armed Forces are more likely to be subservient to civilian authority. After repression decreased the number of alliances in Chile skyrocketed. The presence of thousands of civic society organizations connected individuals once it was possible to do so, enabling mass protests. Military juntas composed of commanders that have a history of being subservient to civilian authority are less likely to be able to repress violently

without creating serious infighting. The second scope condition is ties to the West. Countries with strong connections to the United States and Western multilateral organizations are less likely to be able to sustain high levels of violent repression for extended periods. Economic, political, and social pressure is far more likely to change the behavior of the repressive regime if the West has leverage on the target state (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Out of sample cases would thus be countries that had periods of authoritarian rule in between extended periods of democracy.

The dissertation relies on a subnational research design that allows for inductive theorizing and fine-grained measurement of repression and mobilization. These are strengths of the dissertation. Yet, the question remains whether the logic of the three main arguments can inform mobilization in contexts beyond the Metropolitan Region in the case of the third argument, which is not tested countrywide, or beyond Chile in the case of the first and third arguments. Moreover, it may be fruitful to examine the theoretical implications of the dissertation outside of the context of the Cold War and leftist party militants, in a more recent movement where technology and social media may drastically reduce the difficulty of building alliances with other groups, and in democratic regimes that are using high levels of repression in the context of a civil war.

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## Appendix A. Codebook for the Targets and Victims of Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1989

### Dataset

Version 1.2, May 2017

Individual-level data

Principal Investigator: Consuelo Amat, Yale University ([consuelo.amat@yale.edu](mailto:consuelo.amat@yale.edu))

Variable Name	Variable Description
orgid	<p>Unique group identifier 0=when the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list does not have information about the group to which the individual was affiliated (as long as the variable is there for other individuals).</p> <p>MIR=101, PS=132, PC=131, MAPU=110, Liga Comunista=360, FPMR=103, Tupamaros=99, UP/GAP=145, VOP=98, PR=128, FAR=95, ELN=97, FAP=93, DC=146, FPLP=92, FSLN=94, IC=108, leftist parties=96, Bandera Roja=91, Cristianos por el Socialismo=90, PAIS=89, PPD=88 (highlight cell in spreadsheet if group is not here and leave this variable blank)</p>
first_names	First and middle names of the individuals (names without accents. Instead of “ñ” use “n”).
last_names	Two last names of the individuals (names without accents. Instead of “ñ” use “n”). Most people in Latin America use both of their parents’ last names.
group	Name of opposition group to which individual is affiliated.
orgid_list_victims	<p>Unique group identifier of opposition group that appears in the victims list. This variable applies when there is a discrepancy between the opposition group that appears in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list and the one that appears in the victims’ list.</p> <p>0=here a zero means that the individual had no militancy (in orgid it means that the Manuel Contreras did not assign them an opposition group).</p> <p>. = variable is not applicable or does not exist (It was not possible to distinguish between those for whom we do not have information about their political affiliation (i.e., those “sin dato” (S/D) in the disappeared list), and those who did not have militancy. The disappeared list either assigns an opposition group to a person or it says “without data=sin dato”).</p>
group_list_victims	Name of the opposition group to which the individual is

	<p>affiliated according to the victims lists, in cases when there is a discrepancy between the opposition group in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA lists and the group in the victims lists.  .= variable is not applicable or does not exist.</p>
org_discrepancy	<p>3=Manuel Contreras list did not have information about the person's political affiliation and we do have that information from the victims' lists.  2=the Manuel Contreras lists are less specific, but not wrong, when compared to information about political affiliation gathered in the victims' lists (example: on Manuel Contreras lists we may have an individual is from a "leftist party" and then find through the victims' lists that they are from the Socialist Party, Communist Party, MAPU, etc.)  1=there is a discrepancy between the Manuel Contreras/ DINA lists and the victims lists in terms of the opposition group to which the individual belonged (When possible we code as 1 when the MC lists gave an affiliation to an individual, but the victims' lists says they had no militancy. However, we cannot do this for the disappeared lists because "S/D" (sin dato) or "without data" presumably includes "no militancy" as well. There is no one with "no militancy"),  0=there is not a discrepancy between the groups,  .=variable not applicable/ variable does not exist. Assign a period (.) if the person was not victimized because we do not get a chance to see if there is a discrepancy in the opposition group; if the individual was a victim of torture and we lack his/her information, as it occurs in most cases (if we do have the tortured person's political affiliation, we can code it differently, of course); and if those who appear as "without data" in the disappeared lists).</p> <p>Notes:  If Manuel Contreras lists classified individual as Leftist Party but the victims' lists say MIR, I'm coding that as a mistake (1) because Manuel Contreras classifies MIR separately from Leftist parties – there are lists specifically for the MIR, and then there are lists</p>
activist_militant	<p>1=identified in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list as an "activist" or "militant" or "dirigente=leader",  0=individual is not identified as an "activist" or as a "militant", but rather as another type of dangerous person,  .=variable is not applicable or does not exist. List number 8, which is the "National List of Dangerous People" (<i>Lista Nacional de Peligrosos</i>) has this information.</p>
extremist	<p>1=identified in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list as an "extremist",</p>

	0=individual is not identified as an “extremist”, but rather as another type of dangerous person, .=variable is not applicable or does not exist. List number 8, which is the “National List of Dangerous People” ( <i>Lista Nacional de Peligrosos</i> ) has this information.
suspicious	1=identified in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list as a “suspicious” person, 0=individual is not identified as a “suspicious” person, but rather as another type of dangerous person, .=variable is not applicable or does not exist. List number 8, which is the “National List of Dangerous People” ( <i>Lista Nacional de Peligrosos</i> ) has this information.
guerrilla_terrorist	1=identified in the Manuel Contreras/ DINA list as a “guerrilla fighter” or “terrorist”, 0=individual is not identified as a “guerrilla fighter” or “terrorist”, but rather as another type of dangerous person, .=variable is not applicable or does not exist. List number 8, which is the “National List of Dangerous People” ( <i>Lista Nacional de Peligrosos</i> ) has this information.
position_group_descrip	In some cases the position or rank of the individual within the opposition group is listed. In those cases, include this description verbatim from the list. .= variable is not applicable or does not exist.
mil_experience	1=the list(s) from the DINA/ Manuel Contreras’ book reflect that the individual has had some sort of military training or experience (for example, “Fought in Angola”). Members of the GAP and deserters also have military experience. 0=No military experience noted in the list. .= variable is not applicable or does not exist.
mil_experience_descrip	Include the information about an individual’s military experience verbatim as it appears on the DINA lists. .= variable is not applicable or does not exist.
occupation	Individual’s job or occupation.
occupation_categorical	1=student, 2=worker (obrero), 3=employee (empleado), 4=professional: engineer, economist, architect, accountant, social worker, businessperson, actor, boss/director, nurse, 5= professor, teacher, school helper, 7=service member (military) or policemen/women, investigations, 8=doctor, dentist, veterinarian 9=other type of worker: jewelry worker, electrician, plumber, industrial worker, artisan, nurse helper/hospital helper, cashier, decorator, seller, driver, etc., 10=political leader, 11=retired, 12=unemployed, without a profession, 13=agricultural worker or peasant, 14=priest
class	This variable indicates the socioeconomic class* of the individual, based on the person’s job or occupation. 1=low,

	2=middle, 3=high, . = variable is not applicable or does not exist.
union	1=individual is likely to have been a part of a union** (e.g., teachers, miners, etc.), 0=individual is unlikely to have been a part of a union based on his/her occupation, . =we do not have enough information to make a determination about whether or not the individual was part of a union
address	1=the home address is on the list(s) from the DINA/ Manuel Contreras book, 0=the home address is not on the list from the DINA/Manuel Contreras book even though the variable was there, . = variable is not applicable or does not exist.
list_mc_1	1=individual is not on any of the lists from the DINA/ Manuel Contreras' book (this variable is useful to determine differences between people who were victimized but who were not on any of Manuel Contreras' target lists), 0=individual is on at least one of the lists from the DINA/ Manuel Contreras' book.
list_mc_2	1=individual is on the list "MIR Guerrilla Forces Considering Militants, Helpers, and Sympathizers" ( <i>Fuerzas Guerrilleras del MIR Considerando a los Militantes, Ayudistas y Simpatizantes</i> , pp. 213-240), 0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_3	1=individual is on the list "MIR Members with Courses in Cuba" ( <i>Miembros del MIR con Curso en Cuba</i> , pp. 241-247), 0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_4	1=individual is on the list "MIR Members with Courses on Guerrillas" ( <i>Miembros del MIR con Cursos de Guerrillas</i> , p. 248), 0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_5	1=individual is on the list "MIR Members Affiliated with Explosives" ( <i>Miembros del MIR Relacionados con Explosivos</i> , p. 249), 0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_6	1=individual is on the list "Militants from the Marxist Communist, Socialist, MAPU and other Political Parties that Formed Part of the Guerrilla Forces According to their Capacities and Positions" ( <i>Militantes de los Partidos Marxistas Comunista, Socialista, MAPU y Otros que se Integraron al Ejército Guerrillero de Acuerdo a sus Capacidades y Posiciones</i> , pp. 250-303), 0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_7	1=individual is on the list "Wanted List" ( <i>Listado de Personas Buscadas</i> , pp. 304-314),

	0=individual is not on this list.
list_mc_8	1=individual is on the list “National List of Dangerous People” ( <i>Listado Nacional de Peligrosos</i> , pp. 315-346), 0=individual is not on this list.
security_agency	Government security agency in charge of looking for the individual on the DINA/Manuel Contreras lists, or “informant” security agency that helped with the capture of the individual. 1= Carabineros 2= Investigaciones, 3=Policía internacional, Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas u otras fuerzas internacionales [any agency that is outside of Chile, even if it is the Chilean Embassy to France] 4=DINA, 5=DGP Armada, Ejército 6=Consejo de Guerra (CAJSI. II D. E.), 7=Inst. Departamento de Informaciones, 8=otros (embajadas, consulados, ROB Tucapel, DGP Armada, agentes del estado, operación conjunta), 9=FACH, 10=CNI, 11=SIM (Servicio de Inteligencia Militar), 12=Fiscalía militar, 13=Fiscalía de aviación, 14=Ex juzgado del crimen, 15=CIRE 16=DINE (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército) . = variable is not applicable or does not exist
security_agency_geog	Write down all the information about the locality where the security agency assigned to look for the individual operates (for example, if the security_agency is “Investigaciones Arica,” write “Arica XV Region” in variable security_agency_geog).
repression_year	Year when the repression took place – when the individual was detained, disappeared, executed, or forcibly displaced. If the individual suffered more than one form of repression and we have dates for them, write down the earlier date (the date of the first form of repression that the person suffered) and then write down all the information in a descriptive way in the “notes” variable. . = variable is not applicable or does not exist.
place_arrest	Place where the individual was arrested (this information is often limited to the lists of the disappeared and the forcibly displaced. We may have some of this information for the executed and some political prisoners who were tortured.) 1=at home,

	<p>2=at their workplace,  3=on the street,  4=at a friend's house,  5=other places,  0=list does not contain this information,  .= variable is not applicable or does not exist</p>
city_state	<p>Place where the individual is from (this information is often limited to the lists of the disappeared and the forcibly displaced. We may have some of this information for the executed and some political prisoners who were tortured.)  Example: Santiago/ 13.  .= variable is not applicable or does not exist</p>
leftist	<p>0=center,  1=left,  2=ultra-left</p> <p>Notes:  Coding opposition groups based on their ideology in the early 1970s. The coding is as follows: MIR=2, PS =1, PC=1, Tupamaros=2, UP and Ex-GAP UP=1.  If the Manuel Contreras lists do not have group information (regardless of whether or not the victims lists do) this variable is missing and thus gets assigned a period (.). If there is a discrepancy between the opposition groups based on what the Manuel Contreras and victims lists show, write down the number corresponding to the opposition group in the Manuel Contreras list.</p>
primary_obj	<p>Categorization of the primary objective of the opposition group to which the individual is affiliated.  0=reformist,  1=maximalist***</p> <p>Notes:  Coding opposition groups based on their ideology in the early 1970s. The coding is as follows: MIR=2, PS =1, PC=1, Tupamaros=2, UP and Ex-GAP UP=1.  If the Manuel Contreras lists do not have group information (regardless of whether or not the victims lists do) this variable is missing and thus gets assigned a period (.). If there is a discrepancy between the opposition groups based on what the Manuel Contreras and victims lists show, write down the number corresponding to the opposition group in the Manuel Contreras list.</p>
viol	<p>This variable indicates whether or not the opposition group uses or allows its members to use violence against the regime.  0=group does not promote or use violence,</p>

	<p>1=a faction of the opposition group promotes or uses violence, 2=the opposition group promotes or uses violence</p> <p>Notes: Coding opposition groups in the early 1970s. MIR (2), PS (1), PC (0), Tupamaros (2), MAPU (1), UP (0), GAP-UP (2), VOP (2), PR (?), ELN (2), FAR (2), FSLN (2), FAP (2), IC (?), FPLP (2), If the Manuel Contreras lists do not have group information, this variable is missing (gets assigned a period). In other words, variable does not get coded with the militant's group information if it is acquired through the victim's list.</p>
disappeared	<p>0=individual was not disappeared, 1=individual was disappeared</p>
executed	<p>0=individual was not executed, 1=individual was executed</p>
tortured	<p>0=individual was not detained or tortured, 1=individual was detained and tortured</p>
relegated	<p>0=individual was not relegated to another part of Chile, 1=individual was relegated to another part of Chile and forced to stay there</p>
c_variable	<p>This variable measures the confidence that the coder has in the precision and accuracy of the information that he/she is coding for an individual, or for the opposition group to which the individual is affiliated. Example: "c_leftist" is the variable to indicate the confidence that the coder has in the number assigned to that individual in the "leftist" variable. 1=low confidence, 2=moderate confidence, 3=high confidence</p>
notes	<p>Write down the text verbatim of any commentary on an individual that one finds in the DINA/ Manuel Contreras' lists. For example, "<i>posteriormente VOP</i>" (this means that they later joined another group called VOP), or the dates of their travel to Cuba, or if they were priests (sacerdote), etc. This variable should also be used to write down cases when more than one security force was involved in the arrest or detention of the individual. For example, if under repressive agency or informant agency the list says "Carabineros + Ejercito," we should assign a "1" to the variable "repressive_agency" (because Carabineros is the first agency listed) and then write under notes "Carabineros + Ejercito."</p>
nationality_wanted	<p>Number indicates the nationality of a wanted individual, according to the lists of Manuel Contreras. 1=Argentina, 2=Uruguay, 3=Nicaragua, 4=Bolivia, 5=Ecuador, 6=Brazil, 7=Canada, 8=Venezuela, 9=Spain,</p>

	10=Colombia, 11=Peru, 12=El Salvador, 13=Chile, 14=Germany, 15=Panama, 16=France, 17=Cuba, 18=Dominican Republic, 19=Belgium, 20=Switzerland, 21=Italy, 22=United Kingdom

\* Socioeconomic class: This indicator is designed to discern who would have been in a position to leave Chile and escape persecution. It is essentially a proxy for ability to leave the country. The following are the criteria for what jobs qualify as low, medium, and high income or socioeconomic class:

*Low socioeconomic class:* factory worker, domestic workers, technician, mining workers (except copper miners), unemployed, secretaries, peasants/agricultural workers, artisans, cashier, decorator, involved in commerce, hair stylist, locksmith, tailor, etc.

*Middle socioeconomic class:* teachers, professors, members of the government at the local level, accountants, social workers, journalists, priests, copper miners, photographers, veterinarians, among others.

*High socioeconomic class:* doctors, lawyers, engineers, economists, executives in the business sector, diplomats, government officials at the federal level, political party leaders, famous/well-known artists, among others.

We are not assuming anything about the socioeconomic class of students, architects, actors (unless they are famous), policemen and policewomen, etc.

\*\* Union: Based on the historical context in Chile during the early 70s, we are assuming that the following occupations were unionized: professors, teachers, miners, workers, secretaries, peasants/agricultural workers, mechanics, etc.

In addition, we are assuming that the following *occupations were not unionized*: engineers, priests, students, unemployed, architects, seller, artisans, cashier, decorator, actors, journalists, students, painters, locksmiths, veterinarians, tailor, policemen and policewomen, etc.

We are not assuming anything about the unionization of the following occupations: car mechanic, empleado (worker) unless it says something else that can give us an idea of whether or not the individual was member of a union (for example, “empleado particular” gets a 0 in union variable, while “empleado público” gets a 1), etc.

\*\*\* Primary objective: These are the criteria to classify the primary objectives of the opposition groups.

A group has *maximalist* objectives when it seeks to overthrow the Pinochet dictatorship (regime change), whether it is to bring democratic elections or to take over the government.

A group has *reformist* objectives when it seeks to reform some aspect of government policy, whether they are related to human rights, economic policies, social issues, or others. Basically, if the group is not maximalist, then it is reformist. All the groups are



either categorized as maximalist or reformist, and up until now all opposition groups in the Manuel Contreras lists are maximalists. There is no variation in this variable.

## Appendix B. Codebook for Catholic Congregations in the Metropolitan Region of Chile Dataset, 1973–1989

### Codebook

Version 1.1, Last Updated: March 2018

Congregation-year data

Principal Investigator: Consuelo Amat, Yale University ([consuelo.amat@yale.edu](mailto:consuelo.amat@yale.edu))

Variable Name	Description of Variable	Notes
congregation	Name of the Catholic congregation, church or parish	
main_priest	Name of the main priest in charge of the congregation	
zone	Zone of the Vicariate where the congregation is located: North=1, East=2, West=3, South=4, Central=5, Cordillera=7, del Maipo=8	
deanery	Deanery to which the congregation belongs.	
address	Address of the congregation	
founding_yr	Founding year of the congregation	
dictatorship	Congregation existed during the dictatorship=1; otherwise=0	
ideology	This variable denotes the political tendency of the main priest in the congregation. 0=congregation did not exist; 1=very pro-Pinochet; 2=pro-Pinochet; 3=neutral; 4=in favor of the opposition; 5=leftist; .=information not available/missing data	
commune	This variable denotes the commune in the Metropolitan Region where the congregation is located. The communes are those that existed prior to 1973, rather than those that exist today. Santiago Centro=1; La Cisterna=2; San Miguel=3; La Granja=4; Ñuñoa=5; La Reina=6; La Florida=7; Conchalí=8; Renca=9; Quilicura=10; Colina=11; Lampa=12; Til-Til=13; Estación Central (Santiago)=14; Barrancas=15; Quinta Normal=16; Maipú=17; Providencia=18; Las Condes=19; La Reina=20; Puente Alto=21; San Jose de Maipo=22	
commune_descrip	This variable denotes the name of the commune in the Metropolitan Region where the congregation is located.	
mayor1971	This variable denotes that political party of the mayor that was elected in 1971 in the commune where the congregation is located. Radical Party (Partido Radical Cénista)=128; Communist Party	

	(Partido Comunista)=131; Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)=132; Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)=146; National Party (Partido Nacional)=1880	
pop_commune	This variable denotes the population in the commune according to the 1982 Chilean census.	
rural	This variable takes on the value of 1 if the commune is predominantly rural in terms of land use and economic activity, and 0 otherwise. Source: Chilean 1982 census.	
disappeared	Count of the disappeared ( <i>detenidos desaparecidos</i> ) according to the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (Rettig Report).	
afdd	1=presence of a families of the disappeared group ( <i>Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos</i> ); 0=otherwise	
executed	Count of the executed ( <i>ejecutados políticos</i> ) according to the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (Rettig Report).	
afep	1=presence of a families of the executed group ( <i>Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos</i> ); 0=otherwise	

## Appendix C. Codebook for Bishops in Chile during the Pinochet Dictatorship

Dataset, 1973–1989

### Codebook

Version 1, Last Updated: March 2018

Bishop-dioceses data

Principal Investigator: Consuelo Amat, Yale University ([consuelo.amat@yale.edu](mailto:consuelo.amat@yale.edu))

Variable Name	Variable Description
diocesisid	Unique number to identify the dioceses or archdioceses
name_dioceses	Name of the dioceses or archdioceses
type	This variable denotes the type of religious territorial organization over which the bishop or archbishop ruled: 0=dioceses; 1=prelature ( <i>prelatura</i> ); 2=archdioceses; 3=apostolic vicariate ( <i>vicariato apostólico</i> )
bishopid	Unique number identifying each archbishop or bishop
bishop	Name of the archbishop or bishop
year	year
start_service_year	Year when the bishop or archbishop started his service
start_service_month	Month when the bishop or archbishop started his service
end_service_year	Year when the bishop or archbishop finished his service
end_service_month	Month when the bishop or archbishop finished his service
years_service	This variable indicates the number of years of service by the bishop or archbishop: $\text{end\_service\_year} - \text{start\_service\_year} + 1$
postcoup_bishop	1=Bishop or archbishop was assigned to his post after the September 11, 1973 coup; 0=otherwise
ideology	This variable denotes the political tendency of the main priest in the congregation. 0=congregation did not exist; 1=very pro-Pinochet; 2=pro-Pinochet; 3=neutral; 4=in favor of the opposition; 5=leftist; .=information not available/missing data
pop_dioceses	This variable denotes the population in the dioceses or archdioceses according to the 1982 Chilean census.
rural	This variable takes on the value of 1 if the commune is predominantly rural in terms of land use and

	economic activity, and 0 otherwise. Source: 1982 Chilean Census and the Library of the National Congress Reports ( <i>Informes de la Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional</i> )
dissapeared	Count of the disappeared ( <i>detenidos desaparecidos</i> ) according to the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (Rettig Report).
executed	Count of the executed ( <i>ejecutados políticos</i> ) according to the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (Rettig Report).
mayor71	This variable denotes that political party of the mayor that was elected in 1971 in the commune where the congregation is located. Radical Party (Partido Radical Cenista)=128; Communist Party (Partido Comunista)=131; Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)=132; Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)=146; National Party (Partido Nacional)=1880
afdd	1=presence of a families of the disappeared group ( <i>Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos</i> ); 0=otherwise
afep	1=presence of a families of the executed group ( <i>Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos</i> ); 0=otherwise
year_appointment	Year in which bishop or archbishop was appointed to his post
month_appointment	Month in which bishop or archbishop was appointed to his post
day_appointment	Day in which bishop or archbishop was appointed to his post
birth_year	The bishop or archbishops's birth year.
birth_month	The bishop or archbishops's birth month.
birth_day	The bishop or archbishops's birthday.
cardinal	Name of Cardinal at any given year
cardinalid	Unique number identifying each Cardinal
pope	Name of Pope at any given year
popeid	Unique number identifying each Pope
nuncio	Papal Nuncio assigned to Chile in a given year to choose bishops
nuncioid	Unique number identifying each Papal Nuncio

## Appendix D. Codebook for Opposition Groups in the Metropolitan Region of Chile

### Dataset (OGMC), 1973–1989

#### Codebook

Version 2, April 2018

Group-year data

Principal Investigator: Consuelo Amat, Yale University (([Cavallo, 1991](#)))

Variable Name	Variable Description				
orgid	Unique group identifier				
group	Name of opposition group				
year	Calendar year				
s_month	Month when opposition group started				
s_year	Year when opposition group started				
e_month	Month when opposition group ended				
e_year	Year when opposition group ended				
postcoup	Indicator for whether the group started before or after the September 11, 1973 coup, which marked the beginning of the dictatorship. 1=group started after the September 11, 1973 coup and before the October 5, 1988 national plebiscite that ended Pinochet's rule. If group was formed after the Oct 5, 1988 plebiscite, exclude from dataset; 0=group started before September 11, 1973				
institutiontype	Denotes the type of group in the social and political landscape. These types reveal the institutional support and networks that the group potentially enjoys, as well as the organizing tradition from where they emerge. 1=banned political party; 2=union; 3=religious or faith-based group; 4=human rights NGO; 5=professional association; 6=students group; 7=women's rights/LGBTQ group; 8=victims' group; 9=armed group; 10=territorially based organization (such as a neighborhood association or soup kitchen in a shantytown); 11=art/cultural resistance group; and 12=informal/protest command group.				
geog_type10_type3	Denotes the region where the territorial organization was based when it started. Only relevant for territorial organizations and religious organizations: type=10, type=3 <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Coding</th><th>Region</th></tr> <tr> <td>1</td><td>Santiago: North</td></tr> </table>	Coding	Region	1	Santiago: North
Coding	Region				
1	Santiago: North				

		2	Santiago: East																																															
		3	Santiago: West																																															
		4	Santiago: South																																															
		5	Santiago: Center																																															
		6	Chacabuco																																															
		7	Cordillera																																															
		8	Maipo																																															
		9	Melipilla																																															
		10	Talagante																																															
		11	Coordinating organizations/ present in more than one area. <sup>2</sup>																																															
industry_type2	Indicates the type of industry to which the labor union belongs (institutiontype=2). <table><tr><th>Industry</th><th>Code</th></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Primary</td></tr><tr><td>Agriculture, cattle, hunting, and silviculture</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Fishing</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Mining</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Secondary (Industrial)</td></tr><tr><td>Non-metal manufacturing</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Metal manufacturing</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Electricity, gas and water</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Construction</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Tertiary (Services)</td></tr><tr><td>Wholesale trade</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Hotels and restaurants</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Transportation, storage, and communications</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Financial intermediaries</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Real estate and rentals</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Public administration and defense</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Education</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Social services and health care</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Condo and building administration</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Other services</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Other</td></tr><tr><td>Coalition of multi-industry labor unions</td><td>18</td></tr></table>				Industry	Code	Primary		Agriculture, cattle, hunting, and silviculture	1	Fishing	2	Mining	3	Secondary (Industrial)		Non-metal manufacturing	4	Metal manufacturing	5	Electricity, gas and water	6	Construction	7	Tertiary (Services)		Wholesale trade	8	Hotels and restaurants	9	Transportation, storage, and communications	10	Financial intermediaries	11	Real estate and rentals	12	Public administration and defense	13	Education	14	Social services and health care	15	Condo and building administration	16	Other services	17	Other		Coalition of multi-industry labor unions	18
Industry	Code																																																	
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Other services	17																																																	
Other																																																		
Coalition of multi-industry labor unions	18																																																	
ideology_cat	1=ultra leftist; 2=leftist; 6=center; 3=Catholic; 4=ecumenical; 5=other																																																	
ideology_description	Describe the ideology of the group by summarizing the “set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the																																																	

<sup>2</sup> For religious groups if they did not come from a particular *población* and were operating in Santiago or as part of the Arzobispado, I coded them as 11 as well.

	objectives pursued on behalf of that group, and a program of action” <sup>3</sup>
prim_obj	<p>Categorizes the group’s stated primary objective.</p> <p>1=subsistence (basic services for the poor, such as the soup kitchens); 2=protection for those being persecuted (hiding or helping people seek exile, for example); 3=victim or relative of victim assistance (legal, financial, psychological or health-related help); 4=government reform in the social realm (education, women’s and LGBTQ rights, etc.); 5=government reform in the economic realm (labor, market, taxes, etc.); 6=documenting and denouncing human rights abuses; 7=regime change and elections, 8=regime change and establish new order</p>
op_capacity1	<p>Measures the operational capacity/command and control of the group to accomplish its primary objective.</p> <p>1=low operational capacity (it is common that their planned actions fail or are not realized given poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons);</p> <p>2=medium operational capacity (sometimes their planned actions fail or are not realized due to poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons);</p> <p>3=high operational capacity (their planned actions almost never fail/ are almost always successfully executed)</p>
sec_obj	<p>Categorizes the group’s stated secondary objective.</p> <p>1=subsistence (basic services for the poor, such as the soup kitchens); 2=protection for those being persecuted (hiding or helping people seek exile, for example); 3=victim or relative of victim assistance (legal, financial, psychological or health-related help); 4=government reform in the social realm (education, women’s and LGBTQ rights, etc.); 5=government reform in the economic realm (labor, market, taxes, etc.); 6=documenting and denouncing human rights abuses; 7=regime change and elections; 8=regime change and establish new order</p>
op_capacity2	<p>Measures the operational capacity/command and control of the group to accomplish its secondary objective.</p> <p>1=low operational capacity (it is common that their planned actions fail or are not realized given poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons);</p>

<sup>3</sup> Ideology defined as “ideas and normative commitments that motivate and coordinate, as the bearers of identities, strategies, and institutions, as normative constraints on group strategies.” Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, and Elisabeth Jean Wood (2014) “Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 213-226.



	2=medium operational capacity (sometimes their planned actions fail or are not realized due to poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons); 3=high operational capacity (their planned actions almost never fail/ are almost always successfully executed)
obj_description	Description of the group's primary and secondary objectives
1stmovers	Indicates the segment of the society from where the majority of the first movers come from: 1=peasants ( <i>campesinos</i> )/ rural areas; 2=military; 3=intelligentsia/ intellectuals; 4=religious elite; 5=poor/ informal economy; 6=workers; 7=other
1stmovers_description	Background of the founding members of the group.
lead	Indicates the segment of the society from where the majority of the leaders come from: 1=peasants ( <i>campesinos</i> )/ rural areas; 2=military; 3=intelligentsia/ intellectuals; 4=religious elite; 5=poor/ informal economy; 6=workers; 7=other
lead_description	Background of the leadership of the group.
santiago	Whether or not group has a presence beyond the city of Santiago. 1=presence beyond Santiago; 0=presence only in Santiago
region	Number of states ( <i>regiones</i> ) where the group has a presence.
region_description	Describe where the group has a presence by giving name of town, city, region, etc.
precursor	Indicates whether or not there was an antecedent organization from where the current one emerged. 1=group emerged from a past institution; 0=otherwise
precursor_description	Name of precursor organization
merged	Indicates if the group merged with another one and therefore ceased to exist as such. If the group merged with another organization during the dictatorship (from September 11, 1973 to October 5, 1988), the dataset treats it as if the group ended and therefore does not continue coding it for the remaining years. 1=group merged with another one; 0=otherwise
merged_description	Name(s) of organization(s) with which group merged.
takeover	Indicates whether or not the group takes over another organization. In this case the group doing the taking over does not cease to exist. The organization that is acquired ceases to exist for the purposes of this dataset for the remaining years. 1=group takes over another organization; 0=otherwise
takeover_description	Name(s) or organization(s) that group added.
parish_foundingsite	Indicates whether or not the head priest at the main local parish, where the group was founded, is known to support the Pinochet dictatorship. 1=head priest at the main local parish/church at founding site


	supports the Pinochet dictatorship; 0=otherwise
allies	<p>Name of the allies with which the group actively works. “Actively working” with the group means that they organized more than one event together and/or cooperated in more than one protest, and/or coordinated their actions more than once, such as to make public statements together. If there is evidence that they worked only once together, it does not constitute an alliance.</p> <p>An alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their primary or secondary objectives (as coded in the variables prim_obj and sec_obj), where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political or economic) associated with violating the agreement.</p> <p>This type of collaboration is evaluated yearly. If an alliance exists between two organizations on a particular year, but there is no evidence that it continues the following year, the alliance is coded for that first year but not for the subsequent one. For example, if there was collaboration between X and Q in more than one occasion in 1975 and there is no evidence that the collaboration continues into 1976 or later, the alliance is still coded for 1975 and 1976, but not for 1977 forward.</p>
type_allies	<p>1=has at least one political party as an ally; 2=has at least one labor union as an ally; 3=has at least one religious or faith-based organization as an ally; 4=has at least one human rights NGO as an ally; 5=has at least one professional association as an ally; 6=has at least one student association as an ally; 7=has at least one women’s/LGBTQ rights organization as an ally; 8=has at least one victims’ group as an ally; 9=has at least one territorial group as an ally; 10=has at least one armed group as an ally; 11=has at least one art/cultural resistance organization as an ally; 12=has at least one protest command group as an ally</p> <p>**If the group has several types of allies, write down the numbers separated by commas (for example: write down “1,5, 12” if the group has at least one political party, one professional association, and one protest command group as allies)</p>
clandestine	<p>Indicates the level of secrecy with which the group operates. 1=group is completely public, 2=some of the group’s activities are public and others are clandestine, 3=group operates completely underground</p>
violence	1=There was at least one instance of use of violence by the group; 0=otherwise

	Note: The use of violence could have been for self-defense, throwing rocks at police counts as violence, and setting off bombs to kill people as well. Setting off bombs to cut electricity does not count. If this instance of violence is isolated and it was only an individual, or a very small group, that perpetrated the act of violence in contradiction to the organization's norms, it does not count as violence=1.
training	Indicates if the organization provides educational programs or training to its members in order to do the work of the group. The variable also measures the level of preparation that is provided through these programs.  1=there are no trainings or educational programs for the group's members; 2=there is some training or educational opportunities but they are not systematized or obligatory; 3=there is a compulsory and systematic training/ educational program for members.
train_description	Description of training and educational programs that the organization makes available for members: what type of trainings or educational programs? What is the frequency with which these trainings/programs take place? Who participates (only leaders, members with less rank)?
structure	Indicates the group's organizational structure. 1=hierarchical and connected; 2=decentralized and connected; 3=mixed and connected (some parts are hierarchical and others are decentralized, but they are all connected); 4=hierarchical and not connected/ compartmentalized (clandestine cell structure); 5=decentralized and not connected/compartmentalized (clandestine networks); 6=mixed and not connected (some parts of the organization are hierarchical and others are decentralized, but they are all compartmentalized)
resources	Proxy for the amount of monetary resources that the group has at its disposal. 1=all members of the group are volunteers and do not receive any material support; 2=members are volunteers but they receive some material support such as money for public transportation and food; 3=some members are volunteers, but the leadership and core group (those most committed) get paid
intl_support	Whether or not the group received direct international support of any kind. 1=group received direct international support; 0=otherwise
type_intl_support	Indicates the type of international support that the group directly received. 1=political/diplomatic, 2=material (non-military), 3=military

magnitude_intl_support	1=minimal to no support, 2=moderate level support, 3=significant support
size	Number of active members (highest number within the year)
formalization	Indicator for the extent to which the activities of members (including the leadership, core members, and active members) are structured and governed by rules and procedures that are known to them and exercised accordingly. 1=very low formalization, 2=moderate formalization, 3=high formalization
factions	1 <sup>st</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Whether or not there is evidence of factions/wings/a strong dissenting clique within the group. 1=there are factions within the group, 0=otherwise
leadership changes	2 <sup>nd</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Number of times that there was a change in leadership within the group.
split	3 <sup>rd</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Whether or not the group splits. 1=group is a product of a split with another organization, 0=group is not the result of a group split
split_description	Describe those that split from the organization (their ideology? Followers of a particular leader?) and approximately how many left the group.
disappearance	First repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one disappearance. The disappearance could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
killing	2 <sup>nd</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one killing. The killing could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
torture	3 <sup>rd</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one case of torture. The torture could have happened in any part of Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
detention	4 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least once case of detention for political reasons. The detention could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
search	5 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Authorities searched the opposition group's grounds at least

	<p>once (<i>allanamientos</i>). The search could have happened in any part of Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise</p> <p>Note: Only applicable to territorial organizations because it would be almost impossible to obtain this data for other types of organizations.</p>
forced_exile	<p>6<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group has at least once case of forced exile; 0=otherwise</p>
forced_displacement	<p>7<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one case of forced displacement. The person(s) could have been forcibly displaced anywhere in Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise</p>
layoff	<p>8<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one mass layoff; 0=otherwise</p> <p>Note: Only applicable to unions.</p>
harassment	<p>9<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one incident of harassment, such as receiving personal threats or threats to family members in person or over the phone, packages with dead animals and threatening messages, their office or home catching fire, etc. These incidents could have happened anywhere in Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise</p>
c_variable	<p>This variable indicates the level of confidence that the coder has on the precision and trustworthiness of the data, considering the documents on which they are relying to code the row. The availability of the information and the credibility of the sources are two important factors that should be considered when making this judgment call. 1=low confidence; 2=moderate confidence; 3=high confidence</p>
source	<p>Indicates the sources (archives, documents, web pages, books, articles, etc.) used to code the row of data. A separate Word document contains the bibliographic information of all the sources and each source has a number; these are the numbers that are entered in the dataset, separated by commas.</p>

## Appendix E. Logistic Regression Results without Clustering at the Municipality Level



N=132 churches (robust standard errors)


Controls: rate of repression per 100,000; rural; political party of mayor elected in 1971

## Appendix F. Logistic Regression Results with Interaction Term

$$\text{Mobilization}_i = a + b[\text{BishopIdeology} * \text{Repression}]_i + b\text{BishopIdeology}_i + b\text{Repression}_i +$$

$$b\text{Rural}_i + b\text{Mayor1971}_i + e_i$$

(where  $i$  is each diocese or archdiocese-year)



## **Appendix G. Emails Sent to Professors to Define Must-Do Cases**

En mi trabajo *considero grupos disidentes* a los siguientes tipos de asociaciones: partidos políticos, sindicatos, instituciones religiosas/ecuménicas, ONGs de derechos humanos, asociaciones de estudiantes, asociaciones de profesionales, grupos poblacionales, juntas de vecinos, agrupaciones de víctimas, agrupaciones de mujeres (feministas, por ejemplo), grupos de arte y resistencia cultural, y grupos armados/terroristas.

Clarificación: No hay necesidad de que usted escoja grupos de todos estos tipos – es sólo para clarificar lo que estoy abarcando con esta definición.

Quisiera una *lista de grupos disidentes que usted considere importante de acuerdo a los siguientes criterios*:

### ***Los criterios más importantes***

- Los grupos que fueron más reprimidos por el gobierno y los menos reprimidos por el gobierno.
- Los grupos más “astutos” en cómo manejaron o evadieron la represión, así como también los menos “astutos” en esta misma área.
- Los grupos que tuvieron más impacto en la resistencia contra la dictadura y en el trabajo que se hizo para que regresara la democracia.

### ***Criterios un poco menos importantes***

- Los grupo más grandes (los más exitosos en términos del número de participantes o personas involucradas en la organización), así como también los más chicos que no pudieron crecer.
- Los más exitosos en términos de cohesión interna: sin facciones (o con pocas facciones), sin muchas riñas internas, etc. Así como también los más fragmentados, con más riñas.
- Los grupos con un nivel alto de formalización de la organización, así como también los menos y más informales.



## Appendix H. Representative List of Opposition Groups to be Fully Coded

Name	Post-coup?	Type
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)	0	political party
Partido Humanista (PH)	1	political party
MAPU-OC (MOC)	0	political party
Partido Radical Socialista Democratico (PRSD)/ Partido Radical-Luengo	1	political party
Partido Comunista (PC)	0	political party
Partido Socialista (PS)	0	political party
Partido Socialista-Almeydista/ PS-Almeyda	1	political party
Partido Socialista-Movimiento Recuperacionista	1	political party
Union Popular/ Unidad Popular (UP)	0	political party
Partido Demócrata Cristiano/ Democracia Cristiana (DC/ PDC)	0	political party
Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP)	1	political party
Grupo por la Convergencia Socialista	1	political party
Grupo de los 8 (aunque eran 9)	1	political party
Union Socialista Popular (USOPO)	0	political party
Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR)	0	political party
Union Comunista Revolucionaria	0	political party
Partido de Izquierda Radical/ Movimiento Radical de Izquierda Independiente	0	political party
Accion Popular Independiente (API)	0	political party
Partido Social Democrata	0	political party
Partido Liberal	0	political party
Intransigencia Democratica	1	political party
Partido Democratico Nacional (PADENA)	0	political party
Partido Republicano	1	political party
Grupo de los 13 o ANDE	1	political party
Grupo de los Siete	1	labor union
Cordon Industrial Estacion Central	0	labor union
Federacion Nacional Textil	0	labor union
Federacion Industrial Ferroviaria de Chile	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de OO. de la Construcccion de la Provincia de Santiago	0	labor union
Federacion Personal Conservacion y Revision	0	labor union
Sindicato Estrella de Chile de Talagante	0	labor union
Agrupacion Trabajadores Inds. Zaror	0	labor union
Agrupacion Trabajadores Inds. Besser	0	labor union
Sindicato Nacional de Talleres Metalurgicos	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Sigdo Koopers	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Julio Serra B.	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Jacobo Duchler	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Confecines Luvy	0	labor union

Sindicato Industrial de Fabrica de Camisas Gual y Cia.	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Lanificio Panamericana S.A. (textil)	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Farnesa	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Socometal	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Selleros	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional EE.PP. Metalurgica Cerrillos	0	labor union
Sindicato profesional Obreros Gasfiter, Calefaccionistas y Obras Sanitarias	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Prov. De EE. De Casa Particulares	0	labor union
Asociacion Nacional de Empleados de Impuestos Internos ANEII	0	labor union
Asociacion Nacional de Empleados de Tesoreria	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial CTI FENSA MADEMSA	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Termokohn	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Mixto F.A.B. (plastico)	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Femosa	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de Trabajadores de la Asociacion Chilena de Seguridad	0	labor union
Asociacion de Obreros de Obras Sanitarias "ANODOS"	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Vidrios Planos Cerrillos	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Opici de Deo	0	labor union
Sindicato Imagro	0	labor union
Sindicato Unico Maestranza Maipu	0	labor union
Sindicato Ind. Talleres Metalurgicos Tamet	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de la Companiia Tecno Industrial CTI	0	labor union
Sindicato de Actores de Radio y Television (SIDARTE)	0	labor union
Sindicato Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones HABITAT	1	labor union
Sindicato Interempresa de Trabajadores de Locomocion Linea Recoleta-Lira	NA	labor union
Sindicato Interempresa de Trabajadores del Programa de absorcion de la cesantia PIMO	1	labor union
Comision Nacional Campesina	1	labor union
Asociacion de Funcionarios del Hospital Clinico Jose Joaquin Aguirre	1	labor union
Consejo de Trabajadores de la Vicaria	1	labor union
Sindicato Dos en Uno	1	labor union
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Computacion	1	labor union
Sindicato de la Industrial Textil Yarur	0	labor union
Confederacion de Trabajadores del Sector Privado	0	labor union
Sindicato de la Industria Textil Lanificio Panamericano	0	labor union
Comite de Cesantes de Panal	1	labor union
Confederacion Gastronomic, Hoteleros, de la Alimentacion y Actividades Similares	1	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de Empleados de la Papelera	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial de la Papelera	0	labor union
Comite Permanente del Episcopado	0	faith-based
Vicaria de la Solidaridad	1	faith-based

Comite Pro Paz/ El Comite de Cooperacion para la Paz en Chile (COPACHI)	1	faith-based
Comite 2	1	faith-based
Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC)	1	faith-based
EPES (Educacion Popular en Salud)	1	faith-based
Fundacion Cardijn	0	faith-based
Sagrados Corazones	0	faith-based
Vicaria Pastoral de Obrera	1	faith-based
Movimiento Familiar Cristiano	1	faith-based
Comite de Ayuda Fraterna de la Poblacion San Luis	1	faith-based
Comunidad Cristiana de Villa Francia	1	faith-based
Comunidades Cristianas de Base de la Parroquia El Senior de Renca	0	faith-based
Instituto de Difusion Social (INDISO)	0	faith-based
Oficina Nacional de Catequesis (ONAC)	0	faith-based
Accion Catolica Especializada	0	faith-based
Coordinadora de Comunidades Cristianas de Sectores Populares	1	faith-based
Servicio Evangelico para el Desarrollo (SEPADE)	1	faith-based
Comunidad Cristiana de La Victoria	1	faith-based
Parroquia Nuestra Seniora de La Victoria	0	faith-based
Comunidades Cristianas de Estudiantes Fiscales (COCEF)	1	faith-based
Ayuda Cristiana Evangelica (ACE)	0	faith-based
Decanato Santa Rosa	0	faith-based
Comite de Defensa de Derechos Humanos y Sindicales (CODEHS)	0	human rights NGO
Coordinadora de Organizaciones por los Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Comision Chilena de Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Comite de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (CODEPU)	1	human rights NGO
Comision de Ayuda a los Refugiados (COMAR)	1	human rights NGO
Programa de Apoyo Laboral (PRAL)	1	human rights NGO
PIDEE (Proteccion a la Infancia Daniada por los Estados de Emergencia)	1	human rights NGO
Servicio de Paz y Justicia/ Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ)	1	human rights NGO
Centro de Asesoría y Promocion Electoral del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Coordinadora Nacional de Entidades Humanitarias	1	human rights NGO
Coordinacion de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales	0	human rights NGO
Fundacion INVICA (institucion de apoyo a los organismos sociales)	0	human rights NGO
Familiares de Jose Manuel Parada, Santiago Nattino y Manuel Guerrero (red)	1	human rights NGO
Comite de derechos humanos "Pacem in Terris"	1	human rights NGO
Comite de Activacion por la Vigencia de los Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Amnistia Chile	0	human rights NGO
Comite de Defensa de Derechos Humanos y Sindicales (CODES)	0	human rights NGO
Instituto Latinoamericano de Sicologia/Salud Mental y Derechos Humanos (ILAS)	1	professionals
Colegio de Psicologos	0	professionals

Comite Imprenta Central	0	professionals
Comite Litografia Americana	0	professionals
Colegio Nacional de Periodistas	0	professionals
Cruzada CIVITAS	1	professionals
Escuela Nueva Comunicacion	1	professionals
Instituto Latinoamericano de Salud Mental	1	professionals
Cetro de Investigacion y Asesoría Sindical (CIASI)	1	professionals
Colegio de Arquitectos	0	professionals
CENPROS	1	professionals
Comite Intergubernamental de Migraciones	0	professionals
Asociacion de Academicos de la Universidad Catolica	0	professionals
Asociacion Nacional de Prensa	0	professionals
Asociacion de Academicos de la Universidad de Santiago	1	professionals
Colegio de Dentistas	0	professionals
Coordinadora de Colegios Profesionales por el fin al Exilio	1	professionals
Asociacion Chilena de Agencias de Publicidad	0	professionals
Comision de Abogados por la Democracia	1	professionals
Circuitos Profesionales de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano	1	professionals
Union de Jovenes Democraticos	1	students
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh)	0	students
Estudiantes del Pedagogico	0	students
Estudiantes de la Universidad Tecnologica de Chile (INACAP)	0	students
Grupo de ayunantes Humanistas Cristianos estudiantes	1	students
Centro de Estudiantes de Economía de la Universidad de Chile	0	students
Centro de Alumnas Liceo Santiago de Ninas	0	students
Coordinadora Estudiantil de Actividades Solidarias	1	students
Servicios Culturales Universitarios	1	students
Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios (FESES)	0	students
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Santiago (FEUSACH)	1	students
Centro de Alumno de Leyes de la Universidad de Chile	0	students
Accion Democratica Estudiantil	1	students
Comite Democratico de Ingenieria en Computacion (USACH)	1	students
Alumnos Democraticos de la UC	1	students
Comite de Sancionados USACH	1	students
Centro de Alumnos de Geografía de la UC	0	students
Centro de Alumnos de Teatro UC	0	students
Centro de Alumnos de Historia UC	0	students
Agrupacion de Alumnos Sancionados de las Universidades de Chile y Tecnica del Estado	1	students
Coordinacion de organizaciones de mujeres MEMCH-83	1	women's rights
Cooperativa por Soledad Larrain, Aida Moreno, Eliana Largo y Coty Silva	1	women's rights
Movimiento de Mujeres Pobladoras MOMUPO	1	women's rights


Comite de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de la Mujer	1	women's rights
Mujeres de Chile	1	women's rights
Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios	1	women's rights
RIDEM	1	women's rights
Arpilleristas Zona Oriente	1	women's rights
Talleres Solidarios de la Parroquia Nuestra Senora Reina de los Apostoles	1	women's rights
Departamento Femenino de la Coordinadora Nacional Sindical	1	women's rights
Agrupacion de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD)	1	victims' groups
Familiares de las personas procesadas miembros de la Fuerza Aerea en el "proceso FACH"	1	victims' groups
Agrupaciones de Familiares de Ejecutados Politicos (AFEP)	1	victims' groups
Agrupaciones de Familiares de Relegados y Ex- Relegados (AFAREL)	1	victims' groups
Coordinadora de Agrupaciones de Familiares de Victimas de la Represion (umbrella)	1	victims' groups
Red informal Orellana	1	victims' groups
Movimiento contra la tortura Sebastian Acevedo/ Movimiento Sebastian Acevedo	1	victims' groups
Campania por la Vida	1	victims' groups
Comite Pro Retorno de Exiliados (CPRE)	1	victims' groups
Agrupacion de Padres de Universitarios Detenidos	1	victims' groups
Familiares de muertos en presuntos enfrentamientos en 1981	1	victims' groups
Comite de Familiares de Exiliados	1	victims' groups
Las Brigadas del Pueblo (BP)	1	armed
Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR)	1	armed
Convergencia 19 de abril (ex Militantes Rojos)	1	armed
Comando Lumi Videla	1	armed
Comando Ambrosio Badilla	1	armed
Comando Juan Antono Trujillo	1	armed
Milicias de la Resistencia Popular	1	armed
Mando Nacional de las Milicias de la Resistencia Popular	1	armed
Comando Miliciano Martires de Lonquen	1	armed
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores La Victoria	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores El Teniente Merino	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores/ La Legua	0	neighborhood
Fundacion para la Accion Vecinal y Comunitaria (AVEC)	1	neighborhood
Movimiento Poblacional Dignidad/ Dignidad	1	neighborhood
Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sociales Populares	1	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Renca	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion San Ramon	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Estacion Central	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion La Pitana	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Melipilla	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Cerro Navia	0	neighborhood

Comedor San Daniel	1	neighborhood
Comedor Infantil Poblacion Monte II	1	neighborhood
Centro El Cortijo	1	neighborhood
Comedor Infantil Poblacion Monte II	1	neighborhood
Comedor Los Cruceros	1	neighborhood
Comedores Barrancas Norte	1	neighborhood
Comedor San Pablo	1	neighborhood
Taller "El Esfuerzo"	1	neighborhood
Talleres de Mujeres Pobladoras	1	neighborhood
Programa Metodista de Salud Integral (PROMESI)	1	neighborhood
Comite de Derechos Humanos de la Villa Mexico	1	neighborhood
Ollas Comunes de San Bernardo	1	neighborhood
Olla comun de La Victoria	1	neighborhood
Sociedad de Talleres Artesanales de Conchali	1	neighborhood
Unidad vecinal N 14 de la poblacion "Dos de Marzo" de San Miguel	1	neighborhood
Centro de Educacion y Tecnologia (CET)	1	neighborhood
Huertos Familiares de la Poblacion Huamachuco 2	1	neighborhood
Comite de los Sin Casa de Santa Adriana	1	neighborhood
Organismos Juveniles de las Unidades Vecinales de La Legua	1	neighborhood
Comunidad Juvenil de la Parroquia San Pedro y San Pablo	0	neighborhood
El Colectivo Muralista La Garrapata	1	art/ cultural
Las Brigadas Ramona Parra (BRP)	0	art/ cultural
Servicios Culturales "Puelche"	1	art/ cultural
Casa Folclorica "Donia Javiera Carrera"	1	art/ cultural
Centro Cultural Catolico de Renca	0	art/ cultural
Compania de Teatro Ictus	0	art/ cultural
Centro "El Canelo de Nos" (educacion, region metro)	1	art/ cultural
Taller Sur	0	art/ cultural
Grupo Zapallo	1	art/ cultural
Corporacion Nacional Pro-Defensa de la Paz	1	art/ cultural
Casa de la Cultura Andre Jarlan	1	art/ cultural
Comite Neruda 80 anios	1	art/ cultural
Academia Chilena de la Lengua	0	art/ cultural
Teatro Urbano Contemporaneo (TEUMO)	1	art/ cultural
Grupo de Teatro La Feria	1	art/ cultural
Grupo Illapu	0	art/ cultural
Grupo de Teatro Aleph	0	art/ cultural
Proyecto de Desarrollo para un Concenso Nacional (PRODEN)	1	informal/ protest
Alianza Democratica	1	informal/ protest
Liga Comunista	0	informal/ protest
Movimiento Libertad	1	informal/ protest


Acuerdo Nacional por el NO (ACUSO)	1	informal/ protest
Asociacion de Jubilados Dependientes de la Caja Bancaria de pensiones	0	informal/ protest
Programa Regional del Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe de la OIT (PREALC)	1	informal/ protest
Movimiento Solidaridad Familiar	1	informal/ protest
Frente Contra las Unidades de Fomento	1	informal/ protest
Mesa de Concertacion Social del CNT	1	informal/ protest
Comite Pro Libertad de Expresion	1	informal/ protest
Comite Juvenil Pro Retorno de Exiliados	1	informal/ protest

Appendix I. Additional Figures from Findings

1974 Alliances:




1975 Alliances:







*1976 Alliances:*




*1979 Alliances:*




*1980 Alliances:*




*1981 Alliances:*




*1982 Alliances:*




*1984 Alliances:*



*1985 Alliances:*



*1986 Alliances:*



*1987 Alliances:*

